MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS, MULTIPLE AGENTS: EU AND US DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Karen Del Biondo
Postdoctoral Scholar at CDDRL, 2012-2013; Postdoctoral Fellow, KFG Transformative Power of Europe, Free University of Berlin, 2013-2014
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Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
Encina Hall
616 Serra St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

Voice: 650-723-4610
Fax: 650-724-2996
Website: http://cddrl.stanford.edu/
Multiple principals, multiple agents: EU and US democracy assistance in sub-Saharan Africa

Karen Del Biondo¹

Postdoctoral scholar at CDDRL 2012-2013

Postdoctoral fellow at the KFG Transformative Power of Europe, Free University of Berlin, 2013-2014

karen.delbiondo@gmail.com

Abstract

This paper investigates under which conditions the EU and the US take a political or developmental approach to democracy assistance. It aims to find out whether the approach differs among the relevant sources of democracy assistance: the European Development Fund (EDF), European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Instrument for Stability (IfS), US Agency for International Development (USAID), National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Based on the combination of interests and institutions, it is predicted that a developmental approach is more likely in the case of strategically important countries, but only for USAID, the EIDHR, the EDF and the IfS which are subject to political control. In this case, USAID is expected to be more developmental than the EDF, given the strong political control of the State Department. Based on the combination of ideas and institutions, USAID and the EDF are expected to be more developmental as their main objective is development. In comparison to USAID, the EDF is expected to be more developmental, as the EDF is co-decided by the government. Empirically, the paper analyzes democracy assistance in Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Ethiopia since 2005. Ethiopia and Kenya are strategically important, and thus we expect a more developmental approach than in Rwanda and Zimbabwe. An analysis of democracy assistance disconfirmed the importance of interests and institutions. Transatlantic differences can better be explained by ideas and institutions, particularly the fact that the EDF is co-decided by the government. Two explanations are put forward for the relative unimportance of interests and institutions. First, it is believed that the openness of the government defines the approach to democracy assistance. Second, people in the field may still maintain some autonomy regarding the approach to democracy assistance.

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I. Introduction

The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are usually depicted as fundamentally different democracy promoters. It is believed that the EU is less confrontational and prefers dialogue and capacity-building over sanctions. The US is thought to be more confrontational and prone to use coercive instruments (Kagan 2002; Magen et al. 2009; Hazelzet 2001). However, comparative research on EU and US democracy promotion has mostly focused on the choice of instruments. This paper, however, will investigate the approach to democracy assistance. Democracy assistance can be political, focusing on the core of the democratic process and confronting the government. In contrast, developmental democracy assistance is either purely technical or targets non-political areas. While a political approach may harm diplomatic relations, a developmental approach is unlikely to have such an effect.

The institutional set-up of EU and US democracy assistance is fundamentally different. This paper will investigate how the institutional set-up of democracy promoters defines their approach to democracy assistance. Empirically, the paper will study the approach of the main European and American funding sources and agencies in four countries: Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Kenya. The advantage of choosing four sub-Saharan African cases is that the relevant institutional framework is the same. This is especially important for the EU, where different agreements deal with different countries and regions. Sub-Saharan Africa is part of the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries for which the Cotonou Partnership Agreement is the relevant framework. Sub-Saharan African countries could be seen as ‘least likely cases’ for the importance of strategic interests compared to strategically more important regions, which makes it harder to generalize beyond Africa. For example, for the EU it has been argued that aid towards non-ACP countries is more strategically oriented (Holden 2009). As far as US policy is concerned, military assistance to Ethiopia is nothing compared to the amount provided to Israel or Egypt (Del Biondo 2014). While it may be difficult to generalize findings towards highly strategically important countries, it is expected that conclusions can be generalized to African and non-African countries that are of reasonable strategic importance to the EU and US.

For the US, I look at the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). For the EU, I consider the European Development Fund (EDF), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the Instrument for Stability (IfS). The timeframe of the study is 2005 until present. This choice was largely practical: it was more difficult to find information on older projects. While the study partly covers the period after the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS, 2010-2013), it is beyond the scope

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2 As will be discussed, the State Department also provides democracy assistance, but its role in the four countries studied in this paper was negligible.
of this study to analyze shifts in EU policies. Nonetheless, it is believed that the establishment of the EEAS does not substantially influence the results, as it usually takes more than three years for institutional changes to have a substantial impact.

The study relies on an extensive analysis of policy documents and secondary literature, including on the four cases, as well as on 40 interviews in Washington DC and Brussels in May-December 2013 with officials from the European Commission, the EEAS, USAID, the NED, the NED’s four core grantees, Congress staff and independent experts on US foreign assistance.

The paper will proceed as follows. In the next section, the analytical and theoretical framework is introduced. After outlining the difference between political and developmental democracy assistance, realist and idealist approaches to democracy promotion are discussed in combination with institutions. In the following section, the institutional framework of EU and US democracy assistance is described. This section also discusses how interests and ideas are reflected in this institutional framework, leading to hypotheses on the role of interests & institutions and on the role of ideas & institutions. These hypotheses are then tested in the empirical section, in which EU and US democracy assistance in Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Ethiopia is analyzed. In order to explain the partial mismatch between hypotheses and empirical results, the paper puts forward two additional explanations: the openness of the target government and the importance of the people in the field.

II. The approach to democracy assistance: political versus developmental

II.1. Political and developmental democracy assistance

In this section I will establish an analytical framework that categorizes democracy assistance according to its potential consequences for diplomatic relations. This has not been done in previous studies, which have mostly been limited to describing the harshness of different instruments: sanctions, dialogue, positive measures, etc. Democracy assistance is believed to have little impact on diplomatic relations, as it does not involve a punishment, is not well-known to the public and is often co-decided with the recipient government (Warkotsch 2008; Kotzian et al. 2011: 1003; Youngs 2009: 898). Yet this assumption may be wrong, as non-democratic governments are increasingly restricting projects that they see as threatening, such as support for elections or human rights organizations (Carothers 2010a; Bush 2013). As democracy assistance is the most frequently used instrument of democracy promotion, it is important to study its motives.

Several attempts have been made to categorize democracy assistance on the basis of its level of interference in the domestic affairs of the target country. Ottaway (2003) distinguishes between low-end and high-end
democracy assistance. Low-end programs ‘are less aggressive, put little pressure on the incumbent government, are less invasive of the sovereignty of the recipient country, and are less likely to create a backlash against the countries implementing them by the government or other groups’. High-end programs are more aggressive, such as support to the opposition and election monitoring. Bush (2013) refers to ‘confrontational’ and ‘non-confrontational’ democracy assistance. Confrontational democracy assistance can be perceived as ‘threatening the imminent survival of the incumbent regime in the host state’, for example a program supporting the free media. Non-confrontational democracy assistance does not challenge authoritarian governments, and may include, for example, projects in local governance.

Carothers’ typology of a political and developmental approach is probably the most noticeable effort in this regard. A political approach consists in helping the ‘democrats’ (civil society, journalists, political parties) in their struggle against the ‘non-democrats’ (the government, ruling party, non-democratic institutions). A developmental approach, on the contrary, ‘stresses the importance of partnership with the host government and steers clear of activities that may be seen as politically confrontational or even “too political”’ (Carothers 2009: 7-9).

In the table below, I use the above-mentioned typologies to elaborate on examples of ‘political’ and ‘developmental’ democracy assistance. In accordance with Carothers, political democracy assistance as interpreted in this paper concentrates on the core of the democratic process: elections; political rights and civil liberties; and institutions of horizontal accountability (see also Wetzel and Orbie 2011). Following Bush, Carothers and Ottaway, political democracy assistance is confrontational towards the host government and more likely to lead to a backlash. When political democracy assistance targets elections, it aims at free and fair elections, for example via observer missions, strengthening the independence of the electoral commission or a parallel vote tabulation. It may also include certain types of technical assistance such as the introduction of a biometric voter registration to prevent fraud. When institutions of horizontal accountability (judiciary, parliament) are on the receiving end, the goal is to strengthen the capacity of these institutions to provide checks and balances on the government. This may include certain types of technical assistance such as the introduction of an electronic voting system which makes voting more transparent. Such assistance is unlikely to be provided via government, as authoritarian governments will make sure that democracy assistance is non-threatening, but rather via intermediaries such as local or international NGOs. When political democracy assistance focuses on non-state actors, it often concerns support to groups that may criticize the government (journalists, human rights watchdog organizations) or directly challenge power (opposition parties). Trade unions have in some cases also played such a role, for example the Solidarity movement in Poland which was heavily supported by Western democracy promoters (Carothers 2009: 11).
Developmental democracy assistance is less confrontational towards the host government and thus less likely to lead to a backlash. When developmental democracy assistance concerns the core of the democratic process, it is limited to purely technical capacity-building. For example, technical support can be provided to an electoral commission that is strongly controlled by the ruling party. In some cases, developmental democracy assistance is provided in the form of construction work for the buildings of institutions of horizontal accountability. It can also consist in sectoral budget support (e.g. for the justice sector), which implies that donor money is directly inserted into the budget of the responsible ministry. In other cases multilateral organizations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) or the World Bank work with state institutions to strengthen their capacity. Given the explicitly apolitical mandate of the World Bank and the insistence of the UN on sovereignty, such programs are usually more developmental (Del Biondo 2014). When developmental democracy assistance targets non-state actors, these are groups that are unlikely to challenge the government in the short term. Developmental democracy assistance often focuses on minority groups, women, youth or people with disabilities. Developmental democracy assistance may also promote issues that are only indirectly related to democracy, including the environment, social accountability of development projects and conflict prevention.

Table 1 Political and developmental approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Developmental</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Strengthening the independence of the electoral commission</td>
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<td>Support to political parties</td>
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<td>Voter education</td>
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<td>Electoral observation</td>
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<td>Parallel vote tabulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>Constitutional reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>Strengthening independence of the judiciary</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>Train parliamentarians on producing legislation, acting as oversight institution</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase transparency in parliamentary voting</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Direct support to journalists</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
II.2. Explaining political and developmental democracy assistance

Political democracy assistance, as defined in the previous section, is more likely to have an impact on diplomatic relations than developmental democracy assistance. The question, then, is when the EU and the US are more likely to take a political or developmental approach?

Most analyses of EU and US democracy promotion either explicitly or implicitly engage in the realist-idealist debate on whether interests or norms drive international actors. Such approaches often fail to take into account the myriad of actors involved in democracy assistance. Indeed, it has been recognized that ‘some flux and confusion of purpose is to be expected of the different layers of bureaucracy’ related to democracy assistance (Burnell 2000: 45). Hence, any analytical framework on democracy assistance should take into account the role of institutions.

II.2.1. Realism and EU and US democracy assistance

From a realist perspective, the main aim of the democracy promoter is to acquire more power. Democracy may be the ultimate objective for which political power is sought or it may be a pretext (Morgenthau 1985: 103). When democracy is a genuine objective, it will inevitably be at the bottom of the priority list of the democracy promoter (Mearsheimer 2001: 46). This implies that, in strategically important countries, a developmental approach is likely (Carothers 2009: 10-11). In the Middle East, the EU and the US have avoided a confrontational approach as they feared the rise of Islamist governments (Youngs and Wittes 2009; Durac and Cavatorta 2009). Democracy promotion may also be used to topple unfriendly regimes, in which
case a political approach is more likely. During the Cold War, unfriendly communist regimes were overthrown under the guise of democracy promotion (Mearsheimer 2001: 24-26). The military intervention against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq is a more recent example where democracy promotion serves the interests of great powers (Boudreau 2007). On a more limited scale, the US has taken a political approach to democracy assistance in Venezuela and Cuba where it funded the opposition and civil society organizations that were critical towards the government (Gratius and Legler 2007).

II.2.2. Idealism and EU and US democracy assistance

From an idealist perspective, norms are the main driver of states. Norm-based behavior is what states feel they ought to do, based on a certain identity they strive to assume in international policies or on what they believe to be virtuous (March and Olsen 1998: 951). Idealists believe that Great Powers may be induced into promoting norms by transnational advocacy networks (Risse et al. 1999), even if this hurts their interests. An example are the sanctions Western powers imposed on South Africa to protest against apartheid in the 1980s, in the midst of the Cold War in which South Africa was an ally (Klotz 1999).

Several studies have focused on ideas in EU and US foreign policy. The general view is that the EU and the US have a fundamentally different identity in international relations. In his seminal article *Power and Weakness* Robert Kagan (2002) argues that Europe is like Venus; patient and tolerant in its relations with third states and hesitant to use coercive methods. The US, on the contrary, is like Mars, impatient and more inclined to act in a coercive manner. A recent book compares the instruments that the EU and the US use for democracy promotion (Magen et al. 2009). While some chapters confirm Kagan’s thesis (Gratius and Legler 2009; Kleinfeld 2009; Youngs and Wittes 2009), others argue that the gap had narrowed (Börzel and Risse 2009) or that it depends on the country (Börzel et al. 2009; Van Hüllen and Stahn 2009).

Scholars have described the role of various norms in world politics, including human rights (Risse et al. 1999), equality (Klotz 1998), developmentalism (Sikkink 1991) and poverty reduction (Finnemore 1996). However, these studies focus on one norm only, while possible norm conflicts are hardly considered. Democracy promoters usually have various normative objectives, including democracy, human rights, conflict prevention, poverty reduction, etc. As political democracy assistance is potentially disruptive of the cooperative developmental relationship between donors and recipient governments, donors often neglect democracy and human rights (Carothers 2010b: 13-15; Unsworth 2009).
II.2.3. Bringing institutions into the equation

Realists treat states as unitary actors. While most idealist approaches recognize the importance of non-state actors as norm entrepreneurs, they usually neglect how ideas differ between state institutions (Risse et al. 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1999). However, domestic structures define the authority of key players and the resources that leaders are able to extract from society (Krasner 2009: 5-6 and 41-42).

Based on Hook’s (2008) model for Program Change in foreign policy, I will consider institutions as carriers of interests and ideas. Institutions are particularly relevant for democracy assistance. Democracy assistance is usually delegated to aid bureaucracies. However, aid bureaucracies are poorly equipped and badly designed to promote democracy. Democratization is a very slow process, of which the results are difficult to measure. Aid bureaucracies, however, are required to show results to their principals (Carothers 2010c; Haring 2013). For this reason, more flexible institutions have been set up, which can act swiftly without having to follow complicated and time-consuming bureaucratic procedures. This has resulted in a complex myriad of actors, what has been termed the ‘democracy bureaucracy’ (Melia 2005). In the following, I will explore this democracy bureaucracy in the US and EU.

![Diagram of Interests, Institutions, Democracy assistance]

Source: Author, based on Hook (2008)

III. The Democracy Bureaucracy in the US and the EU

III.1. The United States

The main bodies administering US democracy assistance in sub-Saharan Africa are the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

USAID is the primary actor in budgetary terms. USAID has been involved in democracy assistance since the 1990s, when the Center for Democracy and Governance was established. Today, the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) is responsible for democracy assistance. In 2012, the Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance was established in the DCHA office. In addition to the DCHA bureau, each regional desk has a democracy bureau, which provides input to the field.
Programming for democracy assistance works differently than in other areas, for example it is unlikely that such programs are co-decided with the government.\footnote{Interview, Washington, DC, 20 May 2013.}

However, USAID is not an autonomous actor, as it needs to take into account the preferences of the President and the Congress. The President proposes the budget, can create new institutions and start Presidential initiatives. The Congress approves and thus closely scrutinizes the budget. Both the Congress and the President often impose earmarks and directives, obliging USAID to spend money on certain countries, sectors or purposes (Lancaster 2009: 36-37).

The State Department also has significant influence on USAID. The USAID director reports directly to the Secretary of State (Hyman 2010). Under President George W. Bush, USAID was increasingly brought under the control of the State Department. The latter also hosts the F bureau, the coordinating body for all foreign assistance which was created in 2006 (Lancaster 2008: 30). Furthermore, the State Department provides democracy assistance directly. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor has since 1998, through its Human Rights and Democracy Fund, granted small funds (around USD 1 million) to activists, civil society and minority groups.\footnote{Interview, Washington, DC, 24 May 2013.}

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was set up in 2004 to administer the Millennium Challenge Account, which allocates USD 5 billion yearly to projects in countries with good performance on ‘ruling justly’, ‘investing in people’ and ‘promoting economic reform’. Governments that pass the minimum standard in these areas can sign a compact with the MCC, while governments that only partly meet the standards can sign a ‘Threshold Program’ (Carbone 2004). The MCC was created as an independent institution to administer the MCA, in order to avoid political control and bureaucratic inefficiencies (Girod et al. 2009: 72-73). The MCC provides democracy assistance when compacts include democratic governance (Melia 2005: 13) or in a Threshold Program with a country that does not meet the eligibility criteria for ‘ruling justly’ (Millennium Challenge Corporation 2010).

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created in 1983 as a private non-governmental organization to avoid that democracy assistance was influenced by ‘the short-term policy preferences of a particular U.S. administration or by the partisan political interests of any party or group’ (NED 1983). The NED’s core grantees were chosen to keep the balance between those groups engaged and interested in promoting democracy. They include the American Center for International Labour Solidarity (Solidarity Center) which works with trade unions and the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) which works with the business sector. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican
Institute (IRI) represent the main American political parties and work with political parties. While the core grantees get about half of the NED’s funding, the other half is provided directly to local organizations via discretionary grants.

The NED’s balanced structure has guaranteed a relatively good relationship with the Congress. The link with the State Department has been more problematic. The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor transfers the annual appropriation to the NED. Based on this formal arrangement, the State Department has frequently tried to impose political control on the NED. Despite these attempts, the NED has maintained its independent character. Although it sends quarterly reports to the State Department, these are simply informative and are not subject to approval. It is believed that this independent character has allowed the NED to take a more political approach (Carothers 2009: 14-15; Haring 2013).

**III.2. The European Union**

Compared to USAID, the European Commission is a more autonomous aid bureaucracy. The European Parliament (EP) has no decision-making power over the European Development Fund (EDF), which provides most assistance for the ACP group and is extra-budgetary (Holden 2009: 32-35). However, the EP has created budgetary instruments with the specific aim to promote human rights. In 1994, the EP launched the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (Santiso 2002: 11-12). When in 2006, the European Commission argued that the EIDHR had become superfluous after budget reform, the EP defended the EIDHR, which was renamed European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (Börzel and Risse 2009: 47). The Instrument for Stability (IfS) was set up in 2007 as a tool for rapid funding in situations of crisis, which can include situations that pose a threat to democracy or human rights (Gänzle 2009: 68).

Member States can influence the European Commission via the comitology procedure. In the EDF committee, Country Strategy Papers, National Indicative Programmes and projects above 8 million euros are approved (Holden 2009: 133). The EIDHR committee approves the Strategy Papers and Annual Action Plans, which contain priorities and the amounts per country for the Country Based Support Scheme but not the actual projects. In the case of the IfS, only projects above €20 million have to be approved in the comitology committees (Gänzle 2009: 72). While the sheer amount of Member States (28) makes it difficult for them to closely scrutinize EU development policies (Molenaers and Nijs 2009; Martens 2002), Member

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6 Interview, Washington, DC, 21 May 2013.
7 Interview, Washington, DC, 17 May 2013.
8 Interview, Washington, DC, 28 May 2013.
9 Interview, Brussels, 31 October 2013.
States often submit amendments to the preparatory documents of the committee or discuss Commission policies with the EU delegation through their field offices.\textsuperscript{10}

Prior to the establishment of the European External Action Service in 2010, the EDF, the IfS and the EIDHR were administered by different Directorate Generals (DGs) at the European Commission. While the EDF was the responsibility of DG Development, the EIDHR and the IfS were managed by DG External Relations (RELEX). DG Development was strongly orientated towards poverty reduction, whereas DG RELEX was more oriented towards foreign policy goals (Carbone 2007: 48-49; Holden 2009: 41). Since 2010 the EEAS shares responsibility with the appropriate geographical or thematic desks at the newly established DG Development and Cooperation - Europeaid. Within the European Commission and EEAS, however, different offices administer the IfS, the EDF and the EIDHR.

The EDF, the EIDHR and the IfS have very different procedures. The EDF is co-decided with the partner government, which means that no project, not even those targeting non-state actors, can be implemented without the approval of the host government. This makes the EDF more likely to support developmental democracy assistance in authoritarian countries (Del Biondo 2014). The EIDHR, on the contrary, works directly with local and international non-governmental organizations and multilateral organizations, without approval from the host government (Börzel and Risse 2009: 46). Some of these organizations are selected via calls for proposals managed by the Commission in Brussels, others are managed by the delegation via the Country Based Support Scheme. While the host government is mostly aware of the activities of the EIDHR, there are also covert projects, such as those in support of human rights defenders.\textsuperscript{11} For the IfS there is a difference between short-term projects (<18 months) and long-term projects. The latter are normally based on a dialogue with the partner country (Gänzle 2009: 72).

\textbf{III.3. Hypotheses}

In the above I have described the institutional framework of EU and US democracy assistance, including the various sources of funding, implementing organizations and their relation to legislative and executive bodies. Based on this description, the following hypotheses can be formulated:

\textsuperscript{10} Interviews, Brussels, 26 and 29 November 2013.

\textsuperscript{11} Interview, Brussels, 31 October 2013.
H1.1: In strategically important countries, the approach of USAID, the EDF, the IfS and the EIDHR is more developmental than that of the NED and the MCC. USAID’s approach is more developmental than that of the EDF, the IfS and the EIDHR.

Transatlantic differences would emerge in strategically important countries, as USAID is expected to be more influenced by strategic interests than the European Commission. However, given that the NED and the MCC are independent institutions, they should be free to take a political approach. In the case of the EU, it is expected that projects are more developmental in strategically important countries, as Member States may influence the Commission via the comitology committees. In the case of the EIDHR and the IfS, political control can also be expected from DG RELEX.

H1.2.: In countries that are not strategically important, democracy assistance is more political than in strategically important countries. In this case, USAID, the EDF, the EIDHR and the IfS are not necessarily more developmental than the NED and MCC.

In countries that are not strategically important, there is no political control from the State Department, the European Commission’s DG RELEX or EU Member States. In these cases, a political approach is more likely, and there should not be a difference with the more autonomous NED.

H2: The approach of USAID and the EDF is more developmental than that of the EIDHR, the IfS, the NED or the MCC. The approach of the EDF is more developmental than USAID.

As aid bureaucracies whose main objective is to reduce poverty, USAID and the EC’s DG Development can be expected to take a developmental approach. In the case of the EDF, the requirement of approval by the partner government is likely to lead to a more developmental approach. As the EIDHR, the IfS, the NED and the MCC are more clearly directed towards democracy, they are expected to be more political.

IV. Political or developmental? EU and US democracy assistance in Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Kenya

In this section, I will test the above-mentioned hypotheses on four countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Kenya in the period 2005 until present. Based on the democratic status of these countries in the investigated period, one would expect the EU and the US to take a political approach.
Rwanda and Zimbabwe are classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House. In Rwanda, President Kagame has consolidated his power after presidential elections in 2003 and 2010, which were marred by irregularities and the lack of a level playing field due to the exclusion of several opposition candidates. In Zimbabwe, President Mugabe and the ruling party ZANU-PF have faced strong opposition from Morgan Tsvangirai and his Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Nonetheless, Mugabe has managed to remain in power via the manipulation of elections in 2002 and 2008 and a violent campaign against the MDC. After the 2008 elections, the Global Political Agreement was signed in September 2008, which led to a government of national unity with Mugabe as President and Tsvangirai as Prime Minister. Ethiopia has gone from ‘partly free’ to ‘not free’ status in 2010. This is the result of a growing tendency of the ruling EPRDF regime to tighten political space by draconian laws on civil society, political parties and the media. These laws have been imposed as a response to the unexpected success of the opposition during the parliamentary elections in 2005. Kenya is probably the most ‘free’ of all cases; it has maintained its ‘partly free’ status throughout the period of investigation. However, a political approach is expected in view of the December 2007 elections, which observers found to fall short of international standards and which led to severe election violence between the proponents of President Kibaki and his main opponent Raila Odinga. After a government of national unity with Kibaki as President and Odinga as Prime Minister (2008-2013), presidential elections were held in April 2013 leading to the victory of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto.

These countries vary strongly on donor interests. Ethiopia and Kenya can be considered strategically important, while Rwanda and Zimbabwe cannot. Ethiopia is considered a beacon of stability in the Horn of Africa and, just like Kenya, a key ally in the fight against Islamist terrorism. Both countries have played an important role in supporting the transitional government in Somalia against the Islamist Al-Shabaab. While Rwanda and Zimbabwe have been cooperative on security and the war on terror, they do not play an equally important role given their less strategic location and lack of strong interests in the war on terror.

Information on American projects was taken from various sources. For USAID, information was retrieved from the USAID website, which includes Project Details on most programs, and from Congressional Budget Justifications, which gives a general description of earlier programs. For the NED, its annual reports were used. In case information from these sources was not sufficient, the websites of implementing organizations were consulted. In addition, interviews were held with program officers of the NED and its core grantees in Washington DC (May 2013), as well as with USAID program officers for Zimbabwe (in person) and Kenya (by telephone). For the EU, I consulted the National Indicative Programs for 2003-2007 and 2008-2013, which describe EDF programs. EIDHR projects were found in the EIDHR compendia. In addition, interviews were held with the country desk officers of the four countries in the European

12 http://map.usaid.gov/
Commission and/or EEAS (Brussels, October-December 2013). The case of Ethiopia builds on field research conducted in January 2011 (see Del Biondo 2014). For these projects, a conclusion on their political or developmental character was made on the basis of an analysis of their objectives and beneficiaries. Some degree of subjectivity was inevitable as the description of programs was often rather superficial. However, the case study method is still much more profound than studies that are based on databases covering all projects over a long period (e.g. Bush 2013).

IV.1. Rwanda

US democracy assistance in Rwanda has mostly been developmental. USAID has focused on technical capacity-building of the judiciary and local governments, and enabling local civil society organizations to provide input to local governments (US Congress 2008: 259). An exception is the Rwanda Decides Project, which was launched in 2013 to improve election reporting. None of the NED’s core grantees have been active in Rwanda in the investigated period. The NED’s democracy assistance has thus been limited to discretionary grants, in the field of youth education, access to justice, reintegration of ex-prisoners and cohabitation between genocide survivors and participation of women in decision-making. However, the MCC has provided political democracy assistance, including the strengthening of the media and civic participation (Nichols-Barrer et al. 2011).

Similarly, the EDF had a strong developmental focus. It mainly provided capacity-building for the justice sector, including support for the Gacaca community courts (2001-2006), for the rebuilding of court houses and Sectoral Budget Support to the Ministry of Justice (2010-2014). The rebuilding of the national assembly building was also financed. Slightly more political was the EDF-funded Voice and Accountability project, which assists the parliament, the electoral process, media reporting and Non-State Actors. As regards the parliamentary component, this was mainly restricted to technical capacity-building. Similarly, electoral support consists of technical support to the electoral commission. The media component was a contribution to the Great Lakes Media Center, a training center for journalists in the Great Lakes region which is part of the National University of Rwanda. The NSA component was only launched in 2012, and aimed to select NGOs working on justice and the promotion of a culture of human rights. The approach of the EIDHR has mainly been developmental. Although there were some political projects, including on the

17 http://www.greatlakesmedia.org/ (last consulted 22 July 2014)
media, election observation and human rights advocacy,\(^{19}\) the majority of projects focused on domestic violence, youth leadership and decentralization.

**IV.2. Zimbabwe**

US development assistance to Zimbabwe is not restricted. The 2001 Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act prohibits the US to vote in support of new assistance to Zimbabwe from international financial institutions, but does not restrict US foreign assistance.\(^{20}\) USAID’s approach to democracy assistance in Zimbabwe has mostly been political. With USAID money, the NDI supports public opinion research on elections and domestic electoral observation, and IRI implements a capacity-building project for the opposition party MDC.\(^{21}\) USAID strongly supported the constitutional reform process leading to the 2013 referendum. Other USAID-funded activities include broadcasting by the Voice of America, small grants for human rights defenders\(^ {22}\) and a Freedom House project that supports human rights defenders and an independent news center.\(^ {23}\) Lastly, USAID supported the Zimbabwean parliament, including the strengthening of portfolio committees and the installation of an electronic voting system to make voting more transparent.\(^ {24}\)

The NED has a large program in Zimbabwe, which has included political and developmental democracy assistance. The NDI worked on awareness of the constitution (NED 2010) and on a parallel voting tabulation for the 2012 elections.\(^ {25}\) The Solidarity Center supports the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, the prime trade union federation in Zimbabwe that is linked to the opposition party. CIPE helped to strengthen the voice of business groups and women entrepreneurship. In addition, numerous discretionary projects were supported by the NED, political (voter education, free media, public opinion, civic education, election observation) as well as developmental (democratic participation of youth and women, women’s rights, local accountability).

EDF democracy assistance was limited in Zimbabwe as the EDF has been blocked since 2002, when aid was suspended as a reaction to the political violence against the opposition. As a result, there was no multi-annual Country Strategy Paper but only a short-term strategy, financed by the thematic instruments (including the

\(^{20}\) http://harare.usembassy.gov/sanctions_facts_myths.html (last consulted 7 August 2014)
\(^{21}\) Interview, Washington, DC, 29 May 2013.
\(^{22}\) Interview, Washington, DC, 30 May 2013.
\(^{23}\) http://www.freedomhouse.org/program/zimbabwe#.U3YfsygVApA (last consulted 19 June 2014)
\(^{24}\) Interview, Washington, DC, 30 May 2013.
\(^{25}\) Interview, Brussels, 26 November 2013.
EIDHR and the IfS). However, in 2010, at the request of the delegation, provisions were changed to allow for support to the Global Political Agreement, which took effect in February 2009. As such, the EDF supported electoral assistance by the NGO Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa and electoral observation by the parliamentary forum of the South African Development Community. The EIDHR supported political (elections, constitutional reform) and developmental democracy assistance (women’s rights, prisoner’s rights, health rights). The IfS was mobilized to support political democracy assistance (the constitutional process) and developmental democracy assistance (dispute resolution mechanism and conflict prevention by civil society in the context of the 2012 elections) (European Partnership for Democracy 2011).

IV.3. Kenya

USAID’s approach to democracy assistance in Kenya was both political and developmental. Since 2000, USAID has been supporting a parliamentary strengthening programme which provides technical assistance (electronic voting system, advice on constitutional reform), assists the parliament in strengthening its relations with civil society and includes trainings for legislators. In the context of the 2007 elections, USAID supported voter education, media reporting and domestic observation (US Senate 2008). USAID’s funding increased significantly after the presidential elections in December 2007, in order to support the electoral and constitutional reform process. USAID supported the Panel of Eminent Personalities of the AU in their assistance to the implementation of the reform agenda. In addition, USAID invested heavily in the electoral process. The Kenya Elections and Political Processes Strengthening Program included technical assistance to the electoral commission and the office of political parties, as well as trainings by the NDI to candidates and to the domestic Elections Observations Group, and by the IRI to civil society organizations on voter education. In addition, USAID contributed to the UNDP, which provided technical assistance to the electoral commission and the drafting of regulations on voter registration and political parties. Via the International Development Law Organization, USAID supported constitutional reform. USAID also supported an anti-corruption project implemented by Transparency International.

In 2006, USAID responded to the weakening of civil society by launching the Kenyan Civil Society Strengthening Programme (2006-2013) (de Zeeuw 2010: 6). This programme was rather developmental as democracy and governance formed only one of three focal areas. This developmental focus did not change after the 2007 elections, when civil society support became strongly focused on conflict prevention and

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20 Interview, Brussels, 29 October 2013.
21 Interview, Brussels, 26 November 2013.
22 Interview, Brussels, 26 November 2013.
political violence. In the period 2008-2012, numerous organizations were supported which aim to reduce ethnic and politically motivated violence in Kenya.

The NED had a large program in Kenya, including political and developmental democracy assistance. The NDI trained political parties in the context of the 2007 elections and a parallel vote tabulation in the 2010 constitutional referendum. The IRI worked with young parliamentarians and political parties in the run-up to the 2007 elections, but has since 2008 increasingly focused on the devolution process. In addition to these political programs, many developmental projects were also financed by the NED. CIPE has worked to strengthen the voice of the Kenyan business sector. Discretionary grants were mostly developmental, targeting youth organizations, the devolution process, the rights of disabled people, groups working on the prevention of violence and locally based human rights organizations.

The EDF has mainly taken a developmental approach in Kenya. Until the 2007 elections, there was hardly any democracy assistance, with the exception of some support for domestic election observation. In 2010-2014, however, the Bridging Divides Through Accountable Governance program was implemented, which had two main intervention areas: (1) public governance institutions and non-state actors in two selected areas of governance reform and (2) the implementation of the 2008 Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation Accord. This program was mainly developmental as it was focused on technical assistance to the judiciary via the Ministry of Justice and to the electoral commission via the UNDP. In the field of civil society, the EDF supported the NSA-NET program (2007-2012), which was also quite developmental in its objective to 'strengthening mechanisms, networks and capacity for deepening and broadening of Non-State Actors-NSAs involvement in development processes’ (European External Action Service 2009). Only a small fraction went to the Kenyan Election Domestic Observation Forum (EUR 0.5 of 6 million). EIDHR funding increased after the 2007 elections. Projects were mainly developmental, and focused on torture, access of women to justice, decentralized governance and empowering communities.

### IV.4. Ethiopia

USAID supported mainly political, and to a lesser degree developmental, democracy assistance in Ethiopia in 2005-2010. In the context of the 2005 elections, USAID supported voter education, political party training and electoral observation. This was to be supplemented with projects from the NDI and the IRI, but these

29 See NED annual reports.
31 Interview, Brussels, 16 December 2013.
32 The Ethiopian Herald, 18 August, 2005.
could not be implemented as both organizations were asked to leave Ethiopian territory, presumably because of registration problems (Del Biondo 2014). USAID provided a small contribution to the UNDP’s Democratic Institutions Program, which included technical capacity-building to institutions of horizontal accountability. In 2010, however, USAID withdrew its support to protest against the decision by the electoral commission to deny civil society the possibility to provide voter education for the 2010 elections. In the media sector, USAID supported dialogue between stakeholders in the context of the pending media law in 2008. A similar effort was done in the context of the 2009 civil society legislation. Via Freedom House, USAID supported the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, a human rights watchdog organization. USAID also assisted in the training of police and courts on human rights issues. The political character of many of these programs is reflected in the reaction of the Ethiopian government, which has made it increasingly difficult for USAID to do its work on democracy and governance (Del Biondo 2014). This can explain why, since 2010, the only new programs under democracy and governance were one on improving wheelchair access and improving the employability of people with disabilities. Before 2010, developmental democracy assistance included the production of law textbooks, fiscal decentralization and conflict prevention at the local level.

The NED’s programme in Ethiopia is rather small and largely developmental. Of the core grantees, only CIPE currently works in Ethiopia. The Solidarity Center had a project in 2005 on women in trade unions and the NDI and the IRI did not attempt to restart their activities after being sent out of the country in 2005. Most of the NED’s assistance thus goes to discretionary grants, which have concentrated on local conflict resolution, civic education, women’s rights, environmental action and awareness on rights to development.

The EDF has mostly taken a developmental approach in Ethiopia. A large part of EDF funding has focused on the Public Sector Capacity-Building programme, a World Bank programme that has mostly been focused on administrative governance. While the Democratic Institutions Programme also supports more political institutions including the human rights commission and the parliament, it has mainly taken a developmental approach focused on technical capacity-building. In addition, the EDF has provided capacity-building for the Ministry of Women’s affairs and a training center for judges. €10 million of the EDF was spent on the Civil Society Fund, but this fund has concentrated rather generally on capacity-building of civil society. Only a few organizations financed by the CSF, including the Forum for Social Studies, worked directly on democratization. In 2012, €12 million was allocated to a successor programme, the Civil Society Fund II.

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33 The Democratic Institutions Programme supported the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, the Ethiopian Institute of the Ombudsman, the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, House of People’s Representatives and Regional State Councils, the House of Federation and SNNPR Council of Nationalities and the Office of the Auditor General and Regional Auditor Generals.
34 Interview, Addis Ababa, January 2011.
36 Interview, Washington, DC, 23 May 2013; NED annual reports.
37 Interview, Addis Ababa, 24 January 2011.
The EIDHR funded political and developmental projects, including on women’s rights, ethnic minorities, children and disabled people, election observation, voter education, trainings for parliamentarians, the independence of the media and human rights awareness. The EIDHR was however severely reduced as a consequence of the 2009 civil society legislation (Del Biondo 2014).

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IV.5. Findings

**H1.1:** In strategically important countries, the approach of USAID, the EDF, the IfS and the EIDHR is more developmental than that of the NED and the MCC. USAID’s approach is more developmental than that of the EDF, the IfS and the EIDHR.

This hypothesis could not be confirmed. USAID was not less political than the NED in Ethiopia or Kenya. In Ethiopia, USAID was even more political than the NED, while in Kenya, both USAID and the NED had a rather mixed approach. Moreover, in these cases, USAID was more political than the EDF, contrary to what was expected.

**H1.2:** In countries that are not strategically important, democracy assistance is more political than in strategically important countries. In this case, USAID, the EDF, the EIDHR and the IfS are not necessarily more developmental than the NED and MCC.

This hypothesis was confirmed in the case of Zimbabwe but not in the case of Rwanda. In Zimbabwe, USAID and the EDF largely took a political approach, while in Kenya and Ethiopia, the approach was more mixed. Interestingly, in the case of Zimbabwe USAID and the EDF were more political than the EIDHR and the NED. This should be seen in the light of the overall approach of the EU and the US towards Zimbabwe,
which includes targeted sanctions against members of the Mugabe government. In the case of the EDF, developmental programs are unlikely as government-to-government aid is suspended. The NED, the IfS and the EIDHR are not subject to these sanctions. In Rwanda, however, democracy assistance was mostly developmental, with the exception of the MCC and, to a lesser extent, the EIDHR.

H.2.: *The approach of USAID and the EDF is more developmental than that of the EIDHR, the IfS, the NED or the MCC. The approach of the EDF is more developmental than USAID.*

In the case of US democracy assistance, this hypothesis could not be confirmed. In Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, the NED was more developmental than USAID, rather than the other way around. An exception is Rwanda, where the MCC was found to be more political than USAID. This can be explained by the fact that the MCC’s program in Rwanda was a threshold program aimed to improve Rwanda’s score on the selection criterion for ruling justly (Nichols-Barrer et al. 2011). For the EU, the hypothesis was confirmed in Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda, where the EDF was more developmental than the EIDHR. Again, the Zimbabwe case was quite particular given the suspension of the EDF, which can explain that the approach of the EDF was entirely different in this case. The difference between the EDF and USAID was confirmed in all cases except for Zimbabwe. Hence, it was confirmed that the EDF’s approach to co-decide with the government makes a difference for the approach to democracy assistance. That this was not the case for Zimbabwe is again not surprising. Given that Zimbabwe is under aid suspension, the EDF is blocked and thus the decision-making on aid is more unilateral.

IV.6. *Explanations for the findings*

Two surprising findings stand out from this analysis. First, the findings contradicted the expected differences between USAID and the NED. Secondly, strategic interests were not found to have an impact on the approach to democracy assistance. This suggests that the role of institutions and interests should be nuanced, and that other dynamics than those in diplomacy are at play in the case of democracy assistance. Two potential explanations can explain these findings: the openness of the target country and the role of people in the field.
IV.6.1. The openness of the target country

One possible explanation is that the conditions in the target country are more important than the motives and characteristics of the donors. Donors are often not able to do what they want, and there has been an increasing backlash against democracy assistance (Carothers 2010a; NED 2006; Bush 2013; Haring 2013). Democracy assistance is mostly implemented by field-based organizations, which need to make sure that they can remain in the country and pursue their work (Bush 2013; Haring 2013). In restrictive countries, democracy promoters often do not find appropriate partners for more political projects.

This can explain why the NED was found to have a developmental approach in Ethiopia and Rwanda. Projects officers of the NED and its core grantees confirmed that they had difficulties in finding appropriate partners in Rwanda and Ethiopia, where civil society organizations that do political work are limited.38 In the case of Ethiopia, the NDI and IRI, arguably the most political of the NED’s core grantees (Carothers 2009: 15), had to leave the country in 2005.

In comparison, the NED’s approach in Kenya and Zimbabwe was more comprehensive, including political and developmental projects. For example, most core grantees were active in both countries. Interviews revealed that civil society is relatively well-developed in these countries, which may be surprising in the case of Zimbabwe. As a result, there are more proposals coming from Kenya and Zimbabwe than from Ethiopia and Rwanda.39 Moreover, in both countries there was a window of opportunity for democracy support in the investigated period. In Kenya, donor stepped in to support electoral and constitutional reform after the political agreement in March 2008.40 Similarly, the Global Political Agreement adopted in September 2008 in Zimbabwe provided a window of opportunity for more political democracy assistance.

IV.6.2. The principal-agent chain and the power of the field

Another explanation is that political control is more limited than expected. First of all, implementing organizations may be able to maintain some autonomy. This was confirmed in interviews with people working for NDI and IRI, which are most likely to face pressure given the political character of their work. Nonetheless, they declared to be able to work independently, even when working with USAID grants. Both organizations have insisted on their independence and NGO status, for example by accepting only cooperative agreements and grants, which allow them to have some flexibility, rather than contracts.

40 Anonymous telephone interview, 30 August 2013.
Furthermore, the longstanding work and expertise in their area gives them a position that donors respect.\textsuperscript{41} Organizations that accept grants were often called ‘beltway bandits’, which refers to the ring road surrounding Washington DC where most consultancy businesses are located.\textsuperscript{42}

Secondly, there may be a break in the chain of command between headquarters and the people working in the field. Experts on USAID argued that, while political control is substantial, it mostly concerns the budget per country and per sector, rather than the actual approach or implementing partner.\textsuperscript{43} Strong evidence for this finding is provided by the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya, where money from the Economic Support Fund was used for democracy assistance.\textsuperscript{44} The Economic Support Fund is administered by the State Department with the aim to promote foreign policy objectives. However, although the allocation of these funds per country is decided by State, USAID often takes the lead in determining how the aid is spent (Lancaster 2008: 72). This can explain why funds that were allocated to strategically important countries ended up being used for democracy assistance, which could potentially have a negative effect on diplomatic relations. However, the extent to which this is possible depends greatly on the people in the field. The ambassador has the last word on the overall strategy in a country. In addition, the USAID Democracy and Governance officer and country director also play an important role in setting out programs on democracy and governance.\textsuperscript{45} When those three key actors are willing to take a hard stance, a political approach is more likely. This finding is in line with studies focusing on the implementation level of the policy cycle, which have traditionally focused on public service workers. It has been argued that such ‘street-level bureaucrats’, who work at the local level, often do not neatly follow the commands of their principals (Lipsky 1980). While such approaches have not often been applied to foreign aid, Bicchi (2010) finds them to be relevant in her study on EIDHR micro-projects by the EIDHR in the Mediterranean. In the area of diplomacy, Barkan (2004) argued that the degree to which the US focused on human rights in Kenya varied between different US ambassadors.

V. Conclusions

This paper has attempted to explain the particular approach taken by the EU and the US in democracy assistance. A political approach is more likely to harm diplomatic relations as it is confrontational towards the host government, while a developmental approach is non-confrontational and thus unlikely to influence diplomatic relations.

\textsuperscript{41} Interviews, Washington, DC, 15, 28 May 2013.
\textsuperscript{42} Interview, Washington, DC, 16 May 2013.
\textsuperscript{43} Telephone interviews, 30 August 2013, 22 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{44} This can be seen in the Congressional Budget Justifications (Regional Perspectives).
\textsuperscript{45} Telephone interviews, 30 August 2013, 22 July 2013, interview, Washington, DC, 29 May 2013.
The paper made a contribution to the literature by analyzing the impact of the institutional framework in democracy assistance. In this sense, the EU and the US are particularly interesting given their entirely different institutional set-up. It was expected that interests are more likely to lead to a political approach in the case of USAID, given the large degree of political control from State Department. However, the NED, which is autonomous from the State Department, was expected to have a more political approach.

Based on the role of ideas, on the other hand, we expected the EDF to be more developmental than USAID, given the requirement to co-decide each program with the host government. Moreover, democracy-focused budget lines such as the EIDHR and the IFS in the case of the EU and the MCC and the NED in the case of the US, were believed to be more political than development-oriented budget lines (USAID, EDF).

These hypotheses were then tested in four cases: Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Kenya. Interestingly, our expectations based on interests and institutions were contradicted by our findings: USAID was not more developmental than the EDF and the NED was not more political than USAID in strategically important countries. Our hypotheses based on ideas and institutions were partly confirmed. The EDF approach to co-decide with host governments indeed led to a more developmental approach when compared to USAID. While the EIDHR was found to have a more political approach than the EDF in most cases, this was not the case for the NED and USAID.

On the one hand, these findings suggest that ideas matter. The EU’s approach to provide aid in cooperation with host governments has not remained dead letter, and can explain why democracy assistance is unlikely to be confrontational if financed by the EDF. Institutions also matter, as otherwise we would not have seen a difference between the EDF and the EIDHR. However, the role of ideas and institutions should not be overestimated, as otherwise this would have been reflected more clearly in the case of USAID and the NED. Here, the openness of the target government plays a key role, particularly for the NED which has implementing partners that do very political work.

Moreover, the role of interests and institutions should be strongly nuanced. It was argued that there may be a break in the chain of command, and that the approach favored by those working in the field might play a role. This aspect has been underemphasized in the current literature. Further research, including extensive field research, is advised to investigate how and under what conditions people in the field matter. In this regard, it would be interesting to see if these conclusions are also valid in strategically more important countries, such as those in the European Neighborhood or the Middle East.
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