State Capture in China?
Thursday, October 17, 201912:00 PM - 1:30 PM (Pacific)
Encina Hall E409, Fourth Floor, East Wing, E409
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
Abstract:
The dynamic game between political and business elites in both democratic and non-democratic countries has received much attention since the rise of the super-rich in global politics. How does the Chinese Communist Party manage its rising super-rich in the private sector in order to prevent state capture and stay in power? Using a mixed-method approach, this research project details how the super-rich have become a particular target of the party-state, which aims to monitor them and channel their involvement in politics in ways that minimize their potentials to capture the state and maximize their willingness to cooperate with the regime. This inquiry proposes a new perspective for understanding how China has maintained regime stability thus far with its rapid economic development, and what processes may lead to destabilization.
Speaker Bio: