This week, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov unveiled a new foreign policy doctrine for Russia. As a written document, the doctrine underscores all the right themes. Two themes stand out. First, Russian policymakers plan to follow a rational and realistic foreign policy that will serve Russian economic and political interests. Such a strategy includes active engagement with the West. Second, Russian leaders see an intimate relationship between domestic and foreign policy. The document stresses the need to use foreign policy to help solve Russia's domestic problems, including first and foremost Russia's economic woes.

Michael McFaul discusses the potential for cooperation between the United States and Russia, emphasizing that in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, Russia is in a unique position to partner with the United States. The author warns that any partnership will depend on Russia's continued democratic development and that the U.S. leadership must continue to support democratic consolidation in Russia.

In the wake of the August 1998 financial meltdown, many predicted that political breakdown would soon follow. Throughout the summer and fall, Russian analysts of all political orientations began to speak openly and often about the specter of Russian fascism should the economic crisis continue. Others, including even Yeltsin, have warned about coup plots aimed at toppling Russia's fragile democracy. The threat of Russian federal dissolution also loomed as a possible nightmare scenario as individual regional leaders began to deal with the economic crisis with little regard for national laws or national interests. In this new political context, challenges to Russian electoral democracy have proliferated. Before August 1998, it was taboo to speak of, let alone advocate, alternatives to elections as the method for selecting political leaders. After August 1998, discussions of alternatives have renewed again.

Like no other international crisis of the last decade, NATO's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia threatens to undermine support for Western-oriented reforms in Russia and isolate Moscow from the West internationally. Siding with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and thwarting liberal reforms at home do not serve the long-term interests of Russia as a world power or Russians as a people. In the passion of the moment, however, Russian leaders may be tempted, or feel compelled to take drastic measures to assist Serbia, which, in turn, could precipitate a passionate anti-Russian response in the West. The resulting strain in U.S.-Russia relations would give new meaning to the term "collateral damage."

Although few in Washington have noticed, US-Russian relations have entered a new era with the NATO bombing of Serbia.

The Clinton Administration was right to reject Slobodan Milosevic's cease-fire proposal -- entering into negotiations now with Serbia, which has largely achieved its military goals in Kosovo before NATO has achieved much of anything, would be an admission of defeat.

Only a few weeks ago, Russia was one of the most downtrodden and detested countries in the eyes of Washington's elite. One could not utter the word "Russia" without adding adjectives such as "crime- ridden," "collapsing" or "corrupt." Russia was considered a basket case of a country that had failed at capitalism and democracy and was soon to fail as a state. Russia's reputation in the United States was so bad that Russian businesspeople began courting American public relations firms to help rectify Russia's image.