Enrique Peña Nieto was elected Mexico's president promising to curb the drug-related violence that exploded during Felipe Calderon’s past six years in office. His victory means the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, will return to power after being defeated 12 years ago in the country’s first truly democratic election.

The PRI has a complicated history of corruption. But it also built a reputation for guaranteeing political stability and making the peace among Mexican post-revolutionary warlords during its 71 years as the country’s ruling party.

Associate professor of political science Beatriz Magaloni talks about what to expect from Peña Nieto, what his policies may mean for Mexican-U.S. relations, and how his government would likely allow drug cartels some freedom to operate in exchange for the promise of peace.

Magaloni is the director of the Program on Poverty and Governance at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

What do we know about Enrique Peña Nieto? Who is he?

His campaign slogan was “Because you know me.” But the paradox is that nobody knows him at all. He’s been the governor of Mexico State for six years, but he doesn’t have a particularly good or impressive record. There hasn’t been a lot of scrutiny of his performance, and people perceive him as a product of the media. He’s married to a soap opera star, and he’s known for his good looks – but also his shallowness. He was asked to list three books that have influenced him, and he had a lot of trouble answering the question.

Peña Nieto is the new face of an old party. What did the PRI accomplish in its 71 years of power?

Mexico had a social revolution in 1910. After the revolution there was continuous violence for almost two decades, and the PRI was created to put an end to the violence by bringing together all the post-revolutionary warlords into one single organization. The idea was they would stop killing each other and as long as they joined this organization, they would be guaranteed a piece of the pie.

The party did tame violence in Mexico, and that’s a big accomplishment. The party also has a history of social reform. They organized massive land redistribution, expanded welfare benefits to workers and oversaw moderate economic growth.

But the PRI was so successful in monopolizing power that they became increasingly corrupt. In the end, the corruption wound up destroying Mexico’s development. By the time of the PRI loss in 2000, we had more than 20 years of economic catastrophe. There was huge inflation, devaluation, unemployment, and a lot of corruption that was exceedingly destructive.

What does corruption in Mexico look like today, and how can it be addressed?

The relationships among cartels, police and politicians are very complicated throughout the country. Mexico has 31 states and one federal district. There are more than 2,400 municipalities, each with its own police force. There are also state and federal police. There are about 15 cartels, and as many as 10 different gangs operating in many of the larger cities. So in each region, you never know who the police are really working for.

The drug trade is so profitable that there are huge incentives for vast sectors of Mexican society to participate. You have to offer people opportunities and chances to make money outside of the drug market. You have to give civil society groups the room they need to grow and influence communities. Tijuana has been successful in turning things around. There was a big push to engage entrepreneurs and make them understand it was up to them to reclaim the city. They helped support the arts and culture. And, most importantly, they gave young people opportunities.

There have been at least 50,000 drug-related killings during Calderon’s term. Why has it been such a bloody six years?

This is a big debate. Some people blame Calderon’s policy of attacking the cartels, which they say forced them to strike back with more force. They say that if he didn’t do that, Mexico wouldn’t be as violent as it is now. Implicit in that critique is that Mexico shouldn’t have done anything about the drug problem. This is the argument that PRI is capitalizing on now – this notion that things were better off when we did nothing.

The other argument from Calderon and his supporters is that criminal organizations were already out of control when he took office. He said cartels were the de facto power holders in vast areas of the territory throughout Mexico, and the government had to do something about it to regain control.

How will the drug war shift?

Peña Nieto says he’s going to control the violence more than fight the cartels. So that’s implying that you have to let the cartels operate. Wars are ended with either a pact or a victory. There can be no victory as long as the drug market is as lucrative as it is. So you need a pact that says as long as the cartels don’t kill or kidnap or do violence, they can operate. But the problem with that is they will continue to be extremely powerful and in control of state institutions. It is very hard to draw the line between that kind of pact and absolute state corruption. I fear it’s hard to reach that pact without acknowledging that Mexico will never have rule of law.

It is clear that we cannot continue with the violence as it is. That’s the biggest thing that needs to be addressed. People are suffering so much. Crimes are not being solved. There is no real sense of justice.

As Mexico’s neighbor and the largest consumer of drugs moving out of Mexico, what role does the United States need to play in reducing the violence?

Much of the problem is about the demand for drugs in the U.S. That’s the source. But people aren’t going to stop consuming drugs. So you need to do something about the legal nature of drugs. Making all drug use and trafficking into an illegal activity is what’s fueling a lot of the violence. So if you legalize drugs – that doesn’t mean you sell them as freely as you sell alcohol, but you can sell them under legal regulation – I think violence will be reduced. And if the United States doesn’t become more engaged and rethink its policies, the violence is going to eventually come across its borders.

The provision of public goods and services - education, healthcare, sanitation, potable water and other government benefits - are linked to issues of governance. The Program on Poverty and Governance at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) together with the Center for Latin American Studies will host a conference on May 18-19 at Stanford University to explore how governance impacts the provision of public goods and services throughout the world.

The conference will bring together an interdisciplinary group of economists, political scientists, policymakers, and public health researchers to present on-going research on the links between governance and public goods provisions. The conference will also focus on government corruption, electoral clientelism and the critical role of external actors in the provision and delivery of public goods.

According to Beatriz Magaloni, the director of the Program on Poverty and Governance at CDDRL, “A goal of the conference is to present pioneering research on the major issues facing public goods provision in developing economies and to explore a variety of institutional, political, and international factors that work to improve or hinder government capacity and accountability in service delivery.”

Conference speakers include: Stephen D. Krasner, professor of international relations and deputy director of the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University, commenting on external actors and the provision of goods in areas of limited statehood; Stuti Khemani, senior economist at the World Bank, who will speak about information access and public health benefits; Miriam Goldman, visiting research scholar from Princeton University, who will examine corruption and electricity in India; Edward Miguel, director of the Center for Effective Global Action at UC Berkeley, who will present on institutional reform through minority participation; and James D. Fearon, professor of political science at Stanford University and CDDRL affiliated faculty, and David Laitin, professor of political science and Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) affiliated faculty who will both serve as distinguished discussants.

All sessions will be held in the CISAC Conference room, 2^nd floor of Encina Hall Central, and are free and open to the public. To view the complete agenda and RSVP to the conference, please click here.

Adrian Bonifacio, a second generation Filipino-American from Chicago, is one of the recipients of the Program on Human Rights and the McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society's 2012 Human Rights Fellowship.  The Program on Human Rights at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law together with the McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society offer four annual summer fellowships in human rights open to Stanford undergraduates interested in working for organizations, government agencies, NGOs or international organizations that promote or defend human rights.

This summer, Bonifacio will work with the Asian Pacific Mission for Migrants, a non-governmental organization based in Hong Kong that promotes and defends the rights of migrant workers, a majority of whom are Filipino. Filipino immigrants in Hong Kong work predominately as domestic workers. The situation of Filipino diasporas is very complex with more than 10% of the Filipino population abroad, and over 4,000 Filipinos leaving the country every day.

Passionate about Filipino and Filipino-American issues relating to human rights such as migration, exploitation, and servitude, Stanford undergraduate Bonifacio has joined Filipino groups such as Stanford’s Pilipino American Student Union (PASU) and Anakbayan Silicon Valley, a youth organization based in Santa Clara County. He is currently pursuing a major in international relations with a minor in economics as well as co-term masters degree in sociology.

In the 1970s, Filipino dictator Ferdinand Marcos began the Labor Export Policy (LEP), a deliberate policy to send Filipino workers abroad. “This became a vicious cycle, the Philippines tried to achieve economic development based on remittances but because it sends both high skill and low skill workers abroad, and because the remittances they send are not usually put towards investment and long term development, there is not much progress happening in the country," explained Bonifacio. "Every president since Marcos has continued to promote the LEP in the name of national development.”

Last summer, Bonifacio worked for HURIGHTS OSAKA, a human rights non-profit organization, where he conducted research related to Filipino migrants in Japan to understand the link between human rights and remittances. “Although it was difficult integrating with the community in such a limited timeframe, a lot of different opportunities presented themselves—celebrating Philippine Independence Day, cooking Filipino food for events, even performing traditional dances," said Bonifacio. "My supervisor at work and all the migrants I have come to know made my transition into life in Japan, as well as my research, much easier.”

Japan and agencies in the Philippines that facilitate labor migration are notorious for abusing “entertainment visas” which allowed young women to be trafficked into Japan. Many Filipino women were promised jobs in high-end hotels as singers or dancers, but upon arrival in Japan, were trafficked into bars, with some entering prostitution rings and red light districts... Starting in the mid-1980s, many Japanese men in rural areas began to “import” Filipino women as mail-order brides, to solve the demographic problem of low birth rates caused largely by women moving out to cities to pursue professional careers.

Although the mail-order bride phenomenon has died down and Japan has since abolished the entertainment visa in 2006, there are still cases of abuse and human trafficking. Moreover, Filipino men have a history of working in construction, often as day laborers with insecure sources of income and housing. According to Bonifacio, “It is hard to determine the proportion of remittances that come from exploitation, but if you look at general trends and the types of employment Filipinos have all over the world—for example as “entertainers” in Japan or domestic workers in Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, and even the United States—one could say that remittances and exploitation are closely connected.”

In preparation for his fellowship in Hong Kong Bonifacio says, “I was humbled by what I saw in Japan. I think that one of the best things one can do to educate oneself - and something that does not always happen in a classroom - is to understand the community we want to serve. We need to learn about the issues these communities face before considering fighting for change.”

Students interested in applying to the human rights fellowship for the summer of 2013 should contact Nadejda Marques to learn about the selection process and deadline for submission.