Reagan's Unfinished Agenda: Democracy Still Has a Way to Go in Russia
Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
One of the decade's biggest events in Europe is happening at the end of October - the Ukrainian presidential election. The process by which the next leader of Ukraine is decided will determine that country's future orientation for years to come.
If the current government in Ukraine allows for relatively free and fair elections as the process for selecting the president, then Ukraine will be able to maintain the prospect of consolidating democracy and integrating fully into European institutions. If, however, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma does not allow the people to decide who will replace him, and instead wields the power of the state to undermine the democratic process, then Ukraine will have little chance to consolidate democracy, and no chance of further integrating into Europe. Instead of becoming the next Poland, that is a rising power in the heart of Europe, Ukraine will become yet another post-Soviet autocracy, following Russian dictates with no chance at all of joining the Western community of democratic states.
Anatol Lieven is right to cite the West's approach to Turkey as a model for how to engage Russia today ("A different way of talking to Russia," Views, Oct. 18). Western advocates of disengagement and containment are gravely mistaken. Such an approach would only lead to greater conflict with Russia and would further isolate the Russian people from the West.
However, Western leaders and especially EU leaders must not compromise their standards concerning markets and democracy.
In the run-up to the first Putin-Bush summit since George W. Bush's re-election, analysts, columnists, academics and unnamed "senior administration officials" have once again begun to frame the debate about U.S.-Russia relations as one between friends and foes of Russia. This polarization of the discussion about Russia is not only a lingering legacy of the Cold War, but also a contemporary weapon in the public relations campaign to reify division between East and West and subdue serious discussion about growing autocracy inside Russia. The sooner this tired and distorting framework is abandoned, both in Moscow and in Washington, the better.
Lots of ruthless dictators have remained in power during [George W. Bush]'s tenure, but they were in power before Bush came to the White House. Russia is the only major country in the world that has, during Bush's time in office, moved from "partly free" to "not free" (as determined by Freedom House, the leading institution in the democracy assessment business). Vladimir V. Putin is also one of the few leaders in the world with whom Bush has developed a close relationship. If Russian democracy completely breaks down while Bush is still in office, Bush's decision to invest so much time and energy in Putin will look like a strategic mistake.
This article responds to the "Russian Enigma," a series of essays that ran in the November/December 2006 issue of The American Interest. The authors of those essays agree that liberalism in Russia is on its last legs. As to why liberalism in Russia has faltered, however, they differ. Their fears about the consequences of liberalism's failure also range considerably. Who's right?