In a recent CDDRL seminar series talk, UVA Associate Professor of Politics Anne Meng shared her research on global patterns of presidential election concessions. Her study underscores the crucial yet often overlooked role of election concessions in democracies.

Meng emphasized the vitality of concessions in facilitating peaceful transfers of power, an essential element for the functioning of democracy. When losing candidates concede defeat, they validate the election results and contribute to a smooth transition of power. Despite their significance, systematic data on post-election concessions worldwide has been limited. Meng’s research seeks to fill this gap by presenting a comprehensive dataset tracking presidential election concessions from 1980 to 2020 across 107 countries.

Encompassing both democratic and autocratic regimes, the dataset includes 638 election observations, wherein concessions are categorized into three distinct groups:

1. Strong concessions (losing candidates explicitly admit defeat)
2. Weak concessions (vague statements regarding defeat)
3. No concession (candidates either refuse to concede or make no statement at all).

Meng’s analysis unveiled significant patterns in concession behavior across different political systems. In established democracies, losing candidates typically concede, while “no concession” outcomes are more prevalent in autocratic regimes. When incumbents lose, they are more likely to concede than opposition candidates who lose, a finding that may run contrary to perceptions of incumbents. However, incumbents are less likely to lose elections in the first place.

Meng's study underscores the connection between election integrity and the likelihood of concessions. When the fairness of an election is in doubt, opposition candidates may justifiably withhold concessions to avoid legitimizing an unfair process. Furthermore, the study found that strong concessions correlate with fewer post-election protests and acts of violence, suggesting a potential link between concessions and the stability of power transitions. Meng cautioned, however, that the causal relationship remains unclear, indicating the need for further research to ascertain whether concessions directly reduce unrest or if other factors, such as election integrity, are at play.

Meng identified several factors influencing whether a losing candidate concedes. Candidate characteristics significantly impact concession behavior; for instance, incumbents and successors tend to concede more often. In contrast, factors like gender and ideology do not significantly affect the likelihood of conceding. Additionally, the specifics of the election play a role: concessions are more likely when the victory margin falls between 5% and 10%. Overall, losing candidates in democracies are generally more willing to concede than those in autocratic systems. Notably, Meng's research suggests that past concessions do not guarantee future ones, revealing challenges in establishing consistent democratic norms.

In her conclusion, Meng emphasized that while election concessions generally reflect the health of democracy, their absence can mirror legitimate concerns about unfair elections. This complexity calls for a reevaluation of how we understand concessions, emphasizing the need to consider underlying narratives of election quality and integrity.