PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE

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Party Crasher?

Prime Minister
Nguyen Tan Dung

National Assembly Delegate
Nguyen Minh Thuyet

Was Thuyet’s behavior intended by the party?
Why do we care?

• Ubiquity of authoritarian legislatures

• Do legislatures enhance regime stability?

• Do legislatures impact policy?
Logic of Legislative Institutionalization Under Authoritarian Rule

- Legitimacy
- Co-optation (Gandhi and Przeworski)
- Power Sharing (Svolik, Gehlbach and Keefer)

Legislatures enhance autocratic rule by incorporating elites or opposition
Logic of Legislative Institutionalization
Under Authoritarian Rule

• How well does these theories explain Thuyet’s activity?

• Nguyen Minh Thuyet CV:
  • Party Elite?
  • Party Outsider?

• What reforms made his speech possible?
  • VNA increased number days in sessions (1989)
Days in Session

Figure 3.1: VNA Days in Session
Alternative Logic?

• How well does these theories explain Thuyet’s activity?

• Nguyen Minh Thuyet CV:
  • Party Elite?
  • Party Outsider?

• How was his speech possible?
  • VNA increased number days in sessions (1989)
  • VNA passes more laws (1989)
Laws Passed

Figure 3.2: Laws Per Year
Alternative Logic?

• How well does these theories explain Thuyet’s activity?

• Nguyen Minh Thuyet CV:
  • Party Elite?
  • Party Outsider?

• How was his speech possible?
  • VNA increased number days in sessions (1989)
  • VNA passes more laws (1989)
  • VNA expanded number of fulltime delegates (1992-present)
VNA Membership

Note: Data collected by author from Vietnamese news media and VNA website
Alternative Logic?

• How well does these theories explain Thuyet’s activity?

• Nguyen Minh Thuyet CV:
  • Party Elite?
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• How was his speech possible?
  • VNA increased number days in sessions (1989)
  • VNA passes more laws (1989)
  • VNA expanded number of fulltime delegates (1992-present)
  • VNA televises government hearings (1994)

No reforms increased elite or opposition representation
Alternative Theory: Enhancing “Rule by Law”

- Alternative explanation – Creating “rule by law”
  - Rule By Law: Coherent, enforceable legal code on subset of issues
  - Two components
    - Generating more coherent laws
    - Ensuring government compliance

- More coherent legal code desirable when regime
  - Faces economic crisis
  - Needs private foreign investment
  - Concerned with local implementation of policies

- Why use the legislature?
  - More stable policy
  - Less conflict of interest
  - More legitimate policy
Testing the Theory…

- Observable implications of theory using VNA *speeches*
- Speeches collected from 2007-2013
- Four types of debates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>3605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Hearings</td>
<td>1687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Query Sessions</td>
<td>1182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6663</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Professionals, Elites, and Outsiders

Three types of delegates

1. Professionals: Fulltime delegates
   - Locally nominated
   - Centrally nominated

2. Party Elites: Central Committee Members

3. Outsiders
   - Non-Party members
   - Business delegates
Professionals, Elites, and Outsiders

Note: Data collected by author from Vietnamese news media and VNA website
Hypotheses

**Rule By Law Hypothesis:**
- **Fulltime delegates** are more likely to use speeches to:
  - Ensure coherence of legal code of proposed legislation
  - Ensure government implement existing legislation

**Power-Sharing Hypothesis**
- **Central Committee** delegates more likely to use speeches to:
  - Ensure government implement existing legislation

**Co-optation Hypothesis:**
- **Non-Party/Business** delegates more likely use speeches to
  - Ensure government implement existing legislation
  - Raise issues the party does not want discussed
Models

• Tests of *how* issues are discussed
  • Discriminant/Cluster analysis
  • Standardized log-odds ratio (Monroe, Colaresi, Quinn)

• Tests of *which* issues are discussed:
  • Topic Model
  • Latent Dirichlet Allocation (Blei, Ng, Jordan)
  • Were top-20 words associated with list of “sensitive” issues?
  • “Sensitive issue” created from dictionary
  • Includes words like “South China Sea”, “multi-party democracy”, and dissident names
Data Processing

1. Break word files into speeches
2. Attach speeches to biographical data
3. “Tokenize” speeches: *Trung quốc* becomes *Trung_quốc*
4. Remove “stop” words, numbers, punctuation, capitalization
5. Convert all provincial names to word “province”
6. Convert all committee names to word “committee”

7. For discriminant/cluster models, *equal numbers of each category (fulltime vs. part time; business vs. non-business)* were *selected for each debate through random sampling*
Who speaks?

16% of CCOM delegates make only 3% of speeches
Cluster analysis

- **Fulltime central concentrate on legal code**
- **Fulltime local concentrate on accountability**
- **Party and business delegates focus on economy**
### Topic Analysis

**What about topic of speeches?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>All Sensitive</th>
<th>Non-Party Sensitive</th>
<th>Business Topic</th>
<th>Sensitive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Labor Union/Protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Banking/Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Issues</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rural Development</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Admin Procedures</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Taxes (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitions/Prosecution</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Health Care (2)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Macro-Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Planning</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Accounting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadre Evaluation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Bank/Credit</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Public Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Development</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Business/Conglomerate</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Family Issues</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Taxes (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Security</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Consumer Protection</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Public Investment (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Development</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Social Insurance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Inflation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Oversight</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Health Insurance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Determinants of “sensitive speeches”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Base 1</th>
<th>Interaction 2</th>
<th>12th VNA 3</th>
<th>13th VNA 4</th>
<th>Count 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-0.0158 (0.0122)</td>
<td>-0.0158 (0.0121)</td>
<td>-0.00425 (0.0127)</td>
<td>-0.0273 (0.0209)</td>
<td>-0.0350 (0.0252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Committee</td>
<td>-0.0177*** (0.00580)</td>
<td>-0.0198*** (0.00610)</td>
<td>-0.0165* (0.00952)</td>
<td>-0.0222*** (0.00803)</td>
<td>-0.0380*** (0.00895)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politburo</td>
<td>-0.0188*** (0.00582)</td>
<td>-0.0215*** (0.00647)</td>
<td>-0.0291** (0.0122)</td>
<td>-0.0173** (0.00805)</td>
<td>-0.0307*** (0.0109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulltime</td>
<td>0.00340 (0.00547)</td>
<td>0.0128** (0.00553)</td>
<td>0.0209** (0.00823)</td>
<td>0.00336 (0.00722)</td>
<td>0.0371*** (0.0107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrally Nominated</td>
<td>0.00751 (0.00689)</td>
<td>0.0181* (0.00968)</td>
<td>0.0240 (0.0177)</td>
<td>0.0108 (0.00904)</td>
<td>0.0164 (0.0129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulltime*Centrally Nominated</td>
<td>-0.0244** (0.0107)</td>
<td>-0.0411** (0.0178)</td>
<td>-0.00608 (0.0124)</td>
<td>-0.0352* (0.0192)</td>
<td>-0.0352* (0.0192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>0.00306 (0.00757)</td>
<td>0.00194 (0.00750)</td>
<td>0.00431 (0.00992)</td>
<td>-0.00322 (0.0109)</td>
<td>-0.00579 (0.0124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0111 (0.0282)</td>
<td>0.0148 (0.0279)</td>
<td>-0.0264 (0.0239)</td>
<td>0.0670 (0.0509)</td>
<td>0.0619* (0.0354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.089</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. OLS used for each specification
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses
3. The dependent variable for models 1-4 are the percentage of the delegate's speeches that are "sensitive"
4. The dependent variable for model 5 is the a count of all sensitive speeches
Summary of Results

What explains institutionalization of VNA?

- **Rule by Law Hypothesis:** *Confirmed*
  - Fulltime delegates more active in overseeing cohesiveness of legal code and implementation

- **Power Sharing Hypothesis:** *Disconfirmed*
  - Party elites rarely speak in the VNA
  - Occurs within party institutions

- **Co-optation Hypothesis:** *Disconfirmed*
  - Business/Non-Party delegates do not raise sensitive issues or act more aggressively in oversight
  - Occurs within party institutions
Party Crasher?

Was his behavior intended by the party?

Prime Minister
Nguyen Tan Dung

National Assembly Delegate
Nguyen Minh Thuyet
Party Crasher?

• I have one question that up until now has not been answered. Outside the leaders of Vinashin who else must take responsibility for the violations? The government report says it has responsibility and has conducted internal criticism, but specifically how? From my perspective, in this situation all the government officials involved must face criticism and discipline from the National Assembly…
Generalizability and Implications

Generalizability

• Rule by Law can explain range of reforms not involving increasing parties
• Co-optation may occur in hybrid legislatures
• Power sharing occurs within party, not legislative institutions

Implications

• Professionalization can impact the role of legislatures
• Professionals may use acceptable means to challenge the regime in unexpected ways
Thanks!
More coherent laws…

- Therefore, to ensure the consistency of legal code, I propose that Paragraph 5 of Article 7 in Section 2 be changed as follows. The National Assembly should not oversee the use of capital but instead the National Assembly should oversee the implementation of the legal code related to the management of public debt so that the general decision will be consistent with the Constitution as well as the Law on the Organization of the VNA, and the Law on National Assembly Oversight Activities. With the change, the oversight will be oversight of implementation of the Constitution, law, and decisions not oversight of the use of state resources or related specific activities.
Ensuring Government Compliance

- My second point concerns the more than 10 localities renting more than 400,000 hectares of forest in border regions to foreign organizations. Why were the relevant government offices slow to realize this until the issue was raised by retired cadres? Could the deputy prime minister please let us know outside the responsibility of the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development which other departments and who must take responsibility regarding this issue…
Issue areas

• Speeches concentrated in legislative, economic affairs
Cluster validation: “Legal Words”
Cluster validation: “Responsibility Words”