What ails the Pakistani polity? Since its emergence from the detritus of the British Indian Empire in 1947, it has witnessed four military coups (1958, 1969, 1978 and 1999), long periods of political instability and a persistent inability to consolidate democratic institutions. It also witnessed the loss of a significant portion of its territory (East Pakistan) in 1971 following the brutal suppression of an indigenous uprising in the aftermath of which some ten million individuals sough refuge in India. The flight of the refugees to India and the failure to reach a political resolution to the crisis precipitated Indian military intervention and culminated in the creation of the new state of Bangladesh.

Pakistan's inability to sustain a transition to democracy is especially puzzling given that India too emerged from the collapse of British rule in South Asia. In marked contrast to Pakistan, it has only experienced a brief bout of authoritarian rule (1975-1977) and has managed to consolidate democracy even though the quality of its democratic institutions and their performance may leave much to be desired.

A number of scholars have proffered important explanations for Pakistan's failure to make a successful transition to democracy. This essay will argue that all the extant explanations are, at best, partial and incomplete. It will then demonstrate that the roots of Pakistan's propensity toward authoritarianism must be sought in the ideology, organization and mobilization strategy of the movement for the creation of Pakistan.

The significant increase in the role of international trade in the economic development of nations over the last few decades has been accompanied by a considerable increase in the number of commercial disputes as well. In India too, rapid globalization of the economy and the resulting increase in competition has led to an increase in commercial disputes. At the same time, however, the rate of industrial growth, modernization, and improvement of socio-economic circumstances has, in many instances, outpaced the rate of growth of dispute resolution mechanisms. In many parts of India, rapid development has meant increased caseloads for already overburdened courts, further leading to notoriously slow adjudication of commercial disputes. As a result, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including arbitration, have become more crucial for businesses operating in India as well as those doing businesses with Indian firms.

Keeping in mind the broader goal of exploring links between the quality of legal performance and economic growth, this paper is an attempt to critically evaluate arbitration in India as a legal institution. To this end, this paper presents an empirical inquiry into the state of arbitration, as well as a more theoretical examination of the political economy and arbitration as developed and practiced in India. In sum, although the huge influx of overseas commercial transactions spurred by the growth of the Indian economy has resulted in a significant increase of commercial disputes, arbitration practice has lagged behind. The present arbitration system in India is still plagued with many loopholes and shortcomings, and the quality of arbitration has not adequately developed as a quick and cost-effective mechanism for resolution of commercial disputes.

In this paper, the evolution of arbitration law and practice in India has been explored. Part I of this paper lays out the basics of arbitration in India, with a brief discussion of its history, the statutes that govern arbitration, the types of arbitration practiced, the enforcement of arbitral awards, and the costs of arbitration as compared to those of litigation. Part II explores the working of arbitration in India, while Part III is a critical analysis of the success of arbitration under the 1996 Act. Part IV briefly examines arbitration practice across regions, and the relationship between arbitration and commercial growth. Finally, Part V offers a series of recommendations for improving arbitration practice in India.