The basic argument of this article is that the globalization perspective in all of its variations (and there are many) exaggerates the amount of change in the contemporary global system. States are for the most part exactly what they have always been, the most important actors in the modern international system -- which is not to argue that they are now, or have ever been, immune to influence from other actors or that they have ever been able to fully control economic or other kinds of transactions. The hyperglobalist argument -- which sees states as fundamentally outmoded, incapable of carrying on the basic functions of governance -- is wrong. Transformationist arguments are also for the most part incorrect, but here it is necessary to distinguish among different kinds of claims, which are obfuscated by the emphasis on complexity, interconnectedness and multiple actors.

Synthesizing decades of sociological work at Stanford University on the development of the modern nation-state system since World War II, contributors argue that striking similarities increasingly characterize nation-state structures and policies, suggesting that countries across different domains are following the same models or scripts of what a nation-state ought to be.

Russia, once seen as America's greatest adversary, is now viewed by the United States as a potential partner. This book traces the evolution of American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, and later Russia, during the tumultuous and uncertain period following the end of the cold war. It examines how American policymakers -- particularly in the executive branch -- coped with the opportunities and challenges presented by the new Russia.

Drawing on extensive interviews with senior U.S. and Russian officials, the authors explain George H. W. Bush's response to the dramatic coup of August 1991 and the Soviet breakup several months later, examine Bill Clinton's efforts to assist Russia's transformation and integration, and analyze George W. Bush's policy toward Russia as September 11 and the war in Iraq transformed international politics. Throughout, the book focuses on the benefits and perils of America's efforts to promote democracy and markets in Russia as well as reorient Russia from security threat to security ally.

Understanding how three U.S. administrations dealt with these critical policy questions is vital in assessing not only America's Russia policy, but also efforts that might help to transform and integrate other former adversaries in the future.

James M. Goldgeier is professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University. He is also a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Michael McFaul is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, the Peter and Helen Bing senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, and an associate professor of political science at Stanford University.

Chechnya has been and remains one of the greatest stains in Russia's efforts to move toward a more open and democratic system . The Chechen wars, as Professor Michael
McFaul of Stanford University reminds us in this important essay, "rank as the most serious scars of Russia's troubled transition." Since 1994 these wars, with their vast destruction and terrible human rights abuses, have also posed an enormous policy (and moral) problem for American administrations intent on trying to better integrate Russia into the Western community of nations. Dealing with Chechnya has aroused much debate in and out of the US government-a debate that over the years has sadly declined.

In 2001 the Stanley Foundation and the Century Foundation established a task force to look at the broad question of the impact of American domestic political forces on US-Russia relations. (A report was issued in October 2002.) The first subject the task force discussed was Chechnya, which we labeled "the dog that did not bark." Professor McFaul made an impressive oral presentation on US policy on Chechnya, which we asked him to expand and bring up to date. This essay is the result, a detailed analysis of US policy from the Clinton to Bush administrations and the impact on that policy from forces within Congress and from the NGO community who tried to generate greater public debate and secure a tougher American response toward Russia's actions in Chechnya.

McFaul's tale is a sad one. Its bottom line is that US policy has had little impact on Russia's behavior in Chechnya. Similarly, while many like Senator Jesse Helms fought very hard to toughen policy, domestic political forces had little impact on changing it.

From the wild swings of the stock market to the online auctions of eBay to the unexpected twists of the world's post-Communist economies, markets have suddenly become quite visible. We now have occasion to ask, "What makes these institutions work? How important are they? How can we improve them?"

Taking us on a lively tour of a world we once took for granted, John McMillan offers examples ranging from a camel trading fair in India to the $20 million per day Aalsmeer flower market in the Netherlands to the global trade in AIDS drugs. Eschewing ideology, he shows us that markets are neither magical nor immoral. Rather, they are powerful if imperfect tools, the best we've found for improving our living standards. A New York Times Notable Book. W. W. Norton & Company

The international law rules governing "indirect" expropriations of property reveals a tension between the interest, on one hand, of protecting rights of foreign property owners and investors and, on the other hand, the interest of protecting the sovereign authority of states to regulate in further of public welfare goals. The tension is embodied in the formal doctrine. Thus, a state is responsible under international law for regulation that unreasonably interferes with the foreign owner's enjoyment of his or her property. At the same time, however, the doctrine recognizes that regulation "commonly accepted as within the police power of states" does not give rise to liability for a regulatory taking.

International courts and tribunals are reluctant explicitly to substitute their judgment for that of sovereign state parties before them with regard to the legitimacy of or justification for the particular police power goals those states have decided to pursue through a given regulatory measure. This results in artificially truncated approaches to indirect expropriation cases. In some cases, tribunals focus only on the effect of a regulatory measure on the owner, without regard to the state's purpose. More recent developments in state practice suggest that whenever a state claims a public welfare purpose for regulation, it will not constitute an indirect expropriation of property.

Nevertheless, implicit in the decisions of international tribunals and the practice of states in negotiating property claims settlements is a normative assessment of the legitimacy of the particular police power or public welfare purposes to be served by a particular regulatory measure. These implicit assessments have been keyed not to the socio-political standards of the state adopting the regulation, but to international standards. As such, the question of whether a regulatory measure constitutes an indirect expropriation under international law will depend in part on the extent of international acceptance of the particular substantive public welfare purposes a regulatory measure seeks to advance. Future scholarship should evaluate decisions of international tribunals and state practice to develop clearer and more explicit guidelines on the question of which classes or categories of regulatory purposes are accepted by both developed and developing states as requiring property owners to bear the costs or regulation, and which require the state to provide compensation.

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