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CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow, 2004-05
Visiting Fellow and Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution 2004-05
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Alex Thier is Senior Advisor at Moby Media. He served as CEO of the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery; Co- Director of the Task Force on US Strategy to Support Democracy and Counter Authoritarianism; and Senior Democracy Fellow at Freedom House. He was the ninth Executive Director of the Overseas Development Institute in London, a leading global think tank on sustainable development, conflict, climate, and governance. He was appointed by President Obama to serve as chief of USAID’s Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning from 2013 to 2015, and as chief of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs from 2010 to 2013. He worked previously at the US Institute of Peace, the United Nations, and Oxfam. He was a CDDRL and Hoover Fellow in 2004-2005, and is a graduate of Stanford Law School.

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Although the early U.S. blunders in the occupation of Iraq are well known, their consequences are just now becoming clear. The Bush administration was never willing to commit the resources necessary to secure the country and did not make the most of the resources it had. U.S. officials did get a number of things right, but they never understood-or even listened to-the country they were seeking to rebuild. As a result, the democratic future of Iraq now hangs in the balance.

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Foreign Affairs
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Larry Diamond
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In a lengthy article in the September/October issue of Foreign Affairs, Larry Diamond -- coordinator of the Democracy Program at CDDRL and a political adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq last spring -- details the United States' blunders in Iraq and asserts that the coalition occupation "has diminished the long-term prospects for democracy there."

The article, titled "What Went Wrong in Iraq?" chronicles the U.S. government's miscalculations on several fronts, including its failure to commit enough forces to ensure security in Iraq after toppling Saddam Hussein; Pentagon officials' disregard for the elaborate postwar planning that had been done by the State Department; a lack of determination to face down political threats such as cleric Muqtada al-Sadr; the launching of a de-Baathification campaign that was too broad; a failure to address early on the widespread grievances with the interim constitution that was drafted this past spring; and above all, the U.S. government's failure to understand Iraqi politics, Iraqi society, and the way average Iraqis viewed the United States and its occupation of their country.

Diamond writes that the Bush administration deserves credit for changing its posture after the "rapid implosion of its plan for a political transition in Iraq." And he praises several aspects of the Coalition Provisional Authority's work, such as the training programs it set up to offer Iraqi political parties the skills and tools needed to organize and mobilize. He writes encouragingly that "I have found many Iraqis to have a deep ambition to live in a decent, democratic and free society and found them prepared to do the hard work that building a democracy will require."

But Diamond concludes that because of the failures of the U.S. occupation, along with the intrinsic difficulties of establishing order and democracy in a society like Iraq, "it is going to take a number of years to rebuild the Iraqi state and to construct any kind of viable democratic and constitutional order there."

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The conundrum is plain to anyone who wants to see it. On the one side, autocratic regimes in the Greater Middle East complain that without a "resolution" of the Arab-Israeli conflict they cannot accept calls for extensive political, social or even market reforms. The end of "Israeli occupation", we are told, is a sine qua non for domestic change and there could be no real progress without "justice" for the Palestinians. Putting aside for the moment the logic of these claims, it is clear that crying foul and vilifying Israel is highly convenient for the region's authoritarians-serving at once to divert public anger, justify political oppression, excuse sclerotic economies and resist exogenous pressures to democratise. Yet on the other side, the notion that ambitious strategies for Middle East democratisation can be effectively pursued in isolation from the Arab-Israeli conflict is erroneous, for two very different sets of reasons:

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CDDRL Working Papers
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Amichai Magen
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Alan Isenberg
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In an op-ed published July 22 in the Financial Times, CDDRL affiliated scholar Alan Isenberg asserts that the International Court of Justice -- which recently ruled that Israel's West Bank barrier violates international law and should be dismantled -- should not have issued any opinion on the matter, because the court lacks legitimate authority to rule on the issue.
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In a Los Angeles Times opinion piece, Larry Diamond -- coordinator of the Democracy Program at CDDRL and recently a senior adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq -- asserts that U.S. efforts to establish democracy in Iraq have been hobbled by a failure to promote security and legitimacy.
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The Center for Global Development opened its doors in November 2001, just two months after the terrorist attacks of September 11. The terrorist network behind the attacks was based in Afghanistan, having been expelled from Sudan,a nd was associated with earlier fatal attacks against US targets in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen. These attacks constituted a wake-up call, in both the development and security communities, to a new, shared challenge. In the 21st century, a sensible national security strategy would have to tackle the risks to Americans of development failures in faraway places.

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Center for Global Development
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Michael A. McFaul
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CDDRL organized a conference on "Governance and Sovereignty in Failed and Failing States," held April 16-17, 2004 at Stanford University. The event drew participants from around the United States and abroad, including speakers from Georgetown University, Oxford University, Stanford, Free University of Berlin, the United Nations, the World Bank, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Speakers from SIIS included Larry Diamond, Stephen J. Stedman and Michael A. McFaul.

The participants addressed a variety of topics including "Why States Fail," "UN Responses to State Failure," "Global Security and the United Nations," "Building Democracy in Iraq," and "Corruption and Misgovernance Lessons from U.S. Foreign Aid."

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U.S. President George W. Bush came to power emphasizing that he did not regard nation-building as an appropriate activity for the U.S. military. As he prepares to run for re-election, the United States is engaged in two of the most ambitious nation-building projects in its history in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. undertook a lead role in part because of the circumstances in which the two conflicts commenced, but also as an extension of the present administration's more general opposition to multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. Though the United States determined that it did not need the UN going into Iraq, however, it appears that it has belatedly realized it might need the UN in order to get out.

Simon Chesterman is Executive Director of the Institute for International Law and Justice at New York University School of Law. Prior to joining NYU, he was a Senior Associate at the International Peace Academy and Director of UN Relations at the International Crisis Group in New York. He had previously worked for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Belgrade and at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha.

He is the author of You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford University Press, 2004) and Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2001), which was awarded the American Society of International Law Certificate of Merit. He is the editor, with Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur, of Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance (United Nations University Press, forthcoming) and of Civilians in War (Lynne Rienner, 2001). He regularly contributes to international law and political science journals, as well as mass media publications such as the International Herald Tribune. His has taught at the Universities of Melbourne, Oxford, Southampton, and Columbia.

Encina Hall, east wing ground floor conference room E008

Simon Chesterman Executive Director Institute for International Law and Justice at New York University School of Law
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In a May 14 lecture hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Francis Fukuyama, PhD -- professor of international political economy at Johns Hopkins University and renowned author of The End of History and the Last Man -- discussed the problem of weak, underdeveloped nation-states; the effectiveness of various approaches to strengthening such states; and the importance of culture, context and history in the task of state-building. His lecture, titled "State-building: A Framework for Thinking about the Transfer of Institutions to Developing Countries," drew a full room of attendees to the Bechtel Conference Center in Encina Hall

A former member of the RAND Corp. and the U.S. Department of State who has written widely on issues of democratization and international political economy, Fukuyama first presented a framework with which nation-states can be evaluated according to two key criteria: the strength of the state, and the scope of its functions. The first refers to a state's ability to enforce its own laws and policies; the second refers to how involved the state becomes in carrying out various societal functions, ranging from basic functions such as maintaining law and order and protecting public health, to more "activist" functions such as running industries and redistributing wealth.

Fukuyama asserted that from a development standpoint, nation-states should be strong but should carry out only the minimum necessary functions. He said that only one country he has studied -- New Zealand -- has effectively moved toward this ideal in recent years. He noted that many struggling, developing nations, such as Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan and Turkey, are overly ambitious in their scope -- attempting to run vast industries, for example -- but are weak and unable to carry out their policies because of factors like corruption. Other states that Fukuyama identified as "failed states," such as Haiti and Sierra Leone, are both limited in scope and weak, attempting to carry out only the most basic governmental functions and not doing it very well.

Fukuyama then discussed and evaluated various approaches to strengthening developing nations. He noted that in recent years much emphasis has been placed on encouraging such nations to reduce the scope of their functions, through deregulation and privatization, but said the effectiveness of this approach is now in question. A more effective approach, he said, is helping weak nation-states build their own strong institutions, such as political parties, public health networks and central banking.

Unfortunately, Fukuyama said, sometimes the efforts of outside organizations to strengthen a country's institutions only make things worse, because solutions are imposed from outside rather than developed from within. "Ideally, we would want a country's own public health system to handle that country's problems with AIDS or malaria," he said. "But when you flood the country with your organization's own doctors and nurses and infrastructure, what do the local doctors do? They quit their government posts to get on the payroll of your NGO." In a few months or years, when the organization withdraws its support, Fukuyama noted, the system collapses, because it was not built to be self-sustaining.

At the end of his talk, Fukuyama emphasized the importance of understanding local culture, context and history in the task of state building. For example, he said, those who run programs aiming to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa should consider working with traditional faith healers, as they are an important part of the healthcare system in Africa.

Francis Fukuyama is dean of faculty and the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. His book The End of History and the Last Man was published in 1992 and has appeared in more than 20 foreign editions. It made the bestseller lists in the United States, France, Japan and Chile, and has been awarded the Los Angeles Times' Book Critics Award.

Fukuyama received a BA in classics from Cornell University and a PhD in political science from Harvard University. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation from 1979-1980, then again from 1983-89, and from 1995-96. In 1981-82 and in 1989 he was a member of the policy planning staff of the U.S. Department of State. In the early 1980s he was also a member of the U.S. delegation to the Egyptian-Israeli talks on Palestinian autonomy. He is a member of the President's Council on Bioethics, the American Political Science Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Pacific Council on International Policy, and the Global Business Network.

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