The transitions to democracy in the postcommunist region over the past decade and one-half share a common dynamic, featuring the interaction between two sets of factors. The first is the long-term development of both civil society and a liberal opposition. The second is more short-term: an expansion of international support for regime change, clear demonstration by mass publics that they reject incumbent illiberal regimes (through protests and voting), and the victory of the liberal opposition in competitive elections. Successful democratization in the postcommunist world, therefore, seems to rest upon mass mobilization, a supportive international environment, and a sharp break with the authoritarian past, rather than the model that emerged in Spain and parts of Latin America; that is, a largely domestic dynamic combining bargaining between incumbent and opposition elites and elections and policies in the early stages of transition that bridged the old and the new order.

This paper primarily deals with later postcommunist transitions to democracy. In particular, we compare the decisive turn to democratic politics in Slovakia in 1998 with a similar dramatic political turn in Serbia in 2000. Such a comparison is instructive because of the importance of the model of democratization that was developed and applied in these cases, and because of the insights these two countries offer as a consequence of variations in both political-economic context and the nature of their electoral revolutions.

When Vladimir Putin was elected President of Russia in March 2000, the country bequeathed to him by his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, was an unconsolidated, often disorderly and raucous electoral democracy. Gradually though, the Russian political system under Putin came to be described as first "managed democracy" then "illiberal democracy" or "delegated democracy" and finally, by 2005, a non-democracy.

What happened? Why did the fourth wave crash on Russia's shores, and what prospects are there for external factors to play a role in bringing about a rejuvenation of democracy in Russia in the next decade? Is Russia immune to the diffusion effect of democratization that purportedly swept the East in the late 1980's and that is again moving eastward in the last 4 years? What are the implications for this apparent resistance to the fourth wave for Russia's fragile newly democratic neighbors in Ukraine, Georgia and Serbia? In this essay, I will explore these and other questions as I try to assess the internal and external factors that might help us to understand why Russia has undergone a "reverse wave" in democratization even as its smaller neighbors have apparently resisted the authoritarian tide that struck parts of the post-communist world in the late 1990s.

The "first" transitions from communist rule in Europe and Eurasia at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s did not resemble many of the transitions from authoritarian rule in the previous two decades. Why? Some have suggested that countries in the communist world shared distinguishing historical legacies or particular institutional configurations that made them different from the countries in Latin American and Southern Europe, which in turn had path-dependent consequences for the kind of transition they experienced. These differences are most certainly a major part of the explanation.

In addition, however, this paper argues that the configuration of the international system also played a causal role. The bipolar system of the Cold War constrained the kinds of transitions possible, both in the "East" and in the "West." By 1989, this international system no longer existed, but instead was in transition to a new global order anchored by one hegemon, the United States. This new system allowed for a wider range of transitions than the previous era. The "international system" is the missing independent variable that helps to unify theories about the "third wave" and the "fourth wave" and move us close towards a general theory of democratization.

In order to facilitate a subsequent operationalization of civil liberty, the paper attempts to define and ground civil liberty on the basis of liberal political philosophy/theory as this tradition provides fruitful conceptual distinctions and specifications and offers some interesting motivations for taking civil liberties into deeper consideration. Different clusters of perspectives are found in the literature and one these is identified as key to understand the character of civil liberty and the relationship between civil liberty and democracy. Thereafter, to specify was is plausibly meant by civil liberties, I introduce three historically significant forms of rights codifications, that is, agreements about rights put down in peace treatises on the background of religious wars between Catholics and Protestants; national declarations and constitutional provisions connected to the revolutions in the seventeenth century England and the late eighteenth century USA and France; and international conventions on human rights. As one cannot settle the question of the plausibility of civil liberties just by reference to their legal recognition, I turn to some of the justifications offered by liberal philosophers that are briefly confronted with some general critiques.

The paper concludes that there are good reasons to respect civil liberties and to narrow the focus to (modern, negative) liberal freedom understood as absence of state interference in certain personal exertion rights. On this background, five rights are selected to constitute the core of a civil liberty measure: freedom of opinion and expression; freedom of assembly and association; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of movement and residence; freedom of recourse to independent courts.

The defeat of the Aug 1991 coup attempt in Moscow marked one of the most euphoric moments in Russian history. Emboldened by liberalization under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Russian society organized to resist this use of force by Kremlin dictators. The end of the Soviet dictatorship, however, did not lead immediately or smoothly to the creation of democracy in either Russia or in most of the other newly independent states that emerged after the USSR'S collapse. Of the many countries undergoing democratization in Latin America and southern Europe in the two decades before the Soviet collapse, the most successful cases were "pacted" transitions. In 2001, a decade after the Soviet Union's collapse, three clear regime types had emerged -- democracies, autocracies, and semi-autocratic, semi-democratic regimes in the reminder of the post-Soviet countries. After a decade of revolution and anarchy, Russians yearned for more stability.