Gifford Pinchot and Sustainable Forest Management
The year was 1909, and Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester of the United States, faced a terrible personal dilemma. He had discovered a pattern of corruption in the sale of public lands to developers and other private interests. But the new president, William Howard Taft, depended on support from western Republicans and had placed a gag order on the whole affair. Pinchot was outraged at this evidence of corruption reaching the White House, but he wanted to give Taft a fair hearing. The new president had, after all, vowed to support conservation and strong control over federal lands. Taft invited Pinchot to the White House, where he alternately implored Pinchot not to go public with the matter and threatened him with dismissal if he violated the gag order. Pinchot had in his pocket a letter that could expose the scandal. This case explores the dilemma of Pinchot, a mid-level bureaucrat dependent on a president’s good will, and the strategies available to him. It shows the power of a single leader and the similarities the United States once had with many developing nations struggling with widespread corruption.
Case studies are integral teaching tools for the Leadership Academy for Development workshops conducted around the world.
Conference Report: Lobbying and Campaign Finance [November 2014]
On November 14-15, the Program on American Democracy in Comparative Perspective hosted a conference on Lobbying and Campaign Finance. The conference brought together academics, practitioners, and lawyers to understand the impact of money in politics on a variety of outcomes, including special interest capture, democratic distortion, and inequality. The conference provided a rare opportunity to combine discussions of potential political reforms with evaluation of recent empirical findings in the area of lobbying and campaign finance. Participants covered a range of topics, including lobbying in Congress and in executive agencies; the relationship between patterns of campaign finance and partisan polarization; campaign finance laws, political parties, and special interest influence; and the regulation of lobbying and political money in other advanced democracies. The conference report summarizes the reform ideas that emerged from the conference discussions, including increasing soft money to political parties, disclosure of dark money, limiting lobbying access through the revolving door, and increasing the capacity of government.
The conference was held at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, a donor to the Program on American Democracy.
Lobbying and Campaign Finance
On November 14-15, the Program on American Democracy in Comparative Perspective hosted a conference on Lobbying and Campaign Finance. The conference brought together academics, practitioners, and lawyers to understand the impact of money in politics on a variety of outcomes, including special interest capture, democratic distortion, and inequality. The conference provided a rare opportunity to combine discussions of potential political reforms with evaluation of recent empirical findings in the area of lobbying and campaign finance. Participants covered a range of topics, including lobbying in Congress and in executive agencies; the relationship between patterns of campaign finance and partisan polarization; campaign finance laws, political parties, and special interest influence; and the regulation of lobbying and political money in other advanced democracies. The conference report summarizes the reform ideas that emerged from the conference discussions, including increasing soft money to political parties, disclosure of dark money, limiting lobbying access through the revolving door, and increasing the capacity of government.
The conference was held at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, a donor to the Program on American Democracy.