The U.S.-led reconstruction effort has so far failed to establish democratic institutions in Iraq. But as troubled as that effort has been, it provides valuable lessons for future nation-building endeavors.

Events in Ukraine have inspired most people living in the free world. Ukrainian democrats stood together in the freezing cold to demand from their government what we citizens of democracies take for granted: the right to elect their leaders in free and fair elections. But not all observers of Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" are so elated. Instead of democracy's advance, some see a U.S.-funded, White House-orchestrated conspiracy to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty, weaken Russia's sphere of influence, and expand Washington's imperial reach. These skeptics range from Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia, Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela to Republican Representative Ron Paul of Texas, columnist Patrick Buchanan, and left-wingers at the Nation and the Guardian.

Since the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush has rhetorically pledged to make the promotion of democracy abroad a primary objective of U.S. foreign policy, emphasizing the moral and strategic imperatives for advancing freedom around the world. At the same time, the United States has become both less liked and less admired by governments and societies around the world. Although its roots are deep, this latest spike in anti-Americanism comes largely as the result of Bushs most significant foreign policy initiative, the invasion of Iraq, which has been extremely unpopular both in democratic and nondemocratic states. In its history, the United States has probably never before suffered such a low international standing.

Several influential commentators have suggested recently that democratization in developing countries produces political instability, ethnic conflict, and poor economic outcomes. The authors of this paper show that the data do not support the view that democratization is bad for economic performance. Our analysis reveals that major democratic transitions have, if anything, a positive effect on economic growth in the short run. This is especially true for the poorest countries of the world and those that are marked by sharp ethnic divisions. Democratizations tend to follow periods of low growth rather than precede them. Moreover, democratic transitions are associated with a decline in growth volatility. Systematic analysis therefore uncovers a picture that is considerably more favorable to democratization.

Although interest among sociologists in the consolidation and expansion of an international human rights regime has grown in recent years, little attention is accorded the formal procedures that allow individuals aggrieved by states to appeal directly to an international audience. Using data for 82 countries between 1976 and 1999, this article examines the political and cultural factors that affect the number and rate of individual human rights abuse claims filed with Human Rights Committee. Negative binomial and event history analyses indicate that a country's favorable human rights practices, political democracy, and membership in most non-Western civilizations significantly reduce the number and rate of claims emanating from a country. Conversely, extensive participation in international non-governmental organizations, membership in Western civilization, and intra-state diffusion processes increase the number and rate of claims filed against a country. Other factors, including post-communist regime changes, state participation in international governmental organizations, the World Human Rights Conference, and GDP per capita, have no impact. Results suggest that claims alleging state abuse of human rights

1. increase as a country's human rights practices worsen;
   
2. decline as effective means of recourse become available domestically; and
   
3. increase with the cultural empowerment of individuals.

A unique publication exploring the opportunities for addressing ten of the most serious challenges facing the world today: Climate Change, Communicable Diseases, Conflicts, Education, Financial Instability, Corruption, Migration, Malnutrition and Hunger, Trade Barriers, Access to Water. In a world fraught with problems and challenges, we need to gauge how to achieve the greatest good with our money. Global Crises, Global Solutions provides a rich set of arguments and data for prioritising our response most effectively. Each problem is introduced by a world-renowned expert defining the scale of the problem and describing the costs and benefits of a range of policy options to improve the situation. Each challenge is evaluated by economists from North America, Europe and China who attempt a ranking of the most promising options. Whether you agree or disagree with the analysis or conclusions, Global Crises, Global Solutions provides a serious, yet accessible, springboard for debate and discussion.

The new millennium began with the triumph of democracy and markets. But for whom is life just, how so, and why? And what is being done to correct persisting injustices? Blending macro-level global and national analysis with in-depth grassroots detail, the contributors highlight roots of injustices, how they are perceived, and efforts to alleviate them. Following up on issues raised in the groundbreaking best-seller Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements (California, 2001), these essays elucidate how conceptions of justice are socially constructed and contested and historically contingent, shaped by people's values and institutionally grounded in real-life experiences. The contributors, a stellar coterie of North and Latin American scholars, offer refreshing new insights that deepen our understanding of social justice as ideology and practice.

Ideally, a body of law comprises a set of coherent and consistent rules. These rules contribute to the creation of an environment that is predictable, efficacious, and just. Most international lawyers hope, expect, or believe that such a body of a law can exist for international system. This is a fool's errand.

Clear bodies of international law may develop in specific issue areas, but only if they create self-enforcing equilibria; that is, if the relevant parties, those with the ability to violate the rule, believe that they would be worse off if they did. Even when self-enforcing equilibria do exist, they last only so long as the interests and capabilities of actors, which may always change, generate a structure of payoffs that induces continued rule adherence. Many issues, including core questions related to sovereignty, will never be able to generate self-enforcing equilibria in the first place.