Bandwidth connectivity is extremely low in many parts of the world, often delaying or even preventing people from accessing information. Although connectivity has increased by a factor of 10 or 15 over the last decade, average webpage size and number of objects has simultaneously increased by a factor of 60. This has resulted in what Subramanian terms an "unusable web"; the addition of video, audio and images has created huge web pages that take minutes or even hours to load in low connectivity worlds.

In his talk, Subramanian describes a range of techniques that he and his colleagues are developing to enhance information access in three scenarios of poor connectivity. These techniques illustrate the type of technologies being devised by a new group in Computer Science termed "Computing for Development." The focus of this group is on the design, implementation and evaluation of new computing innovations that enable global social and economic development. Since first world technology can often be a bad fit, this group instead seeks technologies that are locally appropriate, cost-effective, and easy to use.

The first low-connectivity scenario Subramanian discusses is that facing rural mobile users, who rely on low-end mobile devices and can thus only access voice and SMS services. To address the massive need for SMS services for this scenario, Subramanian and his colleagues have developed an SMS-based protocol stack for mobile applications that makes it possible to compress large quantities of information. The so-called UjU stack enables the compression of information into a 140-byte stack, while an affiliated UjU Create App interface enables anyone to create their own apps and forms. These forms are essentially turned into structured records (tables) that can be filled out and transmitted through a short message on a mobile phone. To date, UjU has already been used for microfinance applications in Mexico, mobile health data collection in India, and other applications in Ghana. Subramanian and his colleagues are also rolling out a live SMS search engine in Kenya and a data-over-GSM voice stack to support data connectivity over cellular voice.

Shared low bandwidth networks present a second low-connectivity scenario. In this scenario, an example of which might be a school where 2 Mbps of connectivity is used by 400 students, Subramanian suggests that a completely new Web architecture is needed. He and his colleagues have deployed an early version of such a system called Rural Café User Interface. Typically, a web browser sends dozens of requests when it is loading a particular page, since each site draws content from various sources and advertisers. Rather than being able to attempt to load as many windows and pages as possible, which results in even slower access, every user in Rural Café has a queue of what their search requests are. Users can search for anything at any point, but the interface acts as a planning tool by reporting how long (in seconds or minutes) the user would have to wait to load any particular site. The queue is persistent, so it doesn't change depending on how many new windows users try to open. This system is already being deployed in a few schools and universities in Kenya and India.

The third scenario is that of schools that have computer access, but no connectivity. To address this problem, Subramanian proposes the use of "vertical search engines" or contextual information portals that deliver a vertical slice of the Web in a hard-disk and provide an offline searchable and browse-able Internet. The portals are locally searchable and composed of many web-based services. Since the portals allow the user to search the local cache for the information they need rather than the URLs themselves, many local requests can be handled without browsing, supposing the local cache is strong and based on local interests and content. This is a good tool for either improving download times for people who have limited connectivity, or for enabling access for information for people without any connectivity at all. So far, the system has been piloted as an information tool for students and teachers in five schools with computers but no connectivity around Nairobi, Kenya.

The central premise underlying Bussell's discussion this week is the reality that public service provision is often flawed in the developing world. Reforming public services entails significant efforts to increase the quality of public service, and there have been two important recent trends in this space: privatization and public-private partnerships and increased use of information and communication technologies (ICTs). The one-stop services model (which has been adopted globally in various forms, from Singapore's eCitizen Centre to Germany's Buergerbuero or "Citizen's Bureau"), exemplifies current trends.

In her research, which focuses primarily on the case of India, Bussell asks the following questions: why do or don't governments reform public service delivery? And when governments decide to implement reforms, why do they or don't they employ ICTs in these reforms?

The Indian strategy to public service reform has been to create stand-alone, one-stop citizen service centers. These centers are computerized and frequently have private-sector participation. Aside from these typical characteristics, there is significant state-level variation on several points, including timing of policy adoption, quantity and type of services, degree of automation, and ownership and management models.

Bussell discusses a variety of hypotheses that offer insight into the potential factors influencing the character of Indian reforms. First, she notes that politicians faced mixed electoral incentives for and against reforms. After all, there is evidence that eServices can improve service characteristics and reduce corruption. On the other hand, reforms may also reduce politicians' opportunities to amass funds to run for re-election. After all, bureaucratic discretion and opaque processes enable the siphoning of funds and bribe taking in service delivery. Politicians use "transfer authority" over bureaucrats to access bribes. More transparent services, due the implementation of reforms, threaten this access to bribes. At the same time, reform may also offer new opportunity for rents. Private partnerships to run centers entail new contracting processes. Larger-scale bribes may be available from ownership and management negotiation.

Based on these mixed direct and indirect incentives, Bussell predicts that reform will require expected net benefits to ruling politicians. States with higher petty corruption should implement policy reforms later. Meanwhile, states with higher grand corruption might lead to more partnerships with private sector.

So what factors actually explain variation in when different Indian states adopted reform? According to Bussell's research, the level of corruption was the most statistically significant variable affecting the timing of reform adoption. However, whether or not there was a coalition government in power was also significant. This means that an increase of 1 point out of 10 in the state's corruption level led to a 63% decrease in the chance of a reform being adopted in a given year. The quantity of services covered varied widely in the sample of states from less than 10 to more than 40 services. On average, moving from a state with below average corruption to a state with above average corruption causes a drop of 14 in the number of services covered.

In addition to examining the variation in reform adoption across Indian states, Bussell also looks at the consequences of reform. Despite reforms in the state of Karnataka, to give one example, demand for services continues to outstrip supply. Visitors to Nemmadi (privately-run computerized centers) were able to access services faster, while paying less money, making less visits, spending less time waiting at each visit, and seeing a reduction (on average) in the number of days before receiving the service. Despite quantitative improvements in average efficiency, however, perceived efficiency actually declined. Now, there is a 7-day minimum for service delivery and a 21-day maximum. Although average has declined as a consequence of these new requirements, it is now impossible to bribe officials in order to achieve service delivery in one day.

According to Bussell, these results bring up some interesting policy implications. First, it is important to consider the institutional incentives underlying the established model in order to ensure that reforms are effective. The incentives faced by both top politicians and street level officials must be taken into account. Second, it may be best to design policies that establish a strong, if narrow, initial model. After all, growing citizen demand affects electoral benefits and the calculations of politicians. Third, more research must be done regarding the various factors that influence policy outcomes. According to cases in South Africa and Brazil, there is some evidence that differences in electoral competition can affect policy outcomes. In South Africa, for instance, less electoral competition has led to less incentive to reform. More research will help to clarify the factors of importance in public service reform implementation.

Drawing upon his experience with India's Right to Information movement, Vivek focused his discussion on how information and communication technology (ICT) tools could be designed and applied to strengthen people's movements to combat corruption. Of course, Vivek conceded, ICT cannot combat all kinds of corruption. These tools can be very effective, however, in combating types of corruption for which there is a paper trail attesting to something that never happened (such as the construction of a road or the provision of grain subsides or other goods).

In the past, it has been possible for members of people's movements working to combat corruption to request lists of all government programs going on in a village to monitor who received what benefits. After summing up this information over a long period and comparing notes with the villagers themselves, activists have then been able to expose inaccuracies in government records through public hearings.

Although activists can carry out this sort of fact checking without the use of advanced ICTs, the introduction of such ICTs has helped social movements work much more effectively to combat corruption. After all, an individual who goes to a government office to obtain public information will often face significant resistance. Requiring that government offices make information available online makes getting public records much easier. Additionally, cross-comparisons of data created by different government agencies (i.e. comparing ration card data against census information for each village) can be much more easily executed once this data is online.

In some cases, changing procedures can help reduce certain types of corruption. In Kathmandu, for example, public officials began to be required to wear shirts and pants with no pockets to reduce exchange of petty bribes. Creating procedures like these are very useful, Vivek emphasized, but they can also be enhanced through the use of ICTs. In the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, for example, public managers of public works projects began to be required to send text message at 10:30 in the morning, to ensure that officials accurately reported the number of persons employed at the site. Since these messages can be sent to all interested parties, anyone can photograph the site with their cell phone to expose officials' misreporting. This example illustrates how timely verification and dissemination of information can establish whether information is being falsified.

New technologies are also enabling the reporting of new types of information. New kinds of accounting include cross-verification, biometric verification, image-based processes (i.e. video and audio), and geo-specific information (i.e. through RFID, a low cost passive electric tag). Although what you can verify (i.e. teacher presence at the school) is not always the same as the indicator that is truly important (i.e. student learning), the use of these new reporting methods can often raise the cost of cheating.

In closing, Vivek noted that unless people are mobilized, they will not do anything to combat corruption. Once systems are in place however, technology can make any mobilized groups work more effectively. To maximize the ability of activists to extract information from the grassroots level, we need new forms of accounting and dissemination that are user-centered and not divided up by governmental department. Separating implementation agencies from payment agencies will be another positive approach in the attempt to reduce corruption. As entitlement programs grow due to the increased emphasis on a rights-based approach to international development, the need to combat various kinds of corruption is growing, and the application of ICTs offers a big step forward.

Two decades after the fall of Soviet-bloc dictatorships, popular movements for democracy are erupting in the last regional bastion of authoritarianism: the Arab world.

So far, only Tunisia's dictator, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, has been toppled, while Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak - who has ruled that ancient land longer than many pharaohs - announced Tuesday that he will step down in September. But other Arab autocrats are bound to go. From Algeria to Syria to Jordan, people are fed up with stagnation and injustice, and are mobilizing for democratic change.

So, what happens when the autocrat is gone? Will the end of despotism give way to chaos - as happened when Mobutu Sese Seko was toppled in 1997 after more than 30 years in power in Zaire? Will the military or some civilian strongman fill the void with a new autocracy - as occurred after the overthrow of Arab monarchs in Egypt and Iraq in the 1950s, and as has been the norm in most of the world until recently? Or can some of the Arab nations produce real democracy - as we saw in most of Eastern Europe and about half the states of sub-Saharan Africa? Regime transitions are uncertain affairs. But since the mid-1970s, more than 60 countries have found their way to democracy. Some have done so in circumstances of rapid upheaval that offer lessons for reformers in Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries today.

Unite the democratic opposition.

When a dictatorship is on the ropes, one thing that can rescue it is a divided opposition. That is why autocrats so frequently foster those divisions, secretly funding a proliferation of opposition parties. Even extremely corrupt rulers may generate significant electoral support - not the thumping majorities they claim, but enough to steal an election - when the opposition is splintered.

In the Philippines in 1986, Nicaragua in 1990 and Ukraine in 2004, the opposition united around the candidacies of Corazon Aquino, Violeta Chamorro and Viktor Yushchenko, respectively. Broad fronts such as these - as well as the Concertacion movement that swept Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin to power in Chile in 1989 after the departure of Gen. Augusto Pinochet - often span deep personal and ideological differences. But the time for democratic forces to debate those matters is later, once the old order is defeated and democratic institutions have been established.

Egypt is fortunate - it has an obvious alternative leader, Mohamed ElBaradei, whom disparate opposition elements seem to be rallying around. Whether the next presidential election is held on schedule in September or moved up, ElBaradei, or anyone like him leading a broad opposition front, will probably win a resounding victory over anyone connected to Mubarak's National Democratic Party.

Make sure the old order really is gone.

The exit of a long-ruling strongman, such as Ben Ali, does not necessarily mean the end of a regime. Fallen dictators often leave behind robust political and security machines. No autocrat in modern times met a more immediate fate than Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu, who was executed by a firing squad of his own soldiers in 1989 just three days after a popular revolution forced him to flee the capital. Yet his successor, Ion Iliescu, was a corrupt former communist who obstructed political reform. Most of the former Soviet states, such as Georgia and Kazakhstan, had similar experiences.

Countries are much more likely to get to democracy quickly if they identify and embrace political leaders who are untainted by the old order and are ready to roll it back.

But also come to an understanding with the old order.

Victorious democrats won't be able to completely excise the pillars of the authoritarian order. Instead, for their country to turn toward democracy, those pillars must be neutralized or co-opted. This old order may descend into violence when, as in Iraq, broad classes of elites are stigmatized and ousted from their positions. In a successful bargain, most old-regime elites retain their freedom, assets and often their jobs but accept the new rules of the democratic game.

Unless the military collapses in defeat, as it did in Greece in 1974 and in Argentina after the Falklands War, it must be persuaded to at least tolerate a new democratic order. In the short run, that means guaranteeing the military significant autonomy, as well as immunity from prosecution for its crimes. Over time, civilian democratic control of the military can be extended incrementally, as was done masterfully in Brazil in the 1980s and in Chile during the 1990s. But if the professional military feels threatened and demeaned from the start, the transition is in trouble.

The same principle applies to surviving elements of the state security apparatus, the bureaucracy and the ruling party. In South Africa, for example, old-regime elements received amnesty for their human rights abuses in exchange for fully disclosing what they had done. In this and other successful transitions, top officials were replaced, but most state bureaucrats kept their jobs.

Rewrite the rules.

A new democratic government needs a new constitution, but it can't be drawn up too hastily. Meanwhile, some key provisions can be altered expeditiously, either by legislation, interim executive fiat or national consensus.

In Spain, the path to democratization was opened by the Law for Political Reform, adopted by the parliament within a year of dictator Francisco Franco's death in 1975. Poland adopted a package of amendments in 1992, only after it had elected a new parliament and a new president, Lech Walesa; a new constitution followed in 1997. South Africa enacted an interim constitution to govern the country while it undertook an ambitious constitution-writing process with wide popular consultation - which is the ideal arrangement.

An urgent priority, though, is to rewrite the rules so that free and fair elections are possible. This must happen before democratic elections can be held in Egypt and Tunisia. In transitions toward democracy, there is a strong case for including as many political players as possible. This requires some form of proportional representation to ensure that emerging small parties can have a stake in the new order, while minimizing the organizational advantage of the former ruling party. In the 2005 elections in Iraq, proportional representation ensured a seat at the table for smaller minority and liberal parties that could never have won a plurality in individual districts.

Isolate the extremes.

That said, not everyone can or should be brought into the new democratic order. Prosecuting particularly venal members of a former ruling family, such as those tied to the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos, Indonesia's fallen strongman Suharto or now Tunisia's Ben Ali, can be part of a larger reconciliation strategy. But the circle of punishment must be drawn narrowly. It may even help the transition to drive a wedge between a few old-regime cronies and the bulk of the establishment, many of whom may harbor grievances against "the family."

A transitional government should aim for inclusion, and should test the democratic commitment of dubious players rather than inadvertently induce them to become violent opponents. However, groups that refuse to renounce violence as a means of obtaining power, or that reject the legitimacy of democracy, have no place in the new order. That provision was part of the wisdom of the postwar German constitution.

Transitions are full of opportunists, charlatans and erstwhile autocrats who enter the new political field with no commitment to democracy. Every democratic transition that has endured - from Spain and Portugal to Chile, South Africa and now hopefully Indonesia - has tread this path.

Fragile democracies become stable when people who once had no use for democracy embrace it as the only game in town.