The historic events of the 1996 presidential election appear to point to true progress in making a Russian democracy. Especially when compared with other periods of Russia's history--be it the confrontational and ultimately bloody politics of the first years of the new Russian state, the seventy years of totalitarian rule under the Communists, or the hundreds of years of autocratic government under the tsars--the following milestones are truly spectacular.

When President Boris Yeltsin sneezes, the whole world listens. In a now familiar ritual, the Western world of Russia watchers saw (again) signs of the sky falling as we waited for better facts about the Russian president's health earlier this month. After first repeating third-hand rumors about medical issues about which we know nothing, journalists, politicians, and analysts like myself were then asked to pronounce boldly about the future of Russia without Yeltsin. Most could not imagine a Russia without Yeltsin. Some called him "indispensable" for stability. Others said Yeltsin was a leader whose "importance cannot be overestimated." Still others stated unequivocally that "Foreign investors ... won't return if Yeltsin is incapacitated." The most brazen predicted political and economic collapse in Russia should the president become incapacitated or die.

In both Russia and the West, most analysts portray Russia's political system as an authoritarian regime. According to this view, the executive branch of government dictates state policy. Other institutions of the state do not matter since they are too weak either to make policy or to constrain the all-powerful presidency. The traditional components of a liberal democracy--the separation of powers between the president and the parliament, a party system, federalism, rule of law, independent media, and civil society--are all missing in Russia. Unconstrained by the rules and ways of democracy, Russia's president and his government are free to do whatever they want.

Initially printed as "The Myth of Absolute Power," Moscow Times, November 21, 1997.

As the debate on NATO expansion moves to the more public and open setting of U.S. Senate hearings this month, we will begin to hear the true motivations behind those for and against extending the alliance to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. From the right, senators will declare that they favor enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a hedge against a possible Russian threat to Europe in the future. From the left, senators will argue that they oppose NATO expansion because the move eastward will help nationalist forces within Russia and thereby damage U.S.-Russian relations.

Full article available with subscription.

Superpresidentialism, ambiguous federalism, the weakness of political parties and labor and civic organizations, the inordinate strength of big business, and the virtual absence of the rule of law represent major blemishes on Russia's nascent democracy. . . [But] in bemoaning Russia's slow start in consolidating a liberal democracy, we must not forget the important progress made in establishing an electoral democracy in Russia.

The 1996 presidential election marked the end of polarized politics in Russia. If between 1990 and 1996 electoral politics have been contests between "communists" and "democrats," the next national elections will have a different logic. The threat of communist restoration died in the ballot box in 1996, but so, too, did anti-communism.

Full article available with subscription.

Last week, two critical elections took place, one for governor in Nizhny Novgorod and one for mayor in Samara. These elections took on much greater significance than a typical regional election in that they filled offices vacated by two new deputy ministers in the current government: First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov and Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Sysuyev. Since both Nemtsov and Sysuyev are considered leaders of Russia's "second liberal revolution," elections in Nizhny and Samara effectively served as referenda on the present government. Consequently, supporters and opponents of the current regime devoted inordinate amounts of time, organizational resources and money to their campaigns.

Full article available with subscription.

A new conventional wisdom is emerging among analysts, journalists, and even some government officials in the West who see former Security Council chairman Alexander Lebed as the last great hope for Russian reform. No one doubts that if free and fair elections were held in the immediate future, Lebed would be the obvious front runner. What is troubling, however, is how Lebed's front-runner status in the polls and opposition stance against the current regime has translated into rather uncritical thinking about what his election might mean for the future of Russian markets and Russian democracy.

Full article available with subscription.

The historical facts of Russian politics over the last year appear to point to tremendous progress in making a democracy. There are milestones well worth noting in 1996, especially when compared to other periods: the upheavals of the early years of the new Russian state, the seventy years of totalitarian rule under the Communists, and the hundreds of years of autocratic government under the tsars.