NATO's Collateral Damage in Russia
Although few in Washington have noticed, US-Russian relations have entered a new era with the NATO bombing of Serbia.
Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Although few in Washington have noticed, US-Russian relations have entered a new era with the NATO bombing of Serbia.
The Clinton Administration was right to reject Slobodan Milosevic's cease-fire proposal -- entering into negotiations now with Serbia, which has largely achieved its military goals in Kosovo before NATO has achieved much of anything, would be an admission of defeat.
Only a few weeks ago, Russia was one of the most downtrodden and detested countries in the eyes of Washington's elite. One could not utter the word "Russia" without adding adjectives such as "crime- ridden," "collapsing" or "corrupt." Russia was considered a basket case of a country that had failed at capitalism and democracy and was soon to fail as a state. Russia's reputation in the United States was so bad that Russian businesspeople began courting American public relations firms to help rectify Russia's image.
Two weeks ago, (Boris N.) Yeltsin looked certain to be impeached by the Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament. His main political rival, then-Prime Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov, was the most popular political figure in Russia and was widely regarded as perhaps the leading presidential candidate. With Primakov solidly allied with the Russian Communist Party, it looked like Yeltsin's worst nightmare--the return of the Communists to the Kremlin--was about to come true. But judging from his bold decision to remove Primakov, Yeltsin is not quite ready to fade from Russia's political scene. Furthermore, if forced to depart, the president vowed to go down fighting.
The "who lost Russia" debate reveals more about US electoral politics than it does about Russian realities. Russia is midstream in a social revolution. In only a few short years, the borders of the state, the nature of the economic system, and the organization of the polity have undergone fundamental, simultaneous change. Our current focus on Russian corruption obscures our understanding of this triple transition.
With the United States fixated on crime and corruption in Russia, Russians obsess about two other dramas: upcoming parliamentary elections and the war in the Caucasus region. The first drama might well have a happy ending, rare for Russian dramas these days. The second is almost certainly a tragedy in the making. Worse, the war in the Caucasus may eventually subsume elections altogether, resulting in their cancellation, civil resistance and even civil war. Before such a scenario gains more momentum, U.S. officials should look beyond Russian corruption and do what they can to lower the probability of democratic collapse in Russia.
All countries have the right to defend their people from terrorists. Russia is no exception. The Russian military campaign in Chechnya, however, has moved well beyond the earlier limited objective of combating terrorism. The new strategy and the means being deployed to execute this strategy suggest a new ulterior motive - Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's presidential election campaign.
According to conventional wisdom, the United States "lost" Russia in the 1990s. This
assessment can be found on the pages of The Nation, The Washington Times, The New
York Times magazine, or foreign policy issue papers prepared for presidential candidate
George W. Bush. These attacks fall into two contradictory categories. One school holds
that the policies pursued by the United States over the last decade have failed to establish capitalism and democracy in Russia, and instead have fueled corruption, crime, and ill will towards the United States. The other school argues that the United States was wrong to try to engineer domestic change within Russia in the first place.
Like almost every discussion about Russia in the last ten years (and the Soviet Union during the preceding seven decades), the debate about Russias upcoming parliamentary election is polarized simplistically between "optimists" and "pessimists." Optimists believe that the election is a "good thing." People are voting, parties are participating, and everyone is happy. Pessimists believe that the election is a "bad thing." People do not care, parties dont matter, and everyone is sad.
Every day, democracies all over the world change governments in accordance with some predetermined constitutional process. Yet, when Russian politicians decide to change their government, the event is framed as a "constitutional crisis," a "period of instability" or evidence that Russian president Boris Yeltsin has gone mad.