There is a metaphysical crisis in human rights. And just as this crisis is troubling those who write about legal institutions, it is posing a conundrum for those who write in pure philosophy, in comparative political and international studies, and in all the academic areas that deal with identity, values and human belief. Across these disciplinary fields, scholars are asking the same question: as between radically different forms of human existence, how are 'we' to decide whose values ought to trumps others values? Can human rights only be defended from within a set of foundational beliefs that are particular to Western ideological and cultural commitments? This question about the universality of human rights has given rise to a vigorous debate about cultural relativism. Law, as an institution that enforces core political and social values, cannot sidestep this debate. What are global institutions to do, and how is law to aid those institutions, when there is no global consensus about the values that ought shape political and social relations? Put differently, how can decisions about the content of human rights be made without committing cultural imperialism in the same (though possibly subtler) ways that 19th century colonists committed cultural imperialism?

In recent decades, the individual has become more and more central in both national and world cultural accounts of the operation of society. This continues a long historical process, intensified by the consolidation of a more global polity and the weakening of the primordial sovereignty of the national state. Increasingly, society is culturally rooted in the natural, historical, and spiritual worlds through the individual, rather than through corporate entities or groups. The shift has produced a proliferation and specification of individual roles, accounting for what individuals do in society. It has also produced an expansion in recognized individual personhood, accounting for who individuals are in the extrasocial cosmos and fueling elaborated personal tastes and preferences. Where it has been contested, the shift to the individual has also produced a rise in specializing identities (e.g., in such domains as ethnicity or gender). These offer accounts of individuals' distinctive linkages to the cosmos, and they serve to bolster individual claims to standard roles and personhood. Over time, specializing identities tend to get absorbed into roles and personhood. And in turn, expanded roles and personhood provide further bases for specializing identity claims. Because many theorists mischaracterize the relationship of specializing identities to roles and personhood, the literature often overemphasizes the anomic character of the identity explosion and the closeness of the coupling between social roles and identity claims. On the contrary, specializing identities tend to be edited to remain within general rules of individual personhood and to be disconnected from the obligations involved in institutionalized roles.

The principal focus of the articles in this issue, paralleling the field of the sociology of education in general, is on educational inequality conceived in particular ways. This is the main topic of seven of the nine articles and comes up in the others as well. In this, the field and these articles take up issues that are central to the culture and poicy system of modern education worldwide. Equality in its several senses is a main focus of contemporary educational systems, as well as of sociology research. Sociologists are not the only supporters of equality and critics of inequalities - in one way or another, themes of equality are endemic to modern education. In this article, I consider the nature and impact of this widespread commitment.

Expanded scientific activity is thought to benefit national economic development through improved labor force capacities adn the creation of new knolwedge and technology. However, scientific research activity expands as a global process and reflects the penetration of societies by a general rationalistic world culture. The authors point out that scientific expansion and the accompanying cultural penetration legitimate a board progressive agenda of social amelioration (e.g., by identifying environmental and health problems, and social welfare and human rights issues) that can result in regulation and direct constrainsts on productive economic activity in teh short term. Thus, science can be seen as encouraging a trade-off between short-term economic growth and boarder (and longer-term) social development. The effects of dimensions of scientific infrastrucutre on national economic growth are examined over the 1970-1990 period. Cross-national analyses show that the size of a nation's scientific labor force and training system has a positive effect on economic development, supporting conventional theories. However, indicators of national involvement in scientific research activity show negative effects on economic growth. Corollary analyses show that this negative effect is partially explained by the expansion of scientific activity into more socially relevant domains (e.g., medicine, environmental sciences, etc.) thus supporting the main arguments.

The world polity and cultural system are relatively stateless, but they legitimate strong nation-state identities as the dominant actors. This produces very strong tendencies for the adoption of common models of modernity, despite extraordinary differences in resources and local culture. Local distinctiveness is also legitimated, so long as it is not inconsistent with homogeneity on the main dimensions of stratification and identity.

Much social theory takes for granted the core conceit of modern culture, that modern actors - individuals, organizations, nation states - are autochthonous and natural entities, no longer really embedded in culture. Accordingly, while there is much abstract metatheory about 'actors' and their 'agency,' there is arguably little theory about the topic. This article offers direct arguments about how the modern (European, now global) cultural system constructs the modern actor as an authorized agent for various interests via an ongoing relocation into society of agency originally located in transcendental authority or in natural forces environing the social system. We see this authorized agentic capability as an essential feature of what modern theory and culture call an 'actor,' and one that, when analyzed, helps greatly in explaining a number of otherwise anomalous or little analyzed features of modern individuals, organizations, and states. These features include their isomorphism and standardization, their internal decoupling, their extraordinarily complex structuration, and their capacity for prolific collective action.