The emerging relationship between China and Russia is perhaps the most important force redefining international relations in post-Cold War Asia. In recent years, Russia and China have built a strategic partnership aimed at the 21st century--a development that deeply worries some Western observers and puzzles others.

In this first comprehensive study of Russian-Chinese relations, Sherman Garnett and a team of fifteen U.S., Russian, and Chinese scholars analyze the most important issues posed by the relationship, including: cross-border trade, the impact of Russia's center-periphery politics, migration, arms sales, and (mis)perceptions of one another. The book assesses what will be one of the most important relationships, economically and strategically, in the dynamic region stretching from Central Asia to the Far East. It also weighs the prospects for real cooperation between Russia, a severely weakened power, and China, a power on the rise.

It has been nearly nine years since Russia embarked on ambitious reforms to establish a democratic political system and free-market economy. The road to these goals has not been easy, nor has the task of building relations with the United States following the Cold War. After nine years, what is Russia tody and what will it be in the future - a partner or a competitor?

"During the Yeltsin years, it became fashionable in the West to cite Russia's weak state as the source of Russia's ills. Putin has demonstrated after only a few months in office that the Russian federal state still has tremendous power-perhaps too much power-if the man in control of that state is vigorous, ambitious, and popular."

Russian democracy and American national security are intimately intertwined. This link is not new, but it is not well understood. When the cold war ended and Soviet communism disappeared, American national security was enhanced. If dictatorship returns to Russia, the United States and its allies will once again be threatened. Containment would likely be adopted as the guiding principle of American foreign policy. The United States could find itself in an arms race with Russia. We argue here that the connection of Russian politics and U.S. security needs to be clearer in the minds of U.S. decision makers. Failure to recognize and respond to this link will have consequences for U.S. security interests.

Russia's March 2000 presidential election represents one step forward and two steps back for Russian democracy. For the first time in Russia's history, power within the Kremlin has changed hands through an electoral process. The election not only took place but was conducted as constitutionally prescribed, no small achievement for a country with Russia's authoritarian history. More than two-thirds of the eligible voters participated, and they appeared to make informed choices among a range of candidates who offered competing platforms, policies, and leadership styles. The election, however, was not contested on a level playing field. The winner, acting president Vladimir Putin, enjoyed tremendous advantages that tainted the process. Although weak in some arenas, the Russian state still enjoys too much power with respect to the electoral process, while nongovernmental forces--political parties, civic organizations, trade unions, and independent business groups--remain too weak to shape the outcomes of elections.

Two specialists on Russian politics chronicle the formation and early development of Unity, the latest version of the "party of power" in Russian politics. Unity's unexpected success in the election of the State Duma in December 1999 helped assure Vladimir Putin's subsequent election as president and gave him a reliable base of support within the Duma itself. The authors draw on extensive interviews with participants to outline the motivations behind the creation of Unity and the campaign strategy it pursued in the fall of 1999. They go on to analyze popular sources of support for the party, relying on a two-wave panel survey of the Russian electorate.

A party system is an essential attribute of a democratic policy. No parties, no democracy. Despite the erosion of the influence of parties in old democracies and the difficulties of establishing new parties in new democracies, theorists still agree that parties and a party system are necessary evils for the functioning of representative government. In liberal democracies, parties perform several tasks. During elections, they provide voters with distinctive choices, be they ideological, social, or even ethnic. After elections, parties then represent the interests of their constituents in the formulation (and sometimes implementation) of state policy. The degree of party penetration of state institutions need not correlate directly with a given party?s power over policy outcomes. Empowered by expertise or connections to key decision makers, small parties can have inordinate influence over policy debates, while large parties may suffer the opposite: no expertise, no personal networks, and therefore, little influence over policy. Yet, some degree of representation within the state is usually necessary for a party to influence policy outcomes. In polities with highly developed party systems, parties also perform other functions that can include everything from organizing social life to social welfare.

Days after staring down the August 1991 coup attempt, Russian President Boris Yeltsin boasted a 90 percent approval rating at home, adorned the cover of every international weekly in the world, and was christened a democratic hero by world leaders from Washington to Tokyo. When he suddenly resigned as president on December 31, 1999, Yeltsin enjoyed an eight percent approval rating at home (with a margin of error of plus or minus four percent). He probably had only two or three international calls to make. With the exception of Bill Clinton and a few others, Yeltsin had almost no friends in high places left. Even the Western media all but ignored the passing of this onetime hero. When Clinton appeared that morning to comment on Yeltsin's retirement, most American television networks chose instead to air the fireworks display in Beijing.

Russia today is an electoral democracy. Political leaders come to power through the ballot box. They are not appointed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. They do not take office by seizing power through the use of force. Most elites in Russia and the vast majority of the Russian population now recognize elections as the only legitimate means to power. Leaders and parties that espouse authoritarian practices--be they fascists or neocommunists--have moved to the margins of Russia's political stage. Given Russia's thousand-year history of autocratic rule, the emergence of electoral democracy must be recognized as a revolutionary achievement of the last decade.