How Accountable?: Assessing Developments in Accountability at Multilateral Development Banks
How Accountable?: Assessing Developments in Accountability at Multilateral Development Banks
Thursday, May 11, 201712:00 PM - 1:30 PM (Pacific)
Encina Hall, Second Floor, Central, C231
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305
Abstract:
Within the last fifteen years, nine multilateral development banks (MDBs) have established internal accountability offices (IAOs). These IAOs, the most well-known of which is the World Bank Inspection Panel, allow communities within borrowing states to bring complaints against MDBs if loan programs cause them harm and violate MDB policies. The IAOs have been touted as effective fire-alarm mechanisms and remedies to the democratic deficit problem; they have also been criticized as broadly ineffective and toothless. What explains the variation in IAO impact and efficacy? I argue that borrowing states significantly constrain the impact of MDB IAOs and that borrowing state influence varies depending on regime type. Democratic borrowing states will be more willing to absorb the potential costs associated with MDB IAOs—including program changes and possible program termination—than will autocratic states. The argument is supported with quantitative evidence from a new dataset of all complaints filed through 2015.
Speaker Bio:
![erica gould](https://fsi9-prod.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/styles/500xauto/public/erica_gould.jpg?itok=HUHCFq4P)