Like almost every discussion about Russia in the last ten years, the post-mortem on Russia's recent parliamentary election has polarized simplistically between "optimists" and "pessimists." Optimists argue that people voted, parties participated, the process was free and fair, and the outcome was a victory for "reform." Pessimists believe people did not care, parties did not matter, the process was rigged, and the outcome was a setback for "reform."

In the wake of the August 1998 financial meltdown, many predicted that political breakdown would soon follow. Throughout the summer and fall, Russian analysts of all political orientations began to speak openly and often about the specter of Russian fascism should the economic crisis continue. Others, including even Yeltsin, have warned about coup plots aimed at toppling Russia's fragile democracy. The threat of Russian federal dissolution also loomed as a possible nightmare scenario as individual regional leaders began to deal with the economic crisis with little regard for national laws or national interests. In this new political context, challenges to Russian electoral democracy have proliferated. Before August 1998, it was taboo to speak of, let alone advocate, alternatives to elections as the method for selecting political leaders. After August 1998, discussions of alternatives have renewed again.

Although few in Washington have noticed, US-Russian relations have entered a new era with the NATO bombing of Serbia.

The Clinton Administration was right to reject Slobodan Milosevic's cease-fire proposal -- entering into negotiations now with Serbia, which has largely achieved its military goals in Kosovo before NATO has achieved much of anything, would be an admission of defeat.

Only a few weeks ago, Russia was one of the most downtrodden and detested countries in the eyes of Washington's elite. One could not utter the word "Russia" without adding adjectives such as "crime- ridden," "collapsing" or "corrupt." Russia was considered a basket case of a country that had failed at capitalism and democracy and was soon to fail as a state. Russia's reputation in the United States was so bad that Russian businesspeople began courting American public relations firms to help rectify Russia's image.

The "who lost Russia" debate reveals more about US electoral politics than it does about Russian realities. Russia is midstream in a social revolution. In only a few short years, the borders of the state, the nature of the economic system, and the organization of the polity have undergone fundamental, simultaneous change. Our current focus on Russian corruption obscures our understanding of this triple transition.

With the United States fixated on crime and corruption in Russia, Russians obsess about two other dramas: upcoming parliamentary elections and the war in the Caucasus region. The first drama might well have a happy ending, rare for Russian dramas these days. The second is almost certainly a tragedy in the making. Worse, the war in the Caucasus may eventually subsume elections altogether, resulting in their cancellation, civil resistance and even civil war. Before such a scenario gains more momentum, U.S. officials should look beyond Russian corruption and do what they can to lower the probability of democratic collapse in Russia.

According to conventional wisdom, the United States "lost" Russia in the 1990s. This

assessment can be found on the pages of The Nation, The Washington Times, The New

York Times magazine, or foreign policy issue papers prepared for presidential candidate

George W. Bush. These attacks fall into two contradictory categories. One school holds

that the policies pursued by the United States over the last decade have failed to establish capitalism and democracy in Russia, and instead have fueled corruption, crime, and ill will towards the United States. The other school argues that the United States was wrong to try to engineer domestic change within Russia in the first place.