A potential solution for weak or failing states is to enact a delegation agreement whereby a host relinquishes authority over some governance function to an external actor. Through case studies in Melanesia, I find that these arrangements can be implemented as treaties, rather than contracts, so that the external actor can in such cases remain somewhat exempt from the normal procedure or law of the host state. I also generate hypotheses about the conditions under which host states and external actors enact these self-enforcing equilibria: host states request these agreements either where a failure of law and order requires assistance to reestablish control over the use of force, or where a budgetary crisis necessitates funding to provide public goods. External actors agree to them where the host state poses a transnational security threat, and where the reputational and actual costs of the mission are low, as judged against alternative methods for resolving the threat. The next step in this project, then, is to test these hypotheses in other cases to see if similar agreements are enacted in different regions, and, if so, whether the same incentives also explain the decisions elsewhere.

Aila M. Matanock is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Stanford. Her current research is on effective governance for minimizing conflict, and on bringing violent groups into elections in conflicted states. Before coming to Stanford, she was employed by the RAND Corporation as a research assistant and summer associate on non-proliferation and counterterrorism projects. She received an undergraduate degree magna cum laude in Social Studies from Harvard University, while also working with the Belfer Center's Managing the Atom Project and with the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Seminar summary:

In her presentation, "Learning to Share: Under What Conditions do States Delegate Governance?" Aila Matanock seeks to define the concept of delegated governance and to identify the circumstances under which it arises. Drawing from field research with political elites in Australia and the Melanesian micro-states, she presents the variation in degrees of shared governance arrangements, from strict delegation to semi delegation, contracting and monitoring.

She defines delegated governance as an arrangement between a host state and an external actor that involves sharing in the decision function of the host state. She emphasizes the incentives of both host state and external actor as a framework for identifying the set of conditions under which we might expect to observe delegated governance. She argues and finds, in the Melanesian cases, that host states are more likely to seek delegation agreements if (1) they have lost their monopoly over the use of force (and there is no civil war or major ethnic cleavage); or (2) they are suffering from a severe budgetary crisis. External actors, for their part, enter into such agreements based on the costs they believe they will incur: reputational gains within the international community and domestic support for the delegation arrangement decrease an external actor's cost perception and increase its likelihood of entering into such an agreement. Matanock concludes that the Melanesian cases inform us that governance delegation is not an infrequent phenomenon. It is likely to emerge where lawlessness threatens both the host and external actor, but is constrained by the level of violence and the cleavages in society.

Matanock's presentation prompted questions about the scope and generalizability of the argument (To what extent do these findings reflect a special relationship between Australia and the Melanesian states? Would this apply in larger states such as Cambodia and Liberia, where the costs to an external actor might be greater?); the specific factors leading to the choice of delegated governance over other options (such as contracting, monitoring,...); and the power relationship between external actor and host state.

The stated purpose of the Trade Act of 1974 was to promote free trade. Section 301 authorized the U.S. President to impose retaliatory trade sanctions if negotiations were unsuccessful in reducing unreasonable limits on trade. The Act was reinforced in 1984, became known as “Super 301”, and made annual assessment and retaliatory measures mandatory.

Because of trade imbalances, four emerging Asian countries gave the US firms access to cigarette markets: Japan (1987), Taiwan (1987), South Korea (1989) and Thailand (1990). These forced market opennings were called the “Second Opium War” by local protestors in these countries, challenging U.S. export of unwelcome and unhealthy products.

A sea change occurred in the decades that followed the cigarette market opening in Taiwan. Of particular interest are changes in areas marketing skills and market share; lower cigarette prices; paradoxical increased smuggling; increased youth consumption; evolution of the powerful tobacco industry lobby; and a sharp increase in tobacco-related cancer deaths. Accompanying the increased cigarette consumption, a special, unusual habit of chewing betel quid started and grew into a mainstream practice among adult males (nearly one out of four). Oral and esophageal cancer increased sharply soon after the market opened. At the same time, the patriotic protectionists, NGOs, and government galvanized an anti-smoking movement, which gradually transformed Taiwan's culture so that smoking in public is no longer socially acceptable. A new term, “de-normalization,” was coined about the favorable effect of market opening.

 The ironic outcome of Super 301 is that while the market was forced open solely by the US, in only ten years, US market share, once leading, shrunk to a distant fifth, after Japan, UK, Germany and domestic producers. The trade imbalance was little affected by the opening of the cigarette market.

Dr. Wen's colloquium continues the colloquium series on tobacco control in East Asia, sponsored by the Asia Health Policy Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, in coordination with FSI’s Global Tobacco Prevention Research Initiative.

Chin-Shou Wang is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Graduate Institute of Political Economy at the National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan. He has interviewed more than one hundred Taiwanese prosecutors and judges. He recently published an article on judicial independence reform in the Taiwanese Political Science Review. He is currently working on a book titled Revolt from the Bottom: Judicial Independence Reform in Taiwan.

Professor Wang obtained his MA and Ph.D. in Sociology from University of Carolina at Chapel Hill, and BS in Industrial Management from National Cheng Kung University. 

This is a CDDRL seminar within our Democracy in Taiwan Program.

Iqbal Z. Quadir is the founder and director of the Legatum Center for Development and Entrepreneurship at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which promotes bottom-up entrepreneurship in developing countries. In the 1990s, Quadir founded GrameenPhone, which provides effective telephone access throughout Bangladesh.

Quadir is an accomplished entrepreneur who writes about the critical roles of entrepreneurship and innovations in improving the economic and political conditions in low-income countries. Quadir is often credited as having been the earliest observer of the potential for mobile phones to transform low-income countries. His work has been recognized by leaders and organizations worldwide, as a new and successful approach to sustainable poverty alleviation.

For four years, Quadir taught at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, focusing on the impact of technologies in the politics and economics of developing countries. In 2005, he moved to MIT. His particular research interest is in the democratizing effects of technologies in developing countries.

Earlier in his career, Quadir served as a vice president of Atrium Capital Corp., an associate of Security Pacific Merchant Bank, both in New York, and a consultant to the World Bank in Washington DC. He received an MBA and an MA from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and a BS with honors from Swarthmore College.

Peter Ordeshook is Professor of Political Science at Caltech, member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, author or coauthor of An Introduction to Positive Political Theory; Game Theory and Political Theory; Lessons for Citizens of a New Democracy; Voters, Parties and Elections; A Political Theory Primer; Time Discounting in Social Networks; Designing Federalism; and (forthcoming) The Forensics of Election Fraud.

Seymour Martin Lipset famously claimed that the more well-to-do a nation is, the greater the chance that it will sustain democracy.  This "law" fits the experience of several countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia.  Formerly authoritarian South Korea and Taiwan grew rich and became stable democracies with active civil societies, as Lipset would have expected.  His "law" fits the Philippines and Thailand as well- -poor countries with tenuous holds on democracy where uncivil societies have mobilized to defend elite hegemony against mass-based electoral challenges.

The case of Indonesia, in contrast, limits Lipset's Law.  Poor yet stably democratic, Indonesia is free of regime-threatening social conflicts.  Arguably, despite its poverty, its democracy is already consolidated.  India's record of sustaining democracy is another case in point.  These poor yet successfully democratic polities amount to large stakes in the heart of modernization theory.

Prof. Thompson will contend that Indonesia's democracy is neither middle-class-based nor dominated by big business, but is instead still characterized by traditional cross-cutting ethno-religious cleavages that limit the impact of money politics, reduce the risk of populism, foster elite consensus, and thereby encourage democratic stability. He will link his argument not only to Lipset's Law but to the intellectual legacies of Alexis de Tocqueville, Antonio Gramsci, and Barrington Moore among other students of democracy and modernity.

Mark R. Thompson is a professor of political science at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg in Germany.  A Chicago native, he took his first degree in religious studies at Brown University followed by postgraduate work at Cambridge University and the University of the Philippines.  Fascinated by Philippine people power, he wrote his dissertation at Yale University on the anti-Marcos struggle (Yale University Press, 1996).  After moving to Germany, he witnessed popular uprisings in East Germany and Eastern Europe, inspiring him to conceptualize democratic revolutions in essays later published as a book (Routledge, 2004).  He is in residence at Stanford from February through April 2009.