What is driving the current democratic recession? In a CDDRL seminar series talk, Vanderbilt University Political Scientist Larry Bartels argued that democratic erosion in Europe has been driven primarily by elite behavior, not shifting popular sentiments. Bartels presented findings from his latest book, Democracy Erodes from the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe, published in 2023 by Princeton University Press. The book challenges the view that public opinion drives democratic endurance and erosion.

According to conventional wisdom, social tensions and backlash against globalization and immigration have led to an explosion in populism in democratic societies. This populism, coupled with falling confidence in politicians and government, is posing a serious threat to the future of democracy.

Bartels argued that the data suggests otherwise. In fact, ordinary European political attitudes have changed little over the past 20 years. Using data from 9 rounds of a European social survey running between 2002 and 2019 across 23 countries, Bartels finds public attitudes commonly associated with right-wing populism have remained stable. Favorability toward immigrants, support for European integration, ideological polarization, trust in politicians, and satisfaction with democracy have not seen any significant change during the same period. 

What accounts for the apparent surge in right-wing populists? Bartels explained that right-wing populism is not surging in a new wave. Rather, it is drawing from an old reservoir. 

According to Bartels, claims of a populist wave are unjustified. While populism has increased moderately across Europe, the successes of right-wing populists have been overblown by the press, with far more attention on their political victories than their failures. Additionally, variation in support for populist parties reflects a variation in “supply” rather than in “demand.” In other words, change has been driven by a transformation in the behavior of political elites rather than in public opinion. 

In looking at the correlation between political attitudes and party support, Bartels finds that support for right-wing populists tracks with conservative ideology, anti-immigrant sentiment, anti-EU sentiment, political distrust, and economic disaffection. However, he noted, the relationship between party support and economic disaffection is rather weak. 

Although analysis of public attitudes shows that there remains a group of people susceptible to right-wing populists, this group has not been voting for populist candidates. This suggests these politicians have not yet successfully mobilized right-wing populist sentiments.

In discussing the experiences of Poland and Hungary, Bartels indicated that in both cases, the populist turn was overwhelmingly driven by the political elites. Voters did not choose dictatorship. They were passive and unable to mobilize in defense of democracy. In fact, prior to election, support for populist parties closely resembled that of an ordinary conservative party. Once in power, these parties began abusing their power and undermining democratic institutions.