Throughout the history of the modern world, domestic regime change- be it democratization, autocratization, decolonization, decommunization, federal dissolution, coups, or revolutions- has often triggered international conflict and war. When a regime changes, decaying institutions from the ancien regime compete with new rules of the game to shape political competition in ambiguous ways. This uncertain text provides opportunities for political actors, both old and new, to pursue new strategies for achieving their objectives, including belligerent policies against both domestic and international foes. In desperation, losers from regime change may resort to violence to maintain their former privileges. Such internal conflicts become international wars when these interest groups who benefited from the old order call upon their allies to intervene on their behalf or strike out against their enemies as means to shore up their domestic legitimacy. In the name of democracy, independence, the revolution, or the nation, the beneficiaries of regime change also can resort to violence against both domestic and international opponents to secure their new gains.

The Paradox of Plenty explains why, in the midst of two massive oil booms in the 1970s, oil-exporting governments as different as Venezuela, Iran, Nigeria, Algeria, and Indonesia chose common development paths and suffered similarly disappointing outcomes. Meticulously documented and theoretically innovative, this book illuminates the manifold factors--economic, political, and social--that determine the nature of the oil state, from the coherence of public bureaucracies, to the degree of centralization, to patterns of policy-making.

Karl contends that oil countries, while seemingly disparate, are characterized by similar social classes and patterns of collective action. In these countries, dependence on petroleum leads to disproportionate fiscal reliance on petrodollars and public spending, at the expense of statecraft. Oil booms, which create the illusion of prosperity and development, actually destabilize regimes by reinforcing oil-based interests and further weakening state capacity.

Karl's incisive investigation unites structural and choice-based approaches by illuminating how decisions of policymakers are embedded in institutions interacting with domestic and international markets. This approach--which Karl dubs "structured contingency"--uses a state's leading sector as the starting point for identifying a range of decision-making choices, and ends by examining the dynamics of the state itself.

Although Africa has been one of the least democratic regions of the world, it has been experiencing widespread pressures for democratic change since 1990. Although pressure-from both domestic civil societies and international donors-has failed to bring about a transition to democracy in most cases, it has succeeded in many. Today, about a third of all African countries are at least electoral democracies, and virtually all regimes in sub-Saharan Africa have at least legalized opposition parties. Conventional political science theories view Africa's democratic prospects as grim because of its extreme poverty and deep ethnic divisions. This essay takes a more hopeful and "developmental" view. It argues that democratic change can occur in Africa and must if it is to develop economically. But this will inevitably involve a long-term process of political and social change and, in particular, institution building. African countries need new, more appropriate, and more effective institutions to control corruption, provide a market-oriented enabling environment for economic growth, and generate incentives for political parties to craft broad multiethnic appeals and constituencies. If institutions of governance, electoral politics, and civil society can be strengthened and innovatively designed, there is hope for democracy in Africa. But this will also require heavy international conditionality and pressure for more responsible policies and more effective institutions, as well as greater international support for those African regimes that appear serious about democracy and good governance. African societies are ready for a new democratic beginning, but they require the right institutional frameworks at home and vigorous engagement of the international community if deeply entrenched patterns of statism, corruption, repression, ethnic exclusion, and violence are to be overcome.

The global trend that Samuel P. Huntington has dubbed the "third wave" of democratization has seen more than 60 countries experience democratic transitions since 1974. While these countries have succeeded in bringing down authoritarian regimes and replacing them with freely elected governments, few of them can as yet be considered stable democracies. Most remain engaged in the struggle to consolidate their new and fragile democratic institutions.

Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies provides an in-depth analysis of the challenges that they face. In addition to the complete hardcover edition, Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies is available in two paperback volumes, each introduced by the editors and organized for convenient course use. The first paperback volume, Themes and Perspectives, addresses issues of institutional design, civil-military relations, civil society, and economic development. It brings together some of the world's foremost scholars of democratization, including Robert A. Dahl, Samuel P. Huntington, Juan J. Linz, Guillermo O'Donnell, Adam Przeworski, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Alfred Stepan.

The second paperback volume, Regional Challenges, focuses on developments in Southern Europe, Latin America, Russia, and East Asia, particularly Taiwan and China. It contains essays by leading regional experts, including Yun-han Chu, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, Thomas B. Gold, Michael McFaul, Andrew J. Nathan, and Hung-mao Tien.

Since 1993, Russia has achieved a series of important milestones regarding the articulation of the rules of the game for political and economic competition. Since the popular approval of a new constitution in December 1993, which gave a great deal of power to the president, the division of powers between the executive and legislative branch has been both formalized and respected by actors in both institutions. While critics of this superpresidential system are many, none of these opponents of the new institutional order are prepared to take to the streets to change it. On the contrary, budgets have been passed, governments approved, and laws enacted in a relatively "normal" and peaceful process.

In both Russia and the West, most analysts portray Russia's political system as an authoritarian regime. According to this view, the executive branch of government dictates state policy. Other institutions of the state do not matter since they are too weak either to make policy or to constrain the all-powerful presidency. The traditional components of a liberal democracy--the separation of powers between the president and the parliament, a party system, federalism, rule of law, independent media, and civil society--are all missing in Russia. Unconstrained by the rules and ways of democracy, Russia's president and his government are free to do whatever they want.

Initially printed as "The Myth of Absolute Power," Moscow Times, November 21, 1997.

As the debate on NATO expansion moves to the more public and open setting of U.S. Senate hearings this month, we will begin to hear the true motivations behind those for and against extending the alliance to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. From the right, senators will declare that they favor enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a hedge against a possible Russian threat to Europe in the future. From the left, senators will argue that they oppose NATO expansion because the move eastward will help nationalist forces within Russia and thereby damage U.S.-Russian relations.

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Superpresidentialism, ambiguous federalism, the weakness of political parties and labor and civic organizations, the inordinate strength of big business, and the virtual absence of the rule of law represent major blemishes on Russia's nascent democracy. . . [But] in bemoaning Russia's slow start in consolidating a liberal democracy, we must not forget the important progress made in establishing an electoral democracy in Russia.

Since 1986, Nigeria has been struggling without success to return to a civilian, democratic form of government: as political parties, presidential candidates, economic reform programs, and top military officers have come and gone, the country has become mired in an authoritarian limbo, a transition without end. This wide-ranging study examines the rise and fall of democratic transition and structural adjustment in Nigeria during the eight-year regime of General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993), chronicling the descent from the promise of reform and renewal to an unprecedented political and economic depression.

While showing the vibrancy of Nigeria's democratic aspirations and civil society, the authors document the political and social fragmentation, corruption, cynicism, and repression that undermined Babangida's transition program and brought its collapse in 1993. Providing both historical narrative and political analysis, they offer the most comprehensive treatment to date of Nigeria's failed transition.

For two years, opponents of NATO expansion have warned that inviting former Warsaw Pact countries into the alliance would bolster Russia's nationalist and Communist opposition forces. In Moscow, however, the extension of invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join NATO came and went this month without producing any visible reaction from Russia's opposition.

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