Globalization and the role of the state are issues at the forefront of contemporary debates. With editors and contributors of outstanding academic repututation this exciting new book presents an unconventional and radical perspective. Revealing that states do still matter despite the vigour of international capital flows and the omnipresence of the global market, the chapters in this collection controversially highlight that how states matter depends upon their differing roles in the global economy and geopolitical system.

The acceptance of human rights and minority rights, the increasing role of international financial institutions, and globalization have led many observers to question the continued viability of the sovereign state. Here a leading expert challenges this conclusion. Stephen Krasner contends that states have never been as sovereign as some have supposed. Throughout history, rulers have been motivated by a desire to stay in power, not by some abstract adherence to international principles. Organized hypocrisy--the presence of longstanding norms that are frequently violated--has been an enduring attribute of international relations

Political leaders have usually but not always honored international legal sovereignty, the principle that international recognition should be accorded only to juridically independent sovereign states, while treating Westphalian sovereignty, the principle that states have the right to exclude external authority from their own territory, in a much more provisional way. In some instances violations of the principles of sovereignty have been coercive, as in the imposition of minority rights on newly created states after the First World War or the successor states of Yugoslavia after 1990; at other times cooperative, as in the European Human Rights regime or conditionality agreements with the International Monetary Fund.

The author looks at various issues areas to make his argument: minority rights, human rights, sovereign lending, and state creation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Differences in national power and interests, he concludes, not international norms, continue to be the most powerful explanation for the behavior of states.

What are Russian foreign policy objectives? It depends on whom you ask.

In making assessments of Russia's behavior in the world, it is absolutely

critical that we recognize that Russia today is not a totalitarian state ruled by a

Communist Party with a single and clearly articulated foreign policy of expanding

world socialism and destroying world capitalism and democracy. That state

disappeared in 1991. Rather, Russia is a democratizing state - a weakly institutionalized

democracy with several deficiencies, but a democratizing state

nonetheless. Russia's foreign policy, in turn, is a product of domestic politics in

a pluralistic system.

Throughout the history of the modern world, domestic regime change- be it democratization, autocratization, decolonization, decommunization, federal dissolution, coups, or revolutions- has often triggered international conflict and war. When a regime changes, decaying institutions from the ancien regime compete with new rules of the game to shape political competition in ambiguous ways. This uncertain text provides opportunities for political actors, both old and new, to pursue new strategies for achieving their objectives, including belligerent policies against both domestic and international foes. In desperation, losers from regime change may resort to violence to maintain their former privileges. Such internal conflicts become international wars when these interest groups who benefited from the old order call upon their allies to intervene on their behalf or strike out against their enemies as means to shore up their domestic legitimacy. In the name of democracy, independence, the revolution, or the nation, the beneficiaries of regime change also can resort to violence against both domestic and international opponents to secure their new gains.

Since the collapse of communism and commensurate disappearance of containment as the organizing principle of American foreign policy, U.S. foreign policymakers have lacked a unifying framework for interpreting the international system or a grand strategy for guiding U.S. actions in this system. Lacking a grand strategy, American motivations and objectives in international affairs often seem ambiguous, confused, if not slyly

sinister, to outside observers.

U.S. President Bill Clinton won the debate on foreign policy in this year's presidential campaign. He won it by avoiding it. Foreign policy issues have been so remote to this election campaign that Jim Lehrer, the moderator of the presidential debates, had to beg the audience for a foreign policy question.

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Reading the collected works of Alexander Dallin bears little distinction from reviewing the entire history of the Soviet Union. Few authors have written so widely and crossed so many disciplinary boundaries. Categories such as "historian" versus "political scientist" or expert on "domestic" versus "foreign" policy offer little analytic power in describing Alexander Dallin and his work. In the wake of the Soviet collapse, however, the perspective from which we approach this body of work has suddenly changed. Writing on the eve of the disintegration of the USSR, Alexander Dallin and Gail Lapidus wrote in their introduction to The Soviet System in Crisis that "The changes in Soviet politics and foreign policy precipitated by Gorbachev's leadership challenged the prevailing academic paradigms and the conventional wisdom regarding the Soviet system."

How can Europe, the United States, and Japan stop the technological, trade, and financial war on which they have increasingly and wastefully embarked? How can they direct the development and uses of science and technology and the economy in the interests of the well-being of the 8 billion people who will inhabit the planet in 2010-2020? Limits to Competition boldly frames international political economy and globalization debates within the new overarching ideology of competition and offers a balancing voice.

The word compete originally meant "to seek together," but in our time it has taken on more adversarial connotations and has become a rallying cry of both firms and governments, often with devastating consequences. Limits to Competition explores the question of whether free-market competition can indeed deliver the full range of needs for sustainable development. Is competition the best instrument for coping with increasingly severe environmental, demographic, economic, and social problems at a global level?

What difference do nonstate actors in international relations (such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International, IBM, or organizations of scientists) make in world politics? How do cross-national links interact with the world of states? Who controls whom? This book answers these questions by investigating the impact of nonstate actors on foreign policy in several issue areas and in regions around the world. It argues that the impact of such nonstate actors will depend on the institutional structure of states as well as international regimes and organizations.

In this book, distinguished U.S. and Russian scholars analyze the great challenges confronting post-Communist Russia and examine the Yeltsin government's attempts to deal with them. Focusing on problems of state- and nation-building, economic reform, demilitarization, and the definition of Russia's national interests in its relations with the outside world, the authors trace the complex interplay between the Communist legacy and efforts to chart new directions in both domestic and foreign policy. They give special attention to the defeat of liberal reformers in the latest parliamentary elections and to the implications of that shift for Russia's domestic and foreign policy in the years ahead.