Well before George W. Bush finally won the U.S. presidency, Vladimir Putin and his surrogates made it clear that they hoped for a Republican victory. Putins team believes that the new Bush team for foreign policy will adopt a more realpolitik philosophy toward international affairs. In their view, this means less attention to pesky issues like human rights, corruption and the war in Chechnya, and more attention to traditional issues of foreign diplomacy such as arms control and great power regulation of regional conflicts.

Russia's state media openly championed the benefits of a George W. Bush victory for Russia. Under Bush, so [Putin]'s people believe, the United States will no longer care about domestic politics in Russia, such as human rights, independent media or the war in Chechnya. With Bush in power, so the thinking goes in Moscow, the Kremlin will have a free hand to roll back democracy in the name of restoring law and order.

Obviously, Putin and his people have a cartoonized understanding of the new Bush administration's foreign policy philosophy, a crude reading of how foreign policy is made in the United States and a flawed historical reading of Nixon's policy toward the Soviet Union. It is not the job of the new Bush team to give history lessons or civics courses about the U.S. policy process to its Russian counterpart. But it is imperative that the new Bush foreign policy team signal clearly and immediately to Moscow its true intentions regarding Russia, which above all else should reflect no nostalgia for the "good old days" of the Cold War era.

The Bush administration cannot interfere in the ownership of a Russian company. Nor can it save independent media in Russia or democracy more generally. Ultimately, only the Russian people can prevent dictatorship from reemerging. The Bush administration can, however, signal clearly and loudly that it sides with the majority of Russians and the brave NTV journalists. Silence only confirms what many of those holed up in the NTV offices already believe: that the new American administration does not care about Russian democracy. Even if these Russians lose their battle to maintain a free and independent media, the Bush administration should position itself on the right side of history in this struggle.

Review of Stephen Cohen's Failed Crusade

Revolutions are often deeply disappointing. As opposition builds to an old regime, hopes for a better future grow exponentially. And when the old regime finally falls, the new utopia is supposed to arrive instantly. It never does. In all revolutions, the destroying of old institutions is easier than the building of new ones, and most great revolutions end in dictatorship -- a fact that ought to be kept in mind by champions of the revolution that brought an end to communism in Russia.

In response to the expulsion of Russian diplomats and the recent meeting between U.S. State Department officials and the Chechen "foreign minister," President Vladimir Putin wisely resisted the temptation to echo the chattering classes in both Washington and Moscow, which declared a return of the Cold War. Putin rightly rejected this false analogy, perhaps because he understands that the ideological divide and the perceived symmetry of power between the two superpowers -- two factors central to Cold War dynamics -- are now gone.

President Bush and his new foreign policy team have announced that they plan to undertake a full review of all aspects of American policy toward Russia on matters like economic assistance, NATO expansion and missile defense. There must be a new agenda, we are told, because the old approach of cooperation and engagement pursued by the Clinton administration has been ineffective. In hinting at the tone of their new policy, Bush administration officials have promised a realist approach, which would presumably include greater attention to Russia's international conduct and less to reforms within Russia.

A year ago, many were asking, who is Vladimir Putin? A valid question in that this junior-level KGB officer had risen to become prime minister and then president of Russia with amazing speed. After being elected as Russia's second post-Soviet president, Putin said all the right things about markets and democracy. For those who had worked to overthrow Soviet communism, the coming to power of a KGB officer in postcommunist Russia could only be seen as tragic. Nonetheless, this new, young, and energetic leader inspired hope with his statements about a new beginning for Russia.

Between a continuation of engagement and a return to containment is a third path: realistic engagement. [Bush] needs to communicate to [Putin] that he believes in the possibility of Russia's integration into Europe and the Western community of states. But he also needs to clearly articulate the real terms of integration, terms that will require Russia to undergo serious political and economic changes. To help Russia integrate into the West, the American strategy must still be engagement, but with more realistic expectations about when, and with real standards for how this integration might occur.

President Bush thus must express his faith in Russia's ability to rejoin Europe as a democratic state with a market economy. Many within Russia do not believe the United States and the new administration in particular want to see Russia as part of the West. Bush should even be so bold as to present NATO membership for Russia as a real goal for the long term. Europe will only be whole and free, a goal Bush's father once articulated, if Russia is a member.

Most Russians still hope their country can become a full-fledged member of Europe. They do not want to become an autocratic ally of China seeking to confront the West. But a decade of disappointed expectations about democracy and markets, coupled with seemingly hostile acts from the West, has fueled doubts about Russia's place in the world. President Bush cannot eliminate this self-doubt overnight, but he can make clear American intentions toward Russia. By articulating a positive but realistic vision for Europe -- whole, free and including Russia -- he can help to reverse Russia's dangerous anti-Western drift.

Media-Most and [Elizabeth Sweet] are the most visible victims of a new [Vladimir V. Putin] policy, codified in Russia's informational-security doctrine, of increased state regulation of the free expression of ideas and the free flow of information in Russia. Following Putin's lead, regional governors have placed practically all local media under state control. Every week, there are accounts of violence toward journalists and the suspension or shutdown of newspapers. At the same time, Putin's regional representatives are creating their own mass media, providing them with money and administrative support.

This weekend, I had been invited by Boris Nemtsov from the Union of Right Forces and Alexei Venediktov from Ekho Moskvy to participate in a conference on freedom of the press in Russia, also co-sponsored by Gazprom-Media. When Venediktov informed me this week that he and his associates were withdrawing from this conference to protest the recent Gazprom takeover of the radio, I decided to do the same. Here are excerpts of what I would have said. All the myths stated below are actual statements that Russians -- senior governmental officials or opposition journalists -- either have said to me personally or wrote in the press. These are assertions Russians have made to me in responding to my criticism of their press.