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The field of authoritarian subtypes has usefully described the third wave's undercurrent, an international trend toward plebiscitarian politics among persistent dictatorships. Yet classification does not replace explanation and the proliferation of "authoritarianism with adjectives" risks diverting attention from the core question of comparative regime change studies: Under what conditions do authoritarian regimes become democracies? This paper attempts to reorient the study of contemporary authoritarianism with a theory of ruling parties and coalition management. Whether electoral or exclusionary, authoritarian regimes with ruling parties prove more robust than other nondemocratic systems. Statistical analysis of 135 regimes during the period 1975-2000 shows that the presence or absence of multiparty elections, the key feature of the brand new authoritarianism, has no significant impact on regime survival while party institutionalization remains a strong predictor of regime longevity. Process tracing in four cases with limited multiparty politics details the causal relationship between ruling parties and regime persistence. Egypt and Malaysia evince a pattern of durability in which the dominant party resolves intra-elite conflict and prevents the defection of influential leaders. Iran and the Philippines show that the decline of ruling party institutions generates elite polarization and public rifts, a necessary but insufficient condition for successful opposition mobilization and regime change. Contrary to widespread expectations, elections do not destabilize authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes that have neglected the institutions of coalition maintenance destabilize elections.

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CDDRL Working Papers
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Jason M. Brownlee
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Hosted by the Stanford Project on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE) as part of their Greater China Forum which meets first Tuesday of each month.

Joseph Y. Liu

President, CEO, and member, Board of Directors, Oplink Communications, Inc.

Oplink designs, manufactures, and markets fiber optic products and services that increase the performance of optical networks, including its photonic foundry with manufacturing activities in Zhuhai and design and engineering in San Jose.

Sam T. Wang, Ph.D.

President, SMIC Americas, the US operations of Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC)

With an IPO in March 2004 (and current market cap of $3.6 billion), SMIC is China's most advanced pure play IC foundry company, with wafer fabs located in Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin, including its Fab 1 named "Top Fab of the Year for 2003" by Semiconductor International.

Tien Wu, Ph.D.

President, ASE Americas, Europe and Japan, Board of Directors and Corporate Vice President, Worldwide Marketing and Strategy, ASE Inc., and Chief Executive Officer, ISE Labs Inc (An ASE Test Company)

The ASE Group is the world's largest provider of independent semiconductor manufacturing services in assembly and test with $2.9 billion sales revenue in 2003, 29,000 employees worldwide, and facilities across Asia, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

Philippines Conference Room

Joseph Y. Liu President, CEO, and Member, Board of Directors Oplink Communications, Inc.
Sam T. Wang President, SMIC Americas the US operations of Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation
Tien Wu President, ASE Americas, Europe, and Japan, Board of Directors and Corporate Vice President, Worldwide Marketing and Strategy, ASE Inc., and Chief Executive Officer, ISE Labs Inc (An ASE Test Company)
William F. Miller Co-director Moderator SPRIE
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Alex Thier
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CDDRL Visiting Fellow J. Alexander Thier questions President Bush's assertion that Afghanistan is on a path to democracy. In three years, he notes, the United States has failed to create a secure, stable or prosperous Afghanistan.

President Bush describes Afghanistan, the first front on the war on terrorism, as a success. In comparison to Iraq, perhaps it is. But if you look at Afghanistan on its own merits, the lack of progress is disheartening. In 2002, President Bush promised a "Marshall Plan" for the country, with the goal of turning Afghanistan into a stable, democratic state. On Tuesday, before the United Nations General Assembly, the president said that "the Afghan people are on the path to democracy and freedom." Yet in nearly three years we have failed to create security, stability, prosperity or the rule of law in Afghanistan.

These failings are not just a reflection of the great difficulties of nation-building in places like Afghanistan, they are also the direct result of the Bush administration's policy decisions. Our efforts in Afghanistan are underfinanced and undermanned, and our attention is waning.

The root of the problem is that we invaded Afghanistan to destroy something - the Taliban and Al Qaeda - but we didn't think much about what would grow in its place. While we focused on fighting the terrorists (and even there our effectiveness has been questionable), Afghanistan has become a collection of warlord-run fiefs fueled by a multibillion-dollar opium economy. We armed and financed warlord armies with records of drug-running and human rights abuses stretching back two decades. Then we blocked the expansion of an international security force meant to rein in the militias. These decisions were made for short-term battlefield gain - with disregard for the long-term implications for the mission there.

Our Army continues to hunt insurgents in the mountains, but we have refused to take the steps necessary to secure the rest of the country, and it shows. More coalition and Afghan government soldiers and aid workers have died this year than in each of the previous two. This summer, Doctors Without Borders, which has worked in the most desperate and dangerous conditions around the world, pulled out of Afghanistan after 24 years. In other words, the group felt safer in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and the civil war that followed than it did three years after the United States-led coalition toppled the Taliban.

Last month, after a United Nations-backed voter registration office was bombed, the vice president of the United Nations Staff Union urged Secretary General Kofi Annan to pull employees out of Afghanistan. The opium trade is also out of control, fueling lawlessness and financing terrorists. Last year, the trade brought in $2.3 billion; this year, opium production is expected to increase 50 to 100 percent.

Amid terrorist attacks and fighting among regional warlords, the country is preparing for presidential elections on Oct. 9. A recent United Nations report warned that warlords were intimidating voters and candidates. This month, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has monitored post-conflict elections in trouble spots like Bosnia and Kosovo, declared that Afghanistan was too dangerous for its election monitors (it is sending a small "election support team'' instead). President Hamid Karzai narrowly escaped assassination last week on his first campaign trip outside Kabul, and eight other presidential candidates have called for elections to be delayed, saying it's been too dangerous for them to campaign.

Many of these problems flow from early mistakes. Rather than moving quickly to establish security and then gradually turning over control to a legitimate domestic authority, we have done the opposite. As fighting among warlord militias in the countryside intensifies, we are slowly expanding our presence and being dragged into conflicts. The American "advisers" in Afghan Army units, the ubiquitous heavily armed "private" security forces and the fortress-like American Embassy are garnering comparisons to the day of the Soviets.

In Kabul, the effort to build a stable, capable government has also lagged dangerously. President Karzai has begun to show great fortitude in challenging warlords. But his factious cabinet, born of political compromise, has collapsed under the pressure of the country's hurried presidential elections. Outside Kabul, his control remains tenuous in some places, nonexistent in others. Kabul's Supreme Court, the only other branch of government, is controlled by Islamic fundamentalists unconcerned with the dictates of Afghanistan's new Constitution. On Sept. 1, without any case before the court, the chief justice ordered that Latif Pedram, a presidential candidate, be barred from the elections and investigated for blasphemy. His crime? Mr. Pedram had suggested that polygamy was unfair to women. These clerics are trying to establish a system like that in Iran, using Islam as a bludgeon against democracy.

It's true that there have been several important accomplishments in these three years: the Taliban and Al Qaeda no longer sit in Kabul's Presidential Palace; girls are back in school in many parts of the country; some roads and buildings have been rebuilt; and more than 10 million Afghans have registered to vote for the presidential elections. Thousands of international aid workers have been working with the Afghans, often at great risk, to make things better. Despite the slow progress, most Afghans are more hopeful about their future than they have been in years.

But many people working there are left with the nagging feeling that much more could have been done both to help Afghanistan and fight terrorism over the last three years. Our experience demonstrates that you can't fight wars, or do nation-building, on the cheap. Afghanistan should be a critical election issue this year, but Iraq looms much larger in the public mind. Unless the next administration steps up to the plate, it may well be an issue in four years, when we start asking, "Who lost Afghanistan?"

J Alexander Thier, a fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, was a legal adviser to Afghanistan's constitutional and judicial reform commissions.

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CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow, 2004-05
Visiting Fellow and Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution 2004-05
athier_photo_-_alex_thier.jpg

Alex Thier is Senior Advisor at Moby Media. He served as CEO of the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery; Co- Director of the Task Force on US Strategy to Support Democracy and Counter Authoritarianism; and Senior Democracy Fellow at Freedom House. He was the ninth Executive Director of the Overseas Development Institute in London, a leading global think tank on sustainable development, conflict, climate, and governance. He was appointed by President Obama to serve as chief of USAID’s Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning from 2013 to 2015, and as chief of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs from 2010 to 2013. He worked previously at the US Institute of Peace, the United Nations, and Oxfam. He was a CDDRL and Hoover Fellow in 2004-2005, and is a graduate of Stanford Law School.

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Creative destruction "revolutionises the economic structure from within," Joseph Schumpeter famously said, "incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one." Innovation in business-new goods, new markets, new methods of production, new ways of organizing firms-is the "fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion" (Schumpeter, 1975, p. 82). Does the economy have enough flexibility? Are there barriers in the way of entrepreneurship? This paper develops a framework for quantifying creative destruction.

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This paper first discusses the current situation in Afghanistan, including ongoing security issues and the status of state institutions. It then focuses specifically on the state of the judiciary, its legal and historical underpinnings. Finally, the paper addresses the key challenges in building a justice system in Afghanistan, and the role of the international community in this process.

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CDDRL Working Papers
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Alex Thier
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Big dams built for irrigation, power, water supply, and other purposes were among the most potent symbols of economic development for much of the twentieth century. Of late they have become a lightning rod for challenges to this vision of development as something planned by elites with scant regard for environmental and social consequences, especially for the populations that are displaced as their homelands are flooded. In this book, Sanjeev Khagram traces changes in our ideas of what constitutes appropriate development through the shifting transnational dynamics of big dam construction.

Khagram tells the story of a growing, but contentious, world society that features novel and increasingly efficacious norms of appropriate behavior in such areas as human rights and environmental protection. The transnational coalitions and networks led by nongovernmental groups that espouse such norms may seem weak in comparison with states, corporations, and such international agencies as the World Bank. Yet they became progressively more effective at altering the policies and practices of these historically more powerful actors and organizations from the 1970s on.

Khagram develops these claims in a detailed ethnographic account of the transnational struggles around the Narmada River Valley Dam Projects, a huge complex of thirty large and more than three thousand small dams. He offers further substantiation through a comparative historical analysis of the political economy of big dam projects in India, Brazil, South Africa, and China as well as by examining the changing behavior of international agencies and global companies. The author concludes with a discussion of the World Commission on Dams, an innovative attempt in the late 1990s to generate new norms among conflicting stakeholders.

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Cornell University Press
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0801489075
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The Center for Global Development opened its doors in November 2001, just two months after the terrorist attacks of September 11. The terrorist network behind the attacks was based in Afghanistan, having been expelled from Sudan,a nd was associated with earlier fatal attacks against US targets in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen. These attacks constituted a wake-up call, in both the development and security communities, to a new, shared challenge. In the 21st century, a sensible national security strategy would have to tackle the risks to Americans of development failures in faraway places.

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Policy Briefs
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Center for Global Development
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Michael A. McFaul
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