Around half of democratic transitions are "top-down" in the sense that the autocrats write the constitution that governs post-transition democracy (Albertus and Menaldo 2015). We analyze a model of elite-driven democratization, illustrating its logic and implications in the case of Myanmar.  In the model, continued dictatorship is costly and inefficient due to the risk of a violent rebellion and, possibly, the increase in aid, trade, and geopolitical support that would follow democratization. But the autocrats fear that fair elections would lead quickly to their marginalization. We argue, contrary to a common suggestion, that paper constitutions that provide veto points for the old elite are not by themselves sufficient protection. Top-down "democratic transitions" are really cases of power-sharing, in which the old elite retains de facto control of rent streams that the opposition cannot unilaterally seize simply by changing laws. As the military's coup threat declines over time, democracy may eventually "consolidate."  If the coup threat declines dramatically and is anticipated to do so, a reversion back to autocracy is possible. We also show how the prospect of increased international aid, trade, and investment makes top-down transitions more likely, though only when post-transition power-sharing is feasible.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

James D. Fearon is Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences, and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, and a Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies. His research has focused on civil and interstate war. He has also published on international relations theory, democratization, foreign aid and institution building, and post-conflict reconstruction. Fearon is an elected member of the National Academy of Sciences (2012) and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2002), and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. From 2007 to 2010, he was Chair of the Department of Political Science at Stanford. He served as a Senior Adviser in the U.S. Department of Defense in 2021 and 2022, where he worked primarily with the production and implementation team for the 2022 National Defense Strategy.

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