The Failure of State Building in Afghanistan
Jennifer Brick Mutrazashvili argues that this failure lies in the bureaucratic legacies the country inherited from the Soviet era.
Why did state-building efforts in Afghanistan fail? In a CDDRL Seminar Series talk, University of Pittsburgh Professor of Public and International Affairs Jennifer Brick Mutrazashvili argued that the answer lies in the bureaucratic legacies the country inherited from the Soviet era.
Building on her fieldwork in Afghanistan and long engagement with relevant stakeholders on the ground, Murtazashvili explained that the country’s domestic institutions remained static even after the 2001 US-led intervention. Even though presidential elections were convened and a nominally democratic process was put in place, Afghan political institutions retained their longstanding feature. That is, power remained centralized by the executive without any meaningful devolution of authority to subnational structures, notwithstanding the persistence of informal governance bodies at the local level in some parts of the country.
Executive centralization of power was due to the persistence of governance patterns dating back to the Soviet era. These patterns were shaped by the influx of Soviet aid beginning in the 1950s. Soviet influence helped build highly centralized and dysfunctional institutions, which persisted through 2001. Instead of restructuring these institutions after 2001, the international community worked to preserve their centralized features, fearing that decentralization could empower local warlords. This approach aligned with the interest of national leaders who saw centralization as key to their hold on power and control over state resources.
The Afghan public was uneasy about continued centralization. Public opinion data underscored the widespread sentiment that opportunities for participation in government were limited. People wanted to be represented by local leaders. Numerous protests broke out when the Kabul national leadership handed governorships to individuals hailing from regions other than the ones they were tasked with governing.
These dynamics deepened feelings of disenfranchisement among communities residing outside the capital. Participation in elections declined as Afghans were disillusioned by the lack of change. With the waning of trust in democratic institutions and people failing to experience tangible change in how they are governed, the political fortunes of the Taliban grew.
State building, Murtazashvili argued, failed in breaking from the Soviet-era legacies of centralization.
