Introduction and Contribution

Most authoritarian regimes hold elections where there is some possibility — albeit a small one — that the incumbent will be voted out of office. Autocrats have many tools at their disposal to guard against this possibility, from controlling the media narrative to exploiting public funds and outright election-rigging. A central question for pro-democracy actors is how autocrats can be challenged on such uneven playing fields. Some proposed remedies include forming opposition coalitions, strengthening local-level party organization, and boycotting elections.

Hungary has served as an important battleground for global pro-democracy efforts. After Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party’s 2010 election victory, the country was gradually transformed into an electoral autocracy. Observers have pointed to Fidesz’s adeptness in gerrymandering electoral districts to its advantage, creating fake parties to overwhelm opponents, and leveraging media control to discredit its rivals. However, the Tisza Party, led by former Fidesz member Péter Magyar, won Hungary’s 2026 parliamentary elections. This raises two questions: How did Tisza achieve this, and what can democrats learn from it?

In “Civic Mobilization to Defend Electoral Integrity in Hungary,” Hanna Folsz argues that civil society organizations (CSOs) played a critical role in Tisza’s victory through efforts to combat Fidesz’s electoral manipulation. A broad-front campaign called DE Action Community exposed and countered Fidesz’s vote-buying and voter intimidation practices, which existing accounts of Hungary’s democratic decline and its reversal often underemphasize.

DE’s efforts included mapping vote-buying and voter-intimidation patterns in areas where voters were most likely to be manipulated, releasing a documentary on Fidesz’s practices that was viewed by millions of Hungarians, and dispatching thousands of observers to polling stations on election day. Preliminary evidence from statistical analyses of election results and on-the-ground reporting suggests that these interventions improved electoral competitiveness and reduced manipulation. Naturally, other factors played crucial roles in Tisza’s victory. Tisza ran an effective campaign, and Fidesz had been discredited by economic woes and corruption. Nevertheless, DE’s grassroots efforts appear to have been notably consequential.

Folsz’s argument is noteworthy in two ways: it underscores the significance of (1) nonstate actors in resisting democratic backsliding and (2) vote buying and voter intimidation as central elements in Fidesz’s authoritarian toolkit. Hungary’s recent experience suggests that grassroots organization — even in places where CSOs have been weakened and maligned — can help defeat long-tenured authoritarian parties. Because electoral autocrats remain vulnerable at the ballot box, interventions aimed at constraining manipulation should be central to global democracy promotion.

Fidesz’s Electoral Manipulation

It is commonly assumed that vote buying and voter intimidation were of marginal importance in explaining Fidesz’s dominance, compared with the institutional changes it made through parliamentary supermajorities. Yet these practices were arguably critical: journalists estimate that in previous elections, Fidesz gained between 200,000 and 300,000 votes by using its local networks to compel and coerce extremely marginalized voters. This quantity was decisive in a country where turnout reached about 6 million. Ethnic Roma communities, who often live in de facto segregation, were frequent targets.

The vote-buying and intimidation system worked through ‘patrons’ or local intermediaries — mayors, state employers, and informal brokers — to whom Fidesz elites in Budapest dispensed state resources. Intermediaries rewarded their ‘clients’ with cash, food, firewood, and even alcohol and drugs in exchange for votes. Exploited voters and their patrons did not interact in a one-off manner, but rather were connected in broader relationships of control and dependency. Indeed, Fidesz’s proxies often shaped locals’ access to state jobs, welfare, and medical care. In some cases, intermediaries threatened to call child protective services on noncompliant parents.

As is common in peripheral regions, formal democratic institutions such as secret ballots were not respected in targeted areas. Voters had their ballots photographed or would be followed into voting booths by intermediaries under the guise of assisting illiterate voters. Countering these practices was no small task for Hungarian CSOs, which the Fidesz government had harassed and targeted. 

The Campaign and its Outcome

The DE Action Community network brought together a range of individuals and groups in its campaign to expose and combat Fidesz’s electoral malpractice. This included legal organizations, data analysts, Roma activists, thousands of volunteers, and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union. 

The campaign proceeded in several steps: First, DE spent months mapping out where vote buying operated and which communities were most vulnerable, as well as identifying intermediaries and their tactics. Second, it directed public attention to Fidesz’s authoritarianism by releasing the documentary Price of a Vote three weeks before the elections, which garnered over two million views. Third, DE communicated directly with brokers and informed them they would be monitored; even if state resources had already been dispensed, activists worked to prevent them from reaching voters, for example, by writing letters to mayors and speaking with intermediaries directly. DE also coordinated its efforts with Tisza.

On election day, DE deployed over 2400 trained observers to about 500 high-risk polling stations across 150 localities. The observers documented irregularities and deliberately avoided direct confrontation with state authorities and intermediaries. DE also built a centralized, real-time response system and reporting app, enabling rapid, targeted deployment of observers on motorbikes. 

Ultimately, areas targeted by DE’s campaign had lower Fidesz vote shares than in previous years and in comparable areas. Turnout was lower, consistent with reduced voter coercion. There were also fewer sharp spikes in turnout, which are associated with busing clients en masse to polls at specific times. DE’s campaign not only improved the quality of elections on Hungary’s periphery but also strengthened anti-Fidesz sentiment across the country. The Hungary case suggests that defending electoral integrity can be as important as campaigning against autocrats.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.