We assess the factors affecting national administrative rationalization in the context of the current worldwide movement for governance reforms. Focusing on indicators of corruption control, the rule of law, bureaucratic effectiveness, and investment openness, we conduct cross-national and longitudinal analyses for the period 1985-2002. First, we find a modest overall expansion of rationalization in countries worldwide, with the most substantial changes occurring in developing countries and previously communist countries. Change is mostly on the specific indicator of investment openness. Second, we find that national change tends to reflect links with global society - expanded trade, the penetration of scientific logics, and embeddedness in world organizational activity play prominent roles. We conclude, then, that the rationalization of national governance, as with a good many other dimensions of modernization, is not simply or principally a consequence of endogenous national development or social complexity. Rather, it directly reflects international trade, and institutional linkages with wider rationalizing movements in the current context of a neoliberal world polity.

This paper presents an institution - the Community Responsibility System (CRS) - which presents a missing link in our understanding of market development. The CRS fostered market expansion throughout pre-modern Europe by providing the contract enforcement required for impersonal exchange characterized by separation between the quid and the quo over time and space. It supported market expansion because it did not entail the high marginal cost of establishing new exchange relationships based on a reputation mechanism or the high fixed cost associated with establishing an effective centralized legal system. Merchant communes, motivated by concern over their collective reputations, utilized their local and partial intra-community legal institutions to discipline members who cheated in inter-community exchange and to create the organizational infrastructure required for anonymous merchants to credibly reveal their identities. The CRS endogenously declined as the trade it fostered undermined its self-enforceability. Depending on the prevailing political conditions, it was gradually replaced by a centralized legal system based on personal (rather than collective) legal responsibility and supported by the state. This institutional dynamic supports the view that long-distance trade impacts economic growth through its influence on intra-state institutional development.

A recurring theme in the sociology of education is that schooling produces citizenship or a sense of membership in the nation-state. Much of the literature on civic education explores this theme, either lamenting school failures in this arena or fearing that hyper-successful schools will create massive conformity. Different though these perspectives are they share the premise that schooling is designed to produce national citizens with the national heritage and the nation-state as the crucial and bounded referential standards. This premise is challenged by the development of the human rights movement and its more recent human rights education focus. Human rights has emerged as an influential discourse and this discourse is changing from a solely legal to a broader human rights education focus. Civic education, once the central curricular area for teaching national citizenship, now teaches global citizenship and incorporates a rights discourse that extend beyond national borders.

This paper establishes empirically the existence of structural convergence: country pairs that converge in terms of per capita income also tend to converge in terms of their sectoral similarity, measured by the bilateral correlation of their sectoral labor shares. This is a robust feature of the data at various levels of sectoral disaggregation and data coverage. We shed light on some explanations for structural similarity, chiefly trade related determinants. Convergence in relative factor abundance accounts for approximately 1/3 of the extent of structural convergence. We argue that the existence of structural convergence has important implications for our understanding of business cycles transmission, of long-run development patterns and of the dynamics of specialization.

This paper revisits the empirical evidence on the relationship between economic integration and economic growth. First, we present an updated dataset of openness indicators and trade liberalization dates for a wide cross-section of countries in the 1990s. Second, we extend the Sachs and Warner (1995) study of the relationship between trade openness and economic growth to the 1990s, discussing recent criticisms of their measurement and estimation framework. Our results suggest that the cross-sectional findings of Sachs and Warner are sensitive to the period under consideration. In particular, an updated version of their dichotomous trade policy openness indicator does not enter significantly in growth regressions for the 1990s. Third, and most importantly, we present new evidence on the time paths of economic growth, physical capital investment and openness around episodes of trade policy liberalization. In sharp contrast to our cross-sectional results, we find that liberalization has, on average, robust positive effects on growth, openness and investment rates within countries. We illustrate these large sample findings with detailed case studies in a subsample of representative countries.

Morally and analytically, there is no more vexing phenomenon than the persistence of mass poverty. Over the past half-century, remarkable gains have been made in reducing infant mortality, extending life expectancy, raising levels of income and education, reducing the incidence of severe diseases-and even effectively eliminating a few diseases (USAID, 2003). Huge investments of intellectual analysis, empirical research, and development assistance have been invested in the quest to eliminate, or at least dramatically reduce, absolute poverty, which leaves an individual left to survive on less than $2, or even $1, per day. Yet absolute poverty persists on a mass scale throughout much of what has been termed-unfortunately, rather "euphemistically"-the "developing" world. Why?

The past two decades have seen a worldwide shift to markets. Globalization has opened domestic markets to international competition. The ex-communist countries have converted themselves, to varying degrees, into market economies. In the low-income countries, privatization has shrunk state production. The results of this expansion of markets have been mixed. What lessons does the experience with reform, in both ex-communist and developing countries, hold for future developing-country reformers?