When Kofi Annan announced his plans to step aside as special envoy for the conflict in Syria by the end of the month, he put much of the blame on the United Nations Security Council for the failure to make peace in the war-ravaged country.

"When the Syrian people desperately need action, there continues to be finger pointing and name calling in the Security Council," Annan said. "It is impossible for me or anyone to compel the Syrian government and also the opposition to take the steps to bring about the political process. As an envoy, I can't want peace more than the protagonists, more than Security Council or the international community, for that matter."

The uprising against Syrian President Bashar Assad began in March 2011 and rights activists say it has left more than 19,000 dead. Annan became the U.N.-Arab League envoy to Syria in February, with the goal of getting both sides to put down their weapons. He designed a six-point plan for peace, which was never fully implemented.

Stephen J. Stedman, FSI's Freeman Spogli Senior Fellow, and Larry Diamond — a senior fellow at FSI and the Hoover Institution as well as director of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law — offer their analysis of the impact of Annan's resignation.

Does the resignation of Annan, who is well respected among diplomats, signal that there is no hope for peace in Syria?

Diamond: I think it's been apparent for several weeks, at least, that the peace mission was doomed, that the Assad regime was not prepared to negotiate, and that the refusal of Russia and China to agree to any kind of meaningful pressure on the Assad regime has left violent resistance by the opposition and the society as the only option.

Syria is sinking deeper and deeper into all-out civil war, and only an escalation of military pressure and economic sanctions on the Assad regime and its principal leaders and supporters offers any hope of resolution. Sometimes, when one or both parties refuse to negotiate, the only way to end a civil war is for one side to win. Libya provides the most recent example of that. If Assad and his allies are going to negotiate a peaceful exit, it will only be because they are staring at the prospect of fairly imminent military defeat.

Could Annan have done something differently?

Diamond: It is very difficult to negotiate with a regime that is bent on repression and total domination, especially when you can't credibly threaten to impose formidable costs on the regime if it refuses to compromise. I don't think there was anything more that Annan could have done, because he had no leverage, no tools to work with, as a result of the inability of the Security Council to agree on tough sanctions.

Will the failure to make peace in Syria tarnish Annan's legacy?

Stedman: The failure to make peace in Syria should not and will not tarnish Annan's legacy. First, he is already a Nobel Peace Prize winner, and one failure in an extraordinarily difficult case does not diminish the rest of his diplomatic successes. With regards to Syria, no one expected him to succeed, but he needed to try and he needed to be seen to try. His position was special envoy of the Security Council, and if anyone is looking for a scapegoat they should start looking at the council.

Diamond: No, I don't think this will tarnish Annan's legacy. He had a nearly impossible mission; everyone knew that. The failure was a collective failure of the international system, not the failure of an individual mediator. Annan is a great man who has made major contributions to world peace and security. It's not his fault that a brutal regime, backed by the world's two most powerful authoritarian states, refused to negotiate.

Brooke Donald is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

One year after the Arab Spring, American public diplomacy is still facing the now-established conundrum of linking words and actions. The rise of Islamist political parties as the new leaders in the Arab world is the latest challenge for U.S. public diplomacy, but it is also an opportunity.

Since the attacks of September 11, the United States has been matching its military activity in the Middle East with outreach to Muslim and Arab communities. By and large, this outreach has not been successful. As several public diplomacy experts have been arguing for a number of years now, the limited impact of this outreach is due to the negative perception of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East by citizens in the region. When actions and words do not match, words are perceived with a hefty dose of suspicion.

When the Egyptian revolution began on January 25, 2011, U.S. foreign policy took some time to catch up with sentiment on the Egyptian street. To make matters worse, the “Made in USA” tear gas canisters that protesters in Tahrir Square angrily displayed to the cameras of the international media were a further reminder of the United States’ cozy relationship with the Mubarak regime.

Since then, the U.S. has improved its words and actions by declaring both rhetorical and policy support for the Arab world’s revolutionaries (albeit in varying degrees), and as a result, public opinion about the U.S. in the region has improved. The 2011 Arab Public Opinion Pollshows a significant increase in favorability towards the U.S., compared with the 2010 poll, from 10% to 26%. The U.S. must continue to enhance this record.

Back in 2006, after much hype by the U.S. about the importance of free and fair elections in Palestine, the U.S. backtracked when Hamas swept the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in Gaza,withdrawing aid and boycotting the elected Gaza government. As Islamist parties sweep free and fair elections in one country after another in the region—starting with Tunisia, then Egypt—it is fairly safe to declare that in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, the Arab world will be led by Islamists. So far, the U.S. has not repeated the mistake of 2006 with Hamas’ election in Gaza, accepting the results of the elections as democratic and as representing the will of the people.

But this is not enough. Of course, the United States currently has an easier task, since none of the groups that have been elected to-date in the Arab region are on the U.S.’s “terrorist” list. However, merely accepting election results will not cause a significant change in the perception of the U.S. on the Arab street.

The U.S. recognizes the current period as one of opportunity: it is the time to reinvigorate U.S. assistance with civil society, economic aid, and cultural outreach in the Arab world. But the most important “action” of all remains how foreign policy will play out. The Islamist groups that have assumed leadership positions in Tunisia and Egypt, namely Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood, have one very old dream: to be recognized as statesmen nationally and internationally. If U.S. foreign policy in this new era is going to be successful, it must be based on treating those leaders as such.

This is not just important on the traditional diplomatic level; it is also important for the success of U.S. public diplomacy. The Islamist leaders now assuming positions as Prime Ministers or House Speakers (and who knows, perhaps also presidents in the near future) reached power through having been elected by their constituents. The U.S. cannot reach out to those constituents while treating their leaders differently. In the past, U.S. public diplomacy towards Egypt appeared insincere because the U.S. attempted to engage the Egyptian people while taking a soft stance towards the Mubarak regime, which had been jailing, harassing, and—as in the case of Khaled Said—killing those same people.

For the first time in the Arab world’s history, there is a real opportunity for the U.S. to match its words and actions towards the region, and to have foreign policy become the basis upon which to formulate a truly engaging public diplomacy.

On December 6, the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law together with the Safadi Foundation USA inaugurated the Safadi-Stanford Initiative for Policy Innovation (SSIPI) at a conference hosted by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC and supported by the Center for International Private Enterprise. This gathering convened an upwards of 100 guests to explore the conference's theme of economic reform and development in the Arab world.  

The keynote addresses were delivered by IMF Head Christine Lagarde who commented on the economic landscape in the region and suggested methods to stimulate growth for emerging Arab economics, and Lebanese Finance Minister Mohammad Safadi who stressed the importance of institution building and transparent accountable governance practices for development in the region, particularly in relation to how Arab governments handle international aid.

Safadi Scholar of the Year Katarina Uherova Hasbani presented the findings of a research study she authored on electricity sector reform in Lebanon while in residence at CDDRL this fall. The SSIPI research partnership was initiated to promote policy-relevant research on Lebanon and supported Hasbani's visiting fellowship at Stanford. Hasbani, an energy policy expert, presented her findings to the policy- making community, arguing that reliable and stable electricity supplies are a pre-condition for economic development. Hasbani cautioned that the failing electricity sector in Lebanon threatens the country's progress diverting resources from social development and education.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Tamara Wittes and Mara Rudman, Assistant Administrator for the bureau for Middle East at USAID, both commented on the development challenges and opportunities that lie in the wake of the Arab Spring. "What is happening in the region is about the people writing their own story," said Wittes. "The United States has to approach this with a sense of humility but we have a role to play because we are a major presence in the region." Rudman added that USAID is reaching out to new audience and partners in Egypt, many of whom are outside Cairo, to engage new actors after the January 25 revolution.

Miriam Allam, an economist with the OECD and Safadi Scholar first runner-up stressed the importance of public consultation and good regulation as best practices for cultivating active and democratic citizenship. Undersecretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs Robert D. Hormats, underscored the fact that economic reform must match social and political change in the region to create diverse economies that support growth, investment, and trade.

Inger Anderson, Vice-President for MENA at the World Bank, commented on the funding shortages from European countries that are resulting in decreased investment in the Arab world, when they need it the most. Both Anderson and Lagarde advocated for the reform of government subsidies, according to Lagarde, "governments need sustainable fiscal policies, including better targeted subsidies to help low-income groups."

Lagarde added that a key way forward is encouraging private sector investment to spur job creation but stressed that this requires predictability, a stable legal and tax environment, absence of corruption, and the elimination of regulatory loopholes.

Through this conference and ongoing research, the Safadi-Stanford Initiative for Policy Innovation seeks to offer new approaches and recommendations to advance development and governance practices in the region.

Transcript and video of event:

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-middle-the-storm-development-and-governance-the-arab-world

Speech by IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde:

http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2011/120611.htm