Abstract:

By the standards of prosperity and peace, the post-Cold War international order has been  an unparalleled success. Over the last thirty years there has been more creation of wealth, and reduction of poverty, disease, and food insecurity than in all of previous history. During the same period, the numbers and lethality of wars have decreased. Yet these facts have not deterred an alternative assessment that asserts that civil violence, terrorism, and failed states are at unprecedented high levels, and the numbers of refugees are at an all time high.

There is no global crisis of failed states and endemic civil war, no global crisis of refugees and migration, and no global crisis of disorder. Instead what we have seen is a particular historical crisis unfold in the greater Middle East, which has collapsed order within that region, and has fed the biggest threat to international order: populism in the United States and Europe.

Speaker Bio:

Stephen John Stedman is Deputy Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law (CDDRL), Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) at Stanford University. At CDDRL Professor Stedman directs the project on American Democracy in Comparative Perspective, which examines the sources and extent of polarization and paralysis in Western democracies. From 2010 to 2012 he served as the Director for the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security, a body of eminent persons tasked with developing recommendations on promoting and protecting the integrity of elections. Professor Stedman drafted the Commission’s report, Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide.  In 2003-2004 Professor Stedman was Research Director of the United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and was a principal drafter of the Panel’s report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. In 2005 he served as Assistant Secretary General and Special Advisor to the Secretary General of the United Nations, with responsibility for working with governments to adopt the Panel’s recommendations for strengthening collective security and for implementing changes within the United Nations Secretariat, including the creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office, a Counter Terrorism Task Force, and a Policy Committee to act as a cabinet to the Secretary General.

Professor Stedman has written widely on transnational threats to international security. He is currently researching the historical development of the concept of security and how its meanings have changed over time. Professor Stedman received his BA, MA and PhD degrees from Stanford University.  He and his wife, Corinne Thomas, are the Resident Fellows in Crothers -- Stanford’s academic theme house on global citizenship.

Abstract:

Colombia’s government set out to reduce crime and violence and increase state legitimacy by raising state presence on the streets of Bogotá, either doubling police patrol time or delivering cleanup and lighting services. We evaluate the effects of those interventions over an 8-month window. Interventions at this scale, in a dense network of streets, require us to account for spillovers into control segments. The policy implications also hinge on these spillovers. We show how to design place-based experiments to test for spatial spillovers over varying distances, and estimate direct and spillover effects using randomization inference. Using administrative data alongside a citywide survey, we find that increasing state presence reduces insecurity on targeted streets, and that there may be increasing returns to state presence and to targeting the least secure places. But data suggests that targeted state presence simply pushes insecurity around the corner.

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Abstract:

Within the last fifteen years, nine multilateral development banks (MDBs) have established internal accountability offices (IAOs).  These IAOs, the most well-known of which is the World Bank Inspection Panel, allow communities within borrowing states to bring complaints against MDBs if loan programs cause them harm and violate MDB policies.  The IAOs have been touted as effective fire-alarm mechanisms and remedies to the democratic deficit problem; they have also been criticized as broadly ineffective and toothless.  What explains the variation in IAO impact and efficacy?  I argue that borrowing states significantly constrain the impact of MDB IAOs and that borrowing state influence varies depending on regime type.  Democratic borrowing states will be more willing to absorb the potential costs associated with MDB IAOs—including program changes and possible program termination—than will autocratic states.  The argument is supported with quantitative evidence from a new dataset of all complaints filed through 2015.

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Dr. Brett Carter is an Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California and co-PI of the Lab on Non-Democratic Politics. He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University, where he was a Graduate Fellow at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. He was previously a fellow at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, as well as the Hoover Institution. His research focuses on autocratic politics in the Information Age. He is currently working on three book projects: one on autocratic survival in Post-Cold War Africa, one on autocratic propaganda, and one that exploits the Foreign Agents Registration Act to explore the role of autocratic money in American politics.

Abstract:

One policy option for countries reliant on natural resources is to share part of the revenues directly with citizens, an idea known as oil to cash. Technological innovation, such as biometric identification and mobile money, now allow direct payments to people on a massive scale. Additional changes in the global marketplace, experiments in India and Kenya, and shifting political views of cash transfers have all affected the potential of cash to boost governance.

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Abstract:

This paper provides an account of the strategies of extortion and co-optation used by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) toward civil society in Mexico. Our theoretical approach focuses on levels of territorial contestation among armed actors, as well as state capture by DTOs, to explain variation in co-opting or coercing civil society. Through the use of list experiments in a nationally representative survey, the paper measures extortion and assistance by DTOs in Mexico. We find that territorial contestation among rival DTOs increases predation on civil society while reducing DTOs assistance, which is found to occur in uncontested municipalities. Additionally, we find that extortion is higher in municipalities where DTOs have captured the state. These results suggest that territorial contestation and state capture are important in determining the strategy toward civil society during drug wars.

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