At first glance, the process of democratic transition and consolidation in Russia - and the postcommunist world in general - seems similar to that in other countries that are part of the "third wave" of democratization. The descriptive discourse of "transitology" efficiently identifies the actors, actions, and accidents of postcommunist regime transformations. Scholars already have successfully used concepts from Latin America and Southern Europe such as liberalization, "hard-liners vs. soft-liners," "reforma vs. ruptura," pacts, and founding elections to describe communist regime change. These developments have brought the study of the former communist world into the mainstream, if not the cutting edge, of comparative politics.

Since 1993, Russia has achieved a series of important milestones regarding the articulation of the rules of the game for political and economic competition. Since the popular approval of a new constitution in December 1993, which gave a great deal of power to the president, the division of powers between the executive and legislative branch has been both formalized and respected by actors in both institutions. While critics of this superpresidential system are many, none of these opponents of the new institutional order are prepared to take to the streets to change it. On the contrary, budgets have been passed, governments approved, and laws enacted in a relatively "normal" and peaceful process.

Since the collapse of communism and commensurate disappearance of containment as the organizing principle of American foreign policy, U.S. foreign policymakers have lacked a unifying framework for interpreting the international system or a grand strategy for guiding U.S. actions in this system. Lacking a grand strategy, American motivations and objectives in international affairs often seem ambiguous, confused, if not slyly

sinister, to outside observers.

Freedom in the World is an indispensable annual survey of political rights and civil liberties from Freedom House, the nation's leading human rights advocacy group. Well- established as a standard reference, "Freedom in the World" ranks each country in the world according to degree of political rights and civil liberties its citizens enjoy - or are deprived of. It offers a full overview of each country, identifies its political and economic systems, and provides vital data about life expectancy, population, ethnic composition, and economic indicators. Regional and country reports are accompanied by the annual Map of Freedom, regional maps, charts, tabulated ratings, and other graphic tools that allow immediate comparison between countries. "Freedom in the World" is a crucial resource for all those concerned about progress in human rights.

In June 1996, for the first time in thousand years, Russian citizens were given the chance to select their head of state in a democratic election. Michael McFaul analyzes three major factors that combine to explain why Boris Yeltsin's victory, should have been expected, discusses the reasons behind Yeltsin's victory, and examines its impact on electoral politics in post-Soviet Russia.

The historic events of the 1996 presidential election appear to point to true progress in making a Russian democracy. Especially when compared with other periods of Russia's history--be it the confrontational and ultimately bloody politics of the first years of the new Russian state, the seventy years of totalitarian rule under the Communists, or the hundreds of years of autocratic government under the tsars--the following milestones are truly spectacular.

When President Boris Yeltsin sneezes, the whole world listens. In a now familiar ritual, the Western world of Russia watchers saw (again) signs of the sky falling as we waited for better facts about the Russian president's health earlier this month. After first repeating third-hand rumors about medical issues about which we know nothing, journalists, politicians, and analysts like myself were then asked to pronounce boldly about the future of Russia without Yeltsin. Most could not imagine a Russia without Yeltsin. Some called him "indispensable" for stability. Others said Yeltsin was a leader whose "importance cannot be overestimated." Still others stated unequivocally that "Foreign investors ... won't return if Yeltsin is incapacitated." The most brazen predicted political and economic collapse in Russia should the president become incapacitated or die.

In both Russia and the West, most analysts portray Russia's political system as an authoritarian regime. According to this view, the executive branch of government dictates state policy. Other institutions of the state do not matter since they are too weak either to make policy or to constrain the all-powerful presidency. The traditional components of a liberal democracy--the separation of powers between the president and the parliament, a party system, federalism, rule of law, independent media, and civil society--are all missing in Russia. Unconstrained by the rules and ways of democracy, Russia's president and his government are free to do whatever they want.

Initially printed as "The Myth of Absolute Power," Moscow Times, November 21, 1997.

As the debate on NATO expansion moves to the more public and open setting of U.S. Senate hearings this month, we will begin to hear the true motivations behind those for and against extending the alliance to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. From the right, senators will declare that they favor enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a hedge against a possible Russian threat to Europe in the future. From the left, senators will argue that they oppose NATO expansion because the move eastward will help nationalist forces within Russia and thereby damage U.S.-Russian relations.

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Superpresidentialism, ambiguous federalism, the weakness of political parties and labor and civic organizations, the inordinate strength of big business, and the virtual absence of the rule of law represent major blemishes on Russia's nascent democracy. . . [But] in bemoaning Russia's slow start in consolidating a liberal democracy, we must not forget the important progress made in establishing an electoral democracy in Russia.