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El Democracy Action Lab (DAL), una iniciativa del Centro sobre Democracia, Desarrollo y Estado de Derecho de la Universidad de Stanford para defensores de la democracia, se enorgullece en anunciar oficialmente la primera cohorte de The Democracy Garage, el primer programa acelerador de su tipo dedicado a fortalecer a los defensores de la democracia en primera línea en América Latina y el Caribe.

The Democracy Garage nació de una convicción simple pero urgente: la resiliencia democrática no se construye únicamente a través de ideas, sino a través del fortalecimiento de capacidades de la sociedad civil para actuar estratégicamente, usar la evidencia con eficacia, comunicar de manera persuasiva y adaptarse a entornos políticos en rápida evolución. DAL construyó este programa para cerrar una brecha persistente en el apoyo a la democracia, tendiendo un puente entre la investigación de alto nivel y las necesidades operativas en tiempo real de las organizaciones que hacen el trabajo más difícil sobre el terreno.

Durante los próximos meses, DAL trabajará codo a codo con ocho extraordinarias organizaciones en la región, aplicando una metodología estructurada de acelerador para co-desarrollar estrategias adaptadas a los desafíos democráticos específicos de cada país. Este no es un programa de crecimiento tradicional: es una asociación profunda y colaborativa basada en la evidencia, la estrategia y la solidaridad.

Un Modelo Acelerador de Tres Ejes


El modelo acelerador de The Democracy Garage se organiza en torno a tres ejes que se refuerzan mutuamente, diseñados para abordar una brecha clave en el ecosistema de apoyo democrático: muchos programas ofrecen formación de alto nivel desconectada de las necesidades inmediatas, o asistencia técnica a corto plazo que no genera capacidad duradera. The Garage tiende ese puente.

Eje 1  |  Análisis de Evidencia para la Estrategia Democrática  —  Asesoría Práctica

El primer eje proporciona apoyo de asesoría directa, orientada a los problemas. Cada organización  entra al Garage con un desafío concreto y actual. DAL moviliza su capacidad analítica — incluyendo la experiencia de su cuerpo docente, la participación de estudiantes y herramientas de datos — para abordarlo de forma colaborativa. No se trata de asistencia técnica unidireccional: es un proceso conjunto que desarrolla la propia capacidad de las organizaciones para usar la evidencia como herramienta estratégica, transitando de modos reactivos a anticipatorios.

Eje 2  |  Formación y Fortalecimiento de Capacidades  —  Cuatro Áreas Fundamentales

El segundo eje ofrece formación estructurada en cuatro áreas críticas para la acción democrática: (1) Estrategia para la defensa democrática — comprender el estado de la democracia en la región y sus principales desafíos; (2) IA para el activismo — aplicaciones prácticas de la inteligencia artificial para monitoreo, comunicación y toma de decisiones; (3) Evidencia para la defensa democrática — recolección, análisis e interpretación de datos vinculados directamente a las decisiones estratégicas; y (4) Narrativa para el cambio — traducir el análisis complejo en narrativas persuasivas que resuenen con tomadores de decisiones, medios de comunicación y ciudadanos.

Eje 3  |  Construcción de Plataformas para la Defensa Democrática  —  Escalar el Impacto Sistémico

El tercer eje apoya a las organizaciones  para que se conviertan en nodos fundacionales de plataformas nacionales de defensa democrática. El deterioro democrático rara vez se produce de forma aislada: requiere respuestas coordinadas entre la sociedad civil, los medios, la academia y las instituciones. A través del mapeo de actores, la articulación de redes y el desarrollo de mecanismos de coordinación, el Garage contribuye a construir ecosistemas estructurados capaces de acción colectiva. Este eje culmina en el Encuentro Regional de Sinergias en agosto de 2026, donde las organizaciones presentarán su visión de plataforma y sentarán las bases para la coordinación regional.

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Diagram of Democracy Action Lab's Democracy Garage accelerator methodology, showing three mutually reinforcing tracks — Advisory, Training, and Platform Building — leading to a Regional Synergy Meeting and stronger democratic ecosystems.


Metodología de aceleración de DAL (haga clic para ampliar)

Ocho Organizaciones. Tres Países. Una Región.


Tras un riguroso proceso de selección, The Democracy Garage se enorgullece en dar la bienvenida a las siguientes organizaciones participantes:

CESJUL — Centro de Estudios Socio Jurídicos Latinoamericanos (Colombia)  

Trabaja en la intersección del derecho penal, los derechos humanos y la gobernanza democrática, aportando análisis jurídico riguroso a los desafíos más urgentes de la democracia colombiana — incluyendo el uso del derecho tanto como herramienta de represión como vehículo de rendición de cuentas.

Dejusticia (Colombia)

Una de las organizaciones de derechos humanos más respetadas de América Latina — un auténtico think-and-do tank que combina investigación jurídica rigurosa con litigio estratégico, incidencia directa y formación de capacidades en antidiscriminación, justicia transicional y protección del espacio cívico.

Instituto Sou da Paz (Brazil)

Referente en política de seguridad pública en Brasil durante 25 años, influyendo en la legislación nacional sobre regulación de armas y reducción de homicidios mediante un enfoque basado en evidencia que centra a las comunidades más afectadas por la violencia, en particular la población negra brasileña.

Pacto pela Democracia (Brazil)

La principal coalición pro-democracia de Brasil, integrada por más de 200 organizaciones y reconocida internacionalmente como modelo de defensa democrática colectiva. Su protección coordinada de las elecciones de 2022 — más de 80 acciones entre 35 organizaciones — demostró el poder de construir coaliciones antes de que llegue la crisis.

Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP) (Perú)

Una de las instituciones de ciencias sociales más antiguas y distinguidas de América Latina, el IEP ha construido durante seis décadas la base empírica del análisis democrático en el Perú — desde encuestas de opinión pública y estudios electorales hasta investigación interdisciplinaria sobre poder, desigualdad y el Estado.

Recambio (Perú)

En un país que ha tenido ocho presidentes en una década, Recambio reconstruye la cultura democrática desde dentro del sistema político — con una red de más de 500 egresados de 28 partidos políticos, diálogo interpartidario y la iniciativa 'Voces Contra la Polarización'.

Espacio Crítico (Regional, LAC)

Una organización regional que brinda apoyo estratégico personalizado, formación técnica y asesoría en seguridad a organizaciones de la sociedad civil, periodistas independientes y líderes políticos en la primera línea del retroceso democrático en América Latina y el Caribe.

D-Hub (Regional, Global)

Una comunidad global de defensores de la democracia que conecta a activistas de primera línea y organizaciones de la sociedad civil con expertos que han enfrentado desafíos similares — construyendo la infraestructura para la solidaridad democrática transfronteriza que ninguna organización puede sostener sola.

Un Hito Histórico


The Democracy Garage es el primer programa acelerador de este tipo diseñado específicamente para defensores de la democracia en América Latina y el Caribe. Al combinar el rigor de la investigación basada en evidencia, la agilidad de un modelo acelerador y la profundidad de una alianza a largo plazo, DAL está abriendo un camino inédito para fortalecer la resiliencia democrática — basado en la convicción de que las organizaciones más cercanas a la crisis están mejor posicionadas para afrontarla, cuando se les proporcionan las herramientas, el conocimiento y las conexiones adecuadas.

“Nos enorgullece inmensamente lanzar The Democracy Garage junto a estas ocho organizaciones extraordinarias," afirmó Beatriz Magaloni, codirectora del DAL y Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations en el Departamento de Ciencia Política. "Cada una de ellas representa lo que es la defensa de la democracia en la práctica, no en la teoría. Juntos, estamos comprometidos con algo sin precedentes: construir una comunidad de estrategia y solidaridad que fortalezca la democracia, país por país.”
 

Sobre el Democracy Action Lab

El Democracy Action Lab (DAL) es una iniciativa de investigación y estrategia con sede en el Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law de la Universidad de Stanford, dedicada a traducir las ciencias sociales en herramientas prácticas para quienes defienden la democracia. El DAL trabaja en la intersección entre la evidencia y la acción, colaborando con organizaciones de primera línea para fortalecer las instituciones democráticas, proteger el espacio cívico y contrarrestar las amenazas autoritarias en América Latina y más allá.

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El Primer Acelerador de Democracia de Este Tipo en América Latina y el Caribe.

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  • El Laboratorio de Democracia en Acción (DAL, por sus siglas en inglés) del CDDRL lanzó el primer acelerador de democracia de América Latina, el Democracy Garage (Garaje de la Democracia).
  • El programa combina la capacidad de investigación y la experiencia docente del DAL con ocho organizaciones de Colombia, Brasil y Perú.
  • Beatriz Magaloni, codirectora del DAL, calificó la iniciativa como una comunidad de estrategia y solidaridad sin precedentes, impulsada por Stanford.
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The Democracy Action Lab (DAL), a practitioner-centered initiative of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, is proud to officially announce the first cohort of its Democracy Garage, the first accelerator program of its kind dedicated to strengthening frontline democracy defenders across Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Democracy Garage was born from a simple but urgent conviction: democratic resilience is built not only through ideas, but through the capacity of organizations to act strategically, use evidence effectively, communicate persuasively, and adapt to rapidly evolving political environments. DAL built this program to close a persistent gap in democracy support, bridging high-level research with the real-time, operational needs of the organizations doing the hardest work on the ground.

Over the next few months, DAL will work side by side with eight extraordinary organizations across the region, applying a structured accelerator methodology to co-develop strategies tailored to the specific democratic challenges in each country. This is not a traditional growth program: it is a deep collaboration grounded in evidence, strategy, and solidarity.

A Three-Track Accelerator Model


The accelerator model of the Democracy Garage is organized around three mutually reinforcing tracks designed to address a key gap in the democracy support ecosystem: many programs either provide high-level training disconnected from immediate needs or short-term technical assistance that does not build lasting capacity. The Garage bridges this divide.

Track 1  |  Evidence Analysis for Democratic Strategizing  —  Hands-On Advisory

The first track provides direct, problem-driven advisory support. Each of the selected organizations enters the Garage with a defined, real-time challenge. DAL mobilizes its analytical capacity, including faculty expertise, student engagement, and data tools, to help address it collaboratively. This is not one-directional technical assistance: it is a joint process that builds organizations' own capacity to use evidence as a strategic tool, shifting from reactive to anticipatory modes of operation.

Track 2  |  Training and Capacity Building  —  Four Core Areas

The second track offers structured training in four areas critical to democratic action: (1) Strategizing for democratic defense — understanding the state of democracy in the region and its main challenges; (2) AI for activism — practical applications of artificial intelligence for monitoring, communication, and decision-making; (3) Evidence for democratic defense — data collection, analysis, and interpretation linked directly to strategic decisions; and (4) Storytelling for change — translating complex analysis into compelling narratives that resonate with policymakers, media, and citizens alike.

Track 3  |  Platform Building for Democratic Defense  —  Scaling for Systemic Impact

The third track supports participating organizations in becoming foundational nodes of country-level democratic defense platforms. Democratic erosion rarely unfolds in isolation: it requires coordinated responses across civil society, media, academia, and institutions. Through actor mapping, network articulation, and the development of coordination mechanisms, the Garage helps build structured ecosystems capable of collective action. This track culminates at the Regional Synergy Meeting in August 2026, where organizations will present their platform visions and lay the groundwork for regional coordination.

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Diagram of Democracy Action Lab's Democracy Garage accelerator methodology, showing three mutually reinforcing tracks — Advisory, Training, and Platform Building — leading to a Regional Synergy Meeting and stronger democratic ecosystems.


DAL's Accelerator Methodology (click to enlarge)

Eight Organizations. Three Countries. One Region.


After a rigorous selection process, The Democracy Garage is proud to welcome the following participating organizations:

CESJUL — Centro de Estudios Socio Jurídicos Latinoamericanos (Colombia)  

Works at the intersection of criminal law, human rights, and democratic governance, bringing rigorous legal analysis to the most pressing challenges in Colombian democracy — including the use of law as both a tool of repression and a vehicle for accountability.

Dejusticia (Colombia)

One of Latin America's most respected human rights organizations — a true think-and-do tank combining rigorous legal research with strategic litigation, direct advocacy, and capacity-building across anti-discrimination, transitional justice, and the protection of civic space.

Instituto Sou da Paz (Brazil)

A 25-year leader in public security policy in Brazil, shaping national legislation on firearms regulation and homicide reduction through an evidence-first approach that centers the communities most affected by violence — particularly Black Brazilians.

Pacto pela Democracia (Brazil)

Brazil's preeminent pro-democracy coalition of more than 200 organizations, and an internationally recognized model for coalition-based democratic defense. Its coordinated protection of the 2022 elections — over 80 actions across 35 organizations — demonstrated the power of building coalitions before the crisis arrives.

Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP) (Perú)

One of Latin America's oldest and most distinguished social science institutions, IEP has spent six decades producing the empirical foundation for democratic analysis in Perú — from public opinion surveys and electoral studies to interdisciplinary research on power, inequality, and the state

Recambio (Perú)

In a country that has seen eight presidents in a decade, Recambio is rebuilding democratic culture from within the political system — with a network of over 500 alumni from 28 political parties, cross-partisan dialogue, and the 'Voices Against Polarization' initiative.

Espacio Crítico (Regional, LAC)

A regional organization providing tailored strategic support, technical training, and security advice to civil society organizations, independent journalists, and political leaders on the front lines of democratic backsliding across Latin America and the Caribbean.

D-Hub (Regional, Global)

A global community of democracy defenders connecting frontline activists and civil society organizations with experts who have faced similar challenges — building the infrastructure for cross-border democratic solidarity that no single organization can sustain alone.

A Historic First


The Democracy Garage is the first accelerator program of this type designed specifically for democracy defenders in Latin America and the Caribbean. By combining the rigor of evidence-based research, the agility of an accelerator model, and the depth of long-term collaboration, DAL is pioneering a new approach to democratic resilience — one grounded in the conviction that the organizations closest to the crisis are best positioned to address it, when equipped with the right tools, knowledge, and connections.

"We are immensely proud to launch the Democracy Garage alongside these eight remarkable organizations," said DAL co-director Beatriz Magaloni, the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations. "Each of them represents what democratic defense looks like in practice, not in theory. Together, we are committed to something unprecedented: building a community of strategy and solidarity that makes democracy stronger, one country at a time."
 

About the Democracy Action Lab

The Democracy Action Lab (DAL) is a research and strategy initiative housed at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, dedicated to translating social science into practical tools for democracy defenders. DAL works at the intersection of evidence and action, partnering with frontline organizations to strengthen democratic institutions, protect civic space, and counter authoritarian threats across Latin America and beyond.

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The first democracy accelerator of its kind in Latin America and the Caribbean.

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  • CDDRL’s Democracy Action Lab (DAL) has launched Latin America's first democracy accelerator, the Democracy Garage.
  • The program pairs DAL’s research capacity and faculty expertise with eight organizations across Colombia, Brazil, and Perú.
  • DAL co-director Beatriz Magaloni called the initiative an unprecedented Stanford-led community of strategy and solidarity.
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Critics have warned that Chinese projects could chip away at democracy in Latin America. Our research suggests the opposite may be happening.

This article is based on Ibáñez and Schläpfer's working paper on how exposure to Chinese development projects shapes democratic attitudes in Latin America.

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Rufaro is a Research Assistant and contributor at the Democracy Action Lab, where she supports the lab's research on democracy, security, and state violence. She is a 2026 graduate from Stanford University, completing a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science. Her research interests center on the relationship between law, sovereignty, and state coercive capacity, with a focus on Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to joining DAL, she held research and policy positions at the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Stanford Humanities Center, and Oxford University. In Fall 2026, she will read for an MSc in Refugee and Forced Migration Studies at the University of Oxford.

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Overview & Contribution:


Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele calls himself the “world’s coolest dictator,” which may be an apt title given his social media savviness, backwards baseball caps, and concerted efforts to undermine democracy. While Bukele has enjoyed widespread popularity for his success in crushing El Salvador’s gangs, this has come at a high cost. Thousands of innocent Salvadorans have been imprisoned without due process as Salvadoran streets become ever more militarized. The “Bukele model” has been emulated by a number of Latin American leaders with authoritarian ambitions, which will likely complicate international efforts to isolate the Salvadoran government. Can Bukele continue to consolidate his personal power and popular support? 

In “Does the Bukele Model Have a Future?” Beatriz Magaloni and Alberto Díaz-Cayeros argue that the Salvadoran state’s apparent strength sits atop an extremely fragile foundation: Bukele’s crime policy has successfully improved physical security for some while failing to deliver social and economic gains for El Salvador’s increasingly vulnerable citizenry. As the country’s economic situation worsens, Bukele’s support will decline, likely increasing his reliance on repression. The article is informed by original interview data, which illustrates how dire the situation for ordinary Salvadorans has become both inside and outside of the country’s notorious prisons. 

The reader comes away somewhat optimistic that Bukele’s authoritarianism cannot remain popular indefinitely. And although El Salvador has largely evaded international pressure, this could change, for example, after the United States’ 2028 elections. At the same time, domestic efforts to push back against Bukele and his anti-democratic legacy will surely be difficult. The authors predict that Bukele will alternate between moments of popularity, episodes of repression, and external challenges.

They argue that the Salvadoran state’s apparent strength sits atop an extremely fragile foundation: Bukele’s crime policy has successfully improved physical security for some while failing to deliver social and economic gains for El Salvador’s increasingly vulnerable citizenry.

The Bukele Model and Its Pitfalls:


Bukele is perhaps best known for his war on crime, which followed his unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with and make concessions to gang leaders. Although Bukele took office at a time when homicide rates had declined considerably, crime has sharply declined during his tenure. Yet El Salvador now enjoys the world’s highest incarceration rate by more than double the next highest country. Bukele has consolidated significant executive power, firing Supreme Court justices and pressuring his opponents via armed military and police incursions into the legislature.

The authors conducted interviews with formerly incarcerated Salvadoreans to better understand how the Bukele model has been experienced both inside and outside of prison. Interviewees report that ordinary people are incentivized to provide information (whether true or false) that leads to arrests because of the cash rewards offered. As the country’s economy worsens, these practices have led to a mushrooming of innocent arrests. Although international observers have tended to focus on human rights abuses in El Salvador’s CECOT prison, the conditions in more peripheral prisons are even more harrowing. As the authors report,

Upon entry, detainees are frequently subjected to a violent initiation ritual involving beatings by multiple prison guards…leav[ing] many prisoners with severe physical injuries…once confined…basic human needs such as rest, sanitation, breathable air, food, and water were denied. Some people…reported guards throwing tear gas into their cells and banging repeatedly on cell bars throughout the night…[they] described cells as so overcrowded that they were often forced to sleep in rotations: one half lying on the floors, with their neighbors’ feet pressed against their faces, while the remainder stood waiting for their turn.


A worrying consequence of Bukele’s rise is the diffusion and emulation of his “model” across the hemisphere. For example, Honduras and Ecuador have implemented states of emergency and deployed the military against domestic gangs, citing Bukele as inspiration. Javier Milei’s cabinet has used Bukele’s alleged success as a justification for undermining judicial autonomy in Argentina. Even Costa Rica — one of Latin America’s most stable democracies — built a CECOT-inspired prison and has witnessed growing support for strongman rule as it faces its highest homicide rates on record.

Possible Scenarios:


The authors identify three routes that might characterize El Salvador’s politics in the coming years, none of which are mutually exclusive. A first scenario would involve support for Bukele continuing or increasing. However, given El Salvador’s economic situation, this situation is very unlikely. In places like Singapore and Kuwait, autocrats have enjoyed steady popularity because they have been able to deliver economic prosperity. Yet Bukele lacks foreign investment and world-class infrastructure, as in Singapore, and it lacks the Gulf oil monies that have been showered on Kuwaiti citizens to buy their acquiescence.

A second scenario, which the authors see as more likely, is that Bukele’s popularity declines, leading him to default to more repression and authoritarianism. This parallels Venezuela under Nicholas Maduro, where the collapse of oil prices — which had previously boosted Hugo Chávez’s popularity — coincided with growing corruption and economic precarity. As the country experienced hyperinflation, Maduro clamped down on his opponents and the media while rigging elections.

Magaloni and Díaz-Cayeros show how El Salvador exemplifies the tension between genuine public approval — driven by unprecedented reductions in gang violence — and mounting authoritarianism that inspires other Latin American leaders.

A third scenario would involve international pressure from democratic countries, such as the US and Brazil. This could at least strengthen Salvadoran opposition forces, but would not likely restore the country’s democracy to pre-Bukele levels. For the time being, much of the international community has minimized or ignored Bukele’s transgressions. For example, Bukele maintains a strong relationship with Donald Trump, and a recent U.S. State Department report downplayed Bukele’s human rights violations. Magaloni and Díaz-Cayeros show how El Salvador exemplifies the tension between genuine public approval — driven by unprecedented reductions in gang violence — and mounting authoritarianism that inspires other Latin American leaders.

*Research-in-Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

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Santa Ana, El Salvador
Luis Desiro
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CDDRL Research-in-Brief [4-minute read]

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In the past five years, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele has become Latin America’s most celebrated authoritarian. He has won plaudits—including from U.S. President Donald Trump—for reducing gang violence and transforming one of the world’s most dangerous countries into arguably one of its safest. But Bukele has presided over the erosion of El Salvador’s democracy and the creation of a police state. He rules through a relentless and perpetual state of emergency, the régimen de excepción, that has suspended constitutional protections for more than three years. And there is no end in sight. Bukele and his party have monopolized control over the legislative and judicial branches, which, through constitutional reform, have opened the door for him to serve as president in perpetuity.

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El Salvador’s Police State Will Soon Face a Reckoning

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Foreign Affairs
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Beatriz Magaloni
Alberto Díaz-Cayeros

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Maria Nagawa is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University. She studies governance and development in the Global South with a particular focus on aid and bureaucracy. She employs mixed methods and a range of data sources, including survey, experimental, interview, and administrative data.  

In her book project, she examines how international aid affects the performance of bureaucrats in aid recipient countries. Her work shows how, in incentivizing select bureaucrats to work on aid projects, aid diverts bureaucrats from routine government programming and erodes organizational cohesion. This work draws on months of fieldwork in Uganda, including interviews with diverse actors in the public and aid sectors and a survey of bureaucrats in Uganda's central government.

Prior to starting her fellowship at CDDRL, Maria was a postdoctoral fellow at the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton University. She has worked in both the private and public sectors and received her PhD in Public Policy and Political Science from Duke University in 2024.

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Hanna Folsz is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Stanford University. Her research focuses on opposition parties in authoritarian dominant-party regimes, with a particular focus on the challenges and opportunities they face in countering autocratization. More broadly, her work examines the causes and consequences of democratic backsliding, populism, media capture, and political favoritism — primarily in East-Central Europe and, secondarily, in Latin America. She uses a multi-method approach, including modern causal inference and text analysis techniques.

Her research has been supported by the National Science Foundation and the American Political Science Association, among others. She is the co-founder and co-organizer of EEPGW, a monthly online graduate student workshop on East European politics, and a co-founder and regular contributor to The Hungarian Observer, the most widely read online newsletter on Hungarian politics and culture. At Stanford, she is an active member of  CDDRL's Poverty, Violence, and Governance Lab (PovGov).

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The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law is pleased to announce the release of the fifth and final module of mini-lectures in our Solving Public Policy Problems massive open online course (MOOC).

Case studies like this are instrumental to the curriculum for both CDDRL’s Leadership Academy for Development (LAD) and the Masters’ in International Policy (MIP). They address a wide range of issues in developing countries and are designed to encourage you to think critically about key decisions that have led to policy reforms. This video refers to the implementation segment of the problem-solving framework (Module 1.3).

Facilitating Trade through Effective Border Control: Costa Rica's Challenging Reform Agenda


Peñas Blancas, the border post where all overland commerce passed between Costa Rica and Central American countries to the north, was infamously slow and exceedingly congested. Trucks sometimes waited five days or more to pass through the customs post. The inefficiencies also had a real economic cost, as the border crossing was a major contributor to Costa Rica’s national budget through customs-related taxes and duties. Fixing Peñas Blancas had become a major national priority, and the Deputy Minister of Commerce was put in charge of recommending solutions to the congestion problem and improving the collection of taxes and fees. The task was especially complex because of the power of entrenched opponents of reform and the need to reconcile the competing interests of numerous stakeholders. Any solution would have to take into consideration the ways in which government officials, as well as private-sector actors — from exporters to customs brokers to banks — interacted and conducted business at the border crossing.

In this final lecture, Francis Fukuyama introduces the Costa Rica Border Case, focusing on the problem of ineffective border control and its impact on trade facilitation. He elaborates on the shortcomings of Costa Rica’s border crossing controls and outlines how an effective stakeholder analysis could have helped the reform leader, President Laura Chinchilla, build a coalition for policy reform. The lecture delves into who the supporters and opponents are, their respective vested interests, and what they seek to gain from the reforms. Furthermore, it analyzes the strategies to expand the reform leader’s coalition and evaluates the feasibility of implementing their proposed solutions. Through this case study, students will learn how reform leaders can apply stakeholder analysis to formulate an implementation strategy.

You can read the case study here, access the full series on our YouTube page, and watch Module 5 below:

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Francis Fukuyama teaches Module 5 of CDDRL's "Solving Public Policy Problems" MOOC
Francis Fukuyama teaches the final lecture in CDDRL's "Solving Public Policy Problems" online course.
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This module examines the issue of ineffective border control in Costa Rica, its impact on trade, and the various stakeholders involved. Through this case study, students will learn how reform leaders apply stakeholder analysis to formulate an implementation strategy.

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