Repression, dissent, and poverty in Zimbabwe
Thursday, October 25, 201812:00 PM - 1:30 PM (Pacific)
Encina Hall, Third Floor, Central, C330
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305
Abstract:
State repression is used in many countries by unpopular regimes. Why does repression deter dissent in some cases, but encourage it in others? I argue that repression is most effective against the poor because they are both physically and psychologically more vulnerable to violence. I test this prediction using data on pre-election repression in Zimbabwe and two empirical strategies at the constituency and individual level that draw on exogenous variation in poverty and exposure to repression. Across multiple analyses, I find evidence that the poor are less likely to dissent after repression. I also rule out several important alternative explanations including changes in preferences, differences in the type of repression, or differences in the effectiveness of clientelism. These results may help explain why poverty is associated with authoritarian, non-responsive institutions, and why we see little redistribution to the poor in non-democratic states.
Speaker Bio: