Despite the early prospects for bipartisan unity on terrorism initiatives, government gridlock continues on most major issues in the wake of the 2004 elections. In this fully revised edition, political scientists David W. Brady and Craig Volden demonstrate that gridlock is not a product of divided government, party politics, or any of the usual scapegoats. It is, instead, an instrumental part of American government-built into our institutions and sustained by leaders acting rationally not only to achieve set goals but to thwart foolish inadvertencies. Looking at key legislative issues from the divided government under Ronald Reagan, through Clinton's Democratic government, to complete unified Republican control under George W. Bush, the authors clearly and carefully analyze important crux points in lawmaking: the swing votes, the veto, the filibuster, and the rise of tough budget politics. They show that when it comes to government gridlock, it doesn't matter who's in the White House or who's in control of Congress. Political gridlock is as American as apple pie, and its results may ultimately be as sweet in ensuring stability and democracy.

The collapse of communism did not lead smoothly or quickly to the

consolidation of liberal democracy in Europe and the former Soviet

Union. At the time of regime change, from 1989 into the first few years

of the 1990s, popular democratic movements in the three Baltic states,

Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Eastern Germany, and western Czechoslovakia

translated initial electoral victories into consolidated liberal

democracy. These quick and successful democratic breakthroughs were

the exception, however. Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and eastern

Czechoslovakia (after 1992 known simply as Slovakia) failed to consolidate

liberal democracy soon after communism collapsed. Yet in time,

the gravitational force of the European Union did much to draw these

countries onto a democratic path.

Expanded version published in Russian as " Path of Postcommunist Transformation: Comparative Analysis of Democratic Breakthroughs in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine,"

in Pro et Contra, No. 2 (29) 2005, pp. 92-107

This report on the United Nations is a call for action. It is a call for concrete action now. In December 2004, the U.S. Congress, at the behest of Representative Frank Wolf, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Appropriations for Commerce, Justice, and the State, mandated the establishment of a bipartisan Task Force on the United Nations. The legislation stipulated that the Task Force, to be organized by the United States Institute of Peace, should report to Congress within six months with its conclusions and recommendations on how to make the United Nations more effective in realizing the goals of its Charter. Task Force members, experts, and staff have worked energetically to carry out this mandate. This has involved extensive research, numerous interviews and meetings with organizations, and fact-finding missions around the world.

We provide a simple framework relating cultural distance, genetic distance and differences in income per capita. We estimate the model empirically by regressing current income differences between pairs of countries on measures of geographical and genetic distance ("coancestor coefficients"). We find a significant effect of genetic distance on income differences, while geographical distance (i.e., geodesic distance between major cities) is negative and insignificant when genetic distance is controlled for. Differences in latitude across countries help explain income differences even when genetic distance is controlled for, which is consistent with Jared Diamond's hypothesis regarding a Eurasian advantage in development. We uncover similar patterns of coefficients for differences in human capital, institutions, population growth, and investment rates. Finally, we estimate the structural effects of differences in institutions, human capital, population growth, and investment rates on differences in income per capita using our set of geographic and genetic distances as instruments. Overall, our findings support the view that environmental and cultural barriers play an important role in the diffusion of innovations and development across countries.

Proponents of foreign-led state building or shared sovereignty arrangements have exaggerated the ability of powerful states to foster institutions in developing countries. The empirical record, from successful outcomes in Germany and Japan to dismal failures across the global South, shows foreign forces are heavily constrained by antecedent local capacity. The societies alleged to be most in need of strong institutions have proven the least tractable for foreign administration. Rather than transmitting new modes of organization, would-be state builders have relied upon existing structures for governance. This dependence on the very context that was intended for change shows that foreign state builders wield very little infrastructural power. They are consistently unable to implement political decisions through the subject population. Contrary to recent arguments that sustained effort and area expertise can enable success, external state building has foundered despite such investments. Understanding why foreign-led state building continues to fail is crucial for redirecting intervention where it can be more effective. Advocates of humanitarian assistance should consider the merits of smaller, regenerative projects that can respond better to uncertainty and avoid the perils of large-scale political engineering.

In the coming years, few if any countries will more preoccupy the foreign policy attention of the United States than Iran. The United States has long lacked a viable and coherent policy toward Iran. Perhaps for the first time since the fall of the Shah's regime in 1979, the United States seems determined to try to forge one. The United States must move swiftly to chart a bold, new course that addresses all three of America's principal national interests with Iran. Our policy should seek to halt the development of an Iranian nuclear bomb, to end the regime's support of terrorist groups, and to help the democratic movement in Iran. Each of these goals is vital, but they are also intertwined. Compared to autocracies, democracies are more transparent about their foreign policy intentions and their military capabilities. Only when we have a government in Iran that is truly accountable to its people and to the rule of law will we be able to achieve a permanent and verifiable halt to that country's pursuit of nuclear weapons and its support of international terrorism.