Workshop on Regime Transitions
Transitions from Communist Rule in Comparative Perspective

Sponsored by
The Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

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About This Report

On 15-16 November 2002, the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law of the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University sponsored a workshop in Stanford, CA on “Regime Transitions from Communist Rule in Comparative Perspective.” Over 40 individuals attended the workshop, including many notable American and international scholars. The six individual sessions of the workshop examined a variety of issues: the transitions model two decades later; whether transitions from communist rule are distinctive; theoretical perspectives seeking to explain the variation in outcome among post-communist regimes; and regional perspectives examining the variation in outcome in Central and Eastern Europe, the Slavic Region, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The workshop also sought to determine whether there is a compelling intellectual rationale for a larger scale, multi-year project on transitions from communism or if the workshop itself represented the capstone event.

The workshop was organized by Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Michael McFaul, Hoover Institution and Political Science, and Gail Lapidus, Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Studies. Workshop participants included scholars at many of the leading political science and government departments in the United States, as well as scholars associated with international academic institutions, governments, and development organizations. This report summarizes the presentations given as part of the workshop, and the discussion that followed. Every effort has been made to portray accurately the range of opinions expressed; however, space and organizational considerations resulted in omissions and paraphrasing. Kathryn Ducceschi, who served as a rapporteur during the meeting with John
Cieslewicz, authored this document, and the workshop organizers served as editors. Any errors in fact or interpretation should be attributed to the author and the editors.
Workshop on Regime Transitions
Program

Friday, November 15

8:30-9:00 a.m.  Continental Breakfast

9:00 a.m.  Welcome and Introduction

9:10-10:30 a.m.  Session I:  “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule”:
Reflections on the Transitions Model, Two Decades Later

Historical and comparative reflections on the model of regime transitions articulated during the 1980s by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, Terry Karl and others. How well have the O’Donnell/Schmitter framework, the model of pacted transitions, and the arguments about the relationship mode of transition and regime type stood the test of time? How robust have these arguments proved to be in light of subsequent transitions in Asia, Africa, and the postcommunist world?

Chair:  Michael McFaul, Stanford University (Political Science) and Hoover Institution

Presenters:  Terry Karl, Stanford University (Political Science)
Presenting: “Concepts, Assumptions and Hypotheses about Democratization: Reflections on 'Stretching from South to East’” by Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl

Discussants:  Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution
Leonardo Morlino, Institute for International Studies and University of Florence

10:30-10:45 a.m.  BREAK
10:45 a.m.- 1 p.m.  **Session II: Are Transitions from Communist Rule Distinctive?**

Was there something distinctive about transitions from Communist rule during the late 1980s and beginning of the 90s, as compared with previous transitions from authoritarian rule? How have transitions from communism compared with other regime transitions in terms of such dimensions as speed, simultaneity of changes, historical legacies, the nature of the typical transition (cooperative vs. non-cooperative), and the international context?

Is it more fruitful to distinguish transitioning communist/postcommunist regimes as a separate category, distinct from other kinds of nondemocratic regimes, or to do away with this boundary and compare specific cases of transitions from communist rule with transitions in other parts of the world?

**Chair:** Gail Lapidus, Institute for International Studies, Stanford

**Presenters:**
Valerie Bunce, Cornell University (Political Science)
Hilary Appel, Claremont College
Lilia Shevtsova, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow Center

Presenting
- “Regional Effects in Democratization: The Postcommunist Experience in Comparative Perspective” by Valerie Bunce
- "Russia's Post-Communist Transformation: Variables, Dilemmas, Outcomes" by Lilia Shevtsova
- “Reconsidering the Third Wave and the Transition Paradigm” by Appel

**Discussants:**

David Holloway, Stanford University (IIS Director, History, and Political Science)

1:00-2:15 p.m.  **LUNCH**
Session III: Explaining Variation in Outcomes among Postcommunist Regimes: Theoretical Perspectives

What is the relative weight of agency vs. structure in explaining the trajectories and contemporary forms of different regimes? How much do we attribute to the choices of leaders and the nature of political coalitions? How much to economic structure? How much to culture, class, and other social and historical factors?

Chair: Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution

Presenters:
Michael McFaul, Stanford University and Hoover Institution
Ronald Suny, University of Chicago (History and Political Science)

Presenting:
• “Reform, Revolution, Transition, Transformation: Façade Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Post-Soviet World” by Ronald Suny

Discussants:
Terry Karl, Stanford University
Charles King, Georgetown University (Department of Government)
Ghia Nodia, Chairman, The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, University of Bucharest and Romanian Academic Society

3:30-3:45 Break

3:45-4:45 Discussion of Session III continued
Saturday, November 16

9:00-9:30 a.m. Continental Breakfast

9:30-11:30 a.m. Session IV: Explaining Variation in Outcomes among Postcommunist Regimes: Regional Perspectives

Each regional paper will address the following four questions:

What were the modes of transition in the region? How did the type of transition affect the nature of the subsequent postcommunist regimes (the degree, stability, and type of democracy)?

What was the impact of communist legacies on the nature of the postcommunist regimes?

What was the impact of the particular historical legacies of the country and region (particularly before communist rule) in shaping the character of the postcommunist regimes?

What other factors explain variation within the particular region as well as the distinctiveness of the region in terms of the nature of the postcommunist regimes?

Chair: Michael McFaul

Presenters:
Andras Bozoki, Central European University, *Central and Eastern Europe*
Lucan Way, Temple University: *The Slavic Region*
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, University of Bucharest and Romanian Academic Society *The Balkans*

Presenting
“Central European Ways to Democracy” by András Bozóki
“Democratization without Decommunization: The Postcommunist Experience in Comparative Perspective” by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi
“Authoritarian State Building and Transitions in Western Eurasia” by Lucan A. Way

Discussants:
David Holloway, Stanford University (IIS Director, History, and Political Science)
11:30-11:45  BREAK

11:45-1:00 p.m.  **Session V: Explaining Variation in Outcomes among Postcommunist Regimes: Regional Perspectives (cont.)**

**Chair:** Gail Lapidus, IIS, Stanford University

**Presenters:**
Ghia Nodia, Chairman, The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development *The Caucasus*
Kathleen Collins, Notre Dame University *Central Asia*

Presenting:
“Central Asia’s Post-communist Regimes” by Kathleen Collins
Paper by Ghia Nodia

**Discussants:**
Ned Walker, UC Berkeley (Exec. Director, Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies)
Eric McGlinchey, Visiting Scholar, IIS (Ph.D. candidate, Princeton)

1:00-2:15  LUNCH

2:15-5:00  **Concluding Roundtable Discussion on Future Work**
What is the feasibility and desirability of a more substantial comparative project on “Transitions from Communist Rule,” and if it should be undertaken, how should it be structured?

**Chairs:** Gail Lapidus and Michael McFaul

3:30-3:45  BREAK

3:45-5:00  Concluding discussion continued
INTRODUCTION

The wide range of outcomes in the transitions of post-communist regimes during the last decade compels a review of the adequacy of current models of transition and of explanations of the wide-ranging variation in outcomes within the region. The large number of post-communist regimes that have not clearly transitioned to democracy, and the increasingly prevalent authoritarian institutions in the region, have resulted in a complex political environment that has prompted significant debate in determining the root causes and the impact of this variance. The vast array of dependent and independent variables presents an extremely complex problem to the field of comparative politics. The Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University sponsored a workshop on “Regime Transitions from Communist Rule in Comparative Perspective” at Stanford University on 15-16 November of 2002 in order to assess the domestic and international causes and explanations of the varied outcomes of post-communist transitions. The workshop consisted of six sessions, with the first three focused on theoretical perspectives, the fourth and fifth on regional perspectives, and the last on assessing future prospects and requirements for studying transitions from communist rule.

The first session of the workshop was devoted to historical and comparative reflections on the model of regime transitions articulated during the 1980s by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, Terry Karl and others. The discussion centered on assessing how well this framework, the model of pacted transitions, and the arguments about the relationship of mode of transition and regime type have stood the test of time. Discussion also considered the robustness of these arguments in light of subsequent transitions in Asia, Africa, and the post-communist world. Session II sought to determine whether transitions from Communist rule during the late 1980s and beginning of the 90s were distinctive in comparison to previous transitions from
authoritarian rule. By examining dimensions such as speed, simultaneity of changes, historical legacies, the international context, and the cooperative versus non-cooperative nature of transitions from communism, this session also aimed to establish whether it is more beneficial to distinguish transitioning post-communist regimes as a separate category or to compare specific cases of transitions from communist rule with transitions in other parts of the world. Session III considered the relative weight of agency versus structure in explaining the trajectories and contemporary forms of different regimes. Participants examined the impact of the choices of leaders, of the nature of political coalitions, of the economic structure, of culture, class, and other social and historical factors.

Sessions IV and V brought together regional specialists to explain variation in outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Slavic region, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Participants sought to assess how a variety of factors shaped the character of the subsequent post-communist regimes: modes of transition; communist legacies; particular historical legacies of the country or region; and other factors specific to the region. The final session addressed the desirability and feasibility of a more substantial comparative project on “Transitions from Communist Rule” and the possible structure of such a project, should one be undertaken.
SESSION I  
“Transitions from Authoritarian Rule”:  
Reflections on the Transitions Model, Two Decades Later  
Chair: Michael McFaul

TERRY KARL, Stanford University (Political Science)  
“Concepts, Assumptions and Hypotheses about Democratization: Reflections on 'Stretching from South to East’” by Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl

The original transitions project was launched when there were not yet democracies and the results were still unknown. Transitions from authoritarianism were occurring, but no one knew where they were going or whether countries would revert back to authoritarianism. Subsequently, the cases studied all became democracies. In examining post-communist transitions in comparison to Latin America and Southern Europe, there was disagreement over the qualitative differences of communism. The range of variation of outcomes in the post-communist region was wider, more varied, and qualitatively different. The importance of empire and of imperial collapse, combined with the unique aspect of simultaneity or transition on multiple fronts, are the key differences that distinguish the post-communist region.

In the view of Professor Karl, there have been a number of misinterpretations of the transitions model resulting in the conclusion that it does not apply in the post-communist region. First, it was falsely construed that all change had to result in a democratic transition. The original literature explicitly allowed for the possibility of varied outcomes. At the outset of the project, it was unclear if the countries selected for the study would lead to a transition, stall, or possibly revert back. All the countries of the Southern Cone happened to become democracies, creating a false impression that the theory did not account for variation in outcomes. Other countries that were not included in the original study did not succeed.
Another misinterpretation relates to the conditions of transition, which are separate and distinct from the causes of durability. What brings about democracy is not what sustains it or consolidates it. There were no conditions uniting the group of countries in the original study other than the Rostow condition (must have a nation to have democracy); the Moore condition (without bourgeoisie, there is no democracy); and the type of assets (oil has perverse effects).

Concerning the possible modes of transition, the original literature offered a region-specific argument for Latin America where the hegemonic role of the U.S. did not permit mass formations from below due to the strong link with communism. This was a condition specific to Latin America and should not be interpreted to mean that pacted or elite transitions are always more likely. Mike McFaul argues that in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union mass movements from below are the ones that have proven to be the most successful. But Karl argues these transitions cannot be characterized as revolutions since revolution changes not just the regime, but also the state apparatus, including the military.

Determining the dominant mode of transition in post communist countries is not really all that important; durability studies show that the path to democracy does not affect its staying power. However, the mode of transition does impact the types of institutions that develop, and through this mechanism, can affect the type of democracy that emerges. Additionally, the logic of transition is significant when comparing South America and Southern Europe to post-communist states. There are different logics depending on whether the bargaining is between hardliners and soft liners or between hardliners and hardliners, as occurs in war transitions. Therefore, war is fundamental as it changes the logic of transition to democracy.
Pacts present another challenge since it is not certain if or when they really happen. For example, in Brazil there are not documents or agreements to determine what was negotiated, who was there, and what was taken off the table. In post-communist states, if there were no pacts, how can one explain the absence of trials and of other mechanisms of holding the previous regime accountable? If they are non-cooperative, mass movements from below, why is there an absence of these trials?

Turning to the issue of simultaneity, it is possible that simultaneity simplifies rather than complicates transition. If everything changes at once, there is a wider range of rewards for people. The regime needs some kind of ‘guarantee’ it will not be persecuted or that its claims to property will not be overturned in the future. Essentially, the right to rule is exchanged for the right to make money. Determining whether post-communist transitions represent a different wave than the 1974-wave, depends on the precise definition of the term wave. A wave can be defined as regional or temporal. If it is based on the catalyst of empire collapse, then it can be considered a distinct wave.

Rather than focusing so much on regime, it may be more beneficial to examine urbanization, education, levels of inequality, desperately poor regions (Africa vs. Hungary), and preparedness of citizens. The conditions for democracy may be a better determinant of the quality of democracy.

DISCUSSANTS

Larry Diamond:

In defining democracy, the crucial dimension is the ability to replace leaders through free, fair, and competitive elections. Many countries simply have a façade of multiparty competition. In order to understand transition, it is necessary to categorize the emerging
regimes. The issue in post-communist transitions is not that so few regimes remained autocratic; half of these regimes are still autocratic or have reverted back to authoritarianism.

In general, criticism of the transitions model has unfairly characterized the transitions literature. This literature has identified several critical and relevant factors such as a split within the regime; political liberalization; core mass mobilization; regime hardliners and soft liners versus opposition hardliners and soft liners; and the value, and not necessity, of pacts. Post-communist transitions were part of the same wave initiated in 1974. It is necessary to consider what is going on in the rest of the world and the developing global norms of the time period. By looking elsewhere, such as Africa or Asia, it is evident there are other transitions that also do not conform with the original transitions theory. Since 1974, there has been a clear transformation in global norms and policy emphasizing human rights and democracy. The push for democracy has not been uniform, but there has been a continuous and increasing transformation in a global context that serves to unify the wave.

**Leonardo Morlino:**

There are three key questions implicit in Karl’s paper. First of all, is cross-regional comparison fruitful and meaningful? Cross regional comparison requires regions, and not just in a geographic sense. Neither Southern Europe (Spain-Portugal-Greece) nor East Asia should be considered regions. Eastern Europe is a region, in a weak sense, due to communist traditions.

Secondly, is there a dominant, mainstream, theoretical approach to analyzing transition to democracy? The answer is affirmative in that the actor-centered approach is mainstream. This approach goes against any general theory because it allows an actor to make decisions. There are few accepted classifications of regimes, yet the dimensions are very rich and complex. There
is a wide range of variables to include: duration, violence, civilian actors, institutional actors, agreements, participation, political organizations, and state continuity. The explanatory factors depend on political traditions, the previous regime, its duration, pre-existing levels of opposition, the causes of transition, and the modes of transition.

Lastly, is there a theory of transition to democracy or democratic installation? There is not such a theory, and it is not desirable to develop one. The most fruitful theory can only be a local theory defined temporally and spatially. Theory is applicable in some fields such as consolidation and the anchoring of institutions. When studying transitions, we can only give definitions, explanations, classifications and a framework for research. The result of a theory of transition would be deceiving and lead to the impoverishment of a rich and complex issue.

**OPEN DISCUSSION:**

A number of participants stressed the importance of cross-regional research and the value of broadening the scope of the project. Much of the discussion emphasized regional differences that surface due to varying definitions of terms such as transition and wave, the varied application of concepts such as revolution, and the emphasis on outcome versus process.

Lucan Way pointed out disagreement centers on what actually constitutes transition. The transitions model, as represented by Terry Karl, assumes a more orthodox view by focusing on the sequence of choices and events surrounding liberalization. The sequence of events in post-communist states was very different and revolved around actors. In the Soviet case the transition began under Gorbachev, but the culmination was the disintegration of the entity under observation and the emergence of 15 new entities with distinct trajectories. Another aspect of transition involves understanding it temporally in terms of specifying the actual start. In the
Polish example it makes a difference as to whether mass mobilization is included. In Serbia, and to some degree Kosovo, it was manipulated. Also, the existence of an opposition in waiting is critical as evidenced in Poland versus Bulgaria or Romania.

Terry Karl provided a definition of transition as the moment the old regime is coming apart, and what will replace it is unknown. It is a time of abnormal politics and a great amount of uncertainty. As things become predictable and politics normalize, the transition is over, although change is not necessarily over.

Beyond issues of definition or application, the viability of the transition concept was questioned. The point was raised that if all transitions do not lead to democracy, and the path does not matter, then what does transition as a concept offer? If transition becomes wider than the narrow period between opening and founding elections, what is the difference between transition politics and politics? Maybe transition matters in the moment, but not in the long term. If it ends up not mattering in the long run, is it really important in the short run?

Regarding the concept of revolution, the concern was raised that the difference between revolution and evolution was artificially increasing. The view that a revolution is only successful when the political and military structures are replaced signifies that very few revolutions are actually complete. It would be better to consider the scale of revolutions and the success. Reform and revolution may be difficult to define, but should be considered on a continuum of change from evolutionary and less rapid change to revolutionary and more rapid change. The outcome of the revolution as opposed to the mode of transition is the crucial difference in the definition. At the same time, it is necessary to consider what is gained by calling a transition a revolution. Moreover, others stressed that outcome, and not process, is the key. More violent transitions result in less change while non-violent revolution can produce
more dramatic change. This differs from the classic revolution concept and demonstrates the need to reemphasize outcome, as well as the impact of the Cold War and empire collapse.

Terry Karl noted that coding the mode of transition is not easy. Pacts are not necessarily written down as in Venezuela. Mass mobilization in Latin America was also a critical piece of the transition, but the difference was the ability of the elite to gain control, to utilize this mass mobilization, and to keep it in elite circles. When the masses actually got control, there was reversion to authoritarianism. This is not a revolution just because the citizens describe it that way. There is a huge amount of literature on revolution that should be considered. There are no non-violent revolutions that incorporate changes in all aspects – regime, state (military), and property. There is an enormous similarity of culture between the regions. Those places, with a lot of collusion in setting up the next regime and in deliberately demobilizing the masses, result in prevailing cynical attitudes, and lower quality and less effective democracies.

The debate on waves was inconclusive. Karl offered a definition as a historical period during which there are more moments when groups of countries become democratic. There is no doubt that the collapse of the Soviet Union sparked the post-communist wave. Maybe something else sparked the 1974 wave of two separate and distinct regions which spoke the same language. There may be a ‘diffusion wave’ versus the ‘empire collapse wave’. Others proposed that Africa is part of the distinct 4th wave along with post-communist countries. Another proposal suggested that waves can be waves on top of waves: the 3rd wave did not recede, it surged. Whether labeled a 4th wave or 5th wave, it is all part of the same trend since 1974.

The similarities of post-communist transitions with those of Africa, both of which were profoundly impacted by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, were noted. The wave of change in Africa began in February of 1990 and bears striking similarities
with the politics of Central Asia in terms of neo-patrimonial rule, clan and ethnic alliances and divisions. The project could benefit greatly by broadening its scope to compare these regions.
State socialism was distinctive from its Latin American and southern European cousins due to its institutional design, ideology, relationship to the international system, and level of federalism defined by ethnic groups. More precisely, state socialism was distinctive in that it combined state ownership of the means of production; rule by a single Leninist party; a leftist ideology committed to producing a new “socialist man” and rapid socio-economic development; economic, political, and cultural isolation from the West; and integration into a hierarchical system functioning under the Soviet Union. As a long term consequence, the Soviets lost their regional monopoly and the center lost control over the republics within the ethno-federations.

A distinctive process brought state socialism to an end. The variation in change was faster in those parts of the periphery where states were relatively homogeneous in their ethnic make-up, had some history of protest, and a well-defined dissident community. The breakdown of authoritarian rule came later in the post-communist region because of the pervasive nature of state socialism and its involvement in both the structure and dynamics of the Cold War. The design and structure of state socialism accounts for several other distinct features of the region. Mobilization against the regime spread as a result of the redundancy in social, economic, political structures; the easy diffusion of ideas across boundaries; and accumulating evidence that the risks of protest were small. The linkage between the deregulation of the social and economic monopoly and the spatial monopoly manifested itself in the disintegration of three longstanding states in the region – Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.
The agenda of post-communist transition shared the same basic tasks as the agenda in Latin America and southern Europe; however, it was also significantly more crowded and radical given the absence of a democratic past and the legacies of state socialism. It was a quadruple transition requiring a change in regime, economy, state, and relationship to the international system.

Distinctions between the regions stand out in terms of the impact of different strategies of transition: bridging versus breaking. While bridging between the old and new order constituted the most successful approach to democratization in the south, the most successful strategy in the post-communist region was the opposite: breakage. The strategy of bridging limits the number of participants in the political process, limits the range of issues, coopts the military, incorporates a broadly representative interim government, and produces a bridge between the old and the new regime in the first election. In every highly successful case of democratization in the post-communist region, there was mass mobilization at the outset, the military was excluded from political influence, the first elections resulted in a radical break from the past leadership, and major changes in the economy were introduced rapidly. The countries in the region that have remained authoritarian share one characteristic – limited mass mobilization.

There are evident patterns that need to be emphasized in predicting the possibility of a subsequent democratic trajectory. Only a minority of post-communist countries are democracies, or likely to remain democracies. Conflict continues within the ethno-federal successor states due to the strong institutional legacy of managing majority-minority relations. Ethno-federalism was effective in Spain (and India), but they were unitary states at the start of transition. Regional autonomies came later. The problems with ethno-federalism in the post-
communist region result from a system inherited from the old order. There is a legacy of majority-minority conflicts with majorities embracing a more and more exclusive definition. There is little room for political maneuver as granting more autonomy could lead to further division.

Additionally, in terms of nationalist mobilization, there seems to be positive linkage with successful, sustained democratization. A relatively simple explanation lies in the timing. Late nationalist mobilization, once the regime and state were already disintegrating, produced in virtually every instance a rapid transition to democracy and continued progression. Prior mobilization, under communist rule, became problematic and undermined democracy. The key is whether or not the communist party lost in the first election.

Do these arguments address the same kind of issues with different scores in each region or are there more fundamental differences? Breakdown in the southern cases occurs for many reasons. In the post-communist region, it is a simple story and there is not much variance. The importance of historical and particular institutional factors did not receive enough attention in the first transitions analysis. Neither did the importance of the international scene. The standard model of transition has to do with uncertainty. The level of uncertainty in the post-communist transitions varied tremendously. There were some surprises, but nothing that surprising. It was not the order nor the variance that was surprising, but rather the speed and success of democratization at the top – the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. The issue of transition should be separated from the issue of uncertainty.
How is post-communist transition distinct? Does it belong in the Third Wave with Latin America and southern Europe, or a different wave? Why are post-communist transitions grouped in the Third Wave and why is transition the dominant language?

Similarities alone may not be sufficient. There are many similarities between post-communist and post-colonial transitions: new parties, mass enfranchisement, national sovereign economies, new central banks, new modes of production, judicial structure, property rights, and new trading relations. Post-colonialism captures regime and state change better, as well as the role of external factors and the Soviet/colonialism attitudinal shift.

Post-communist transitions are grouped with those of Latin America and southern Europe primarily because of a temporal association. However, they are independent despite parallel internal developments. The contagion effect from southern Europe to the post-communist regions is unlikely since the contagion factor acts within a region, and not between regions. It is also unlikely that common international conditions resulted in external forces producing similar internal responses. All of these conditions had very different implications for each country depending on its location and importance. European or Western integration is an incentive for post-communist consolidation, but not for transition. EU membership was a pipedream in 1989. In the long term however, it will strengthen democracy in these countries as a consensus that EU membership is a goal has marginalized radical actors and policies.

If timing is not powerful as a factor for grouping these countries, why did this become the language of post-communist regime change? Post-communist transitions occurred at the peak of the transitions paradigm. Path dependency was the prevailing trend and the transitions paradigm was powerful at the time. As a consequence, political transformation at the expense of
other transitions was analyzed with a teleological bias that presumed a capitalistic, democratic, Western end point. Were these transitions from authoritarianism, rather than to democracy? It is an illogical basis from which to judge development around the globe.

Finally, it is also unclear how global normative change impacted transition. Neo-liberalism is an internationally diffused paradigm. But U.S. foreign policy did not consistently favor democracy, rather compliance and stability. Was this real promotion of democracy, or was it the zeitgeist acting across regions? Post-communist transitions should be regarded as a separate wave.

LILIA SHEVTSOVA
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow Center
"Russia's Post-Communist Transformation: Variables, Dilemmas, Outcomes"

Cross-regional comparisons are useful for a number of reasons: they assist in overcoming isolation; can broaden the understanding of transitologists; and can affect the application or elaboration of political and practical solutions. However, there is a danger of oversimplifying and arriving at incorrect conclusions. State socialism is quite unique in the fusion between power and economy, power and business, and the state and the individual. There is a gap between old institutions and international relationships as the collapse resulted in the dismantling of old institutions. Comparisons are incompatible although some can be grouped together. For example, what was useful for Spain and Portugal could help prospective EU candidates.

The significance of the mode of transition is not why it influences institutions, but why the same mode had different results. Revolution in the fields of economy and politics was anti-systemic, but in the field of geopolitics, it represented continuity. Simultaneity facilitated
extrication, but hindered consolidation. Oil served to consolidate power, consolidate industrial interests, and prevent the capacity to move beyond the industrial state.

There are practical and political decisions and conclusions that can be drawn from a comparison between central and eastern European transitions; a study of the impact of natural resources like oil as a hindrance or an aid; and the pattern of dual leadership and post-communist leadership. The most important challenge is grasping the crucial variable - the external factor. Even without democratic movement, it plays a role. How can the West integrate post-communism by looking at China and Asian modernization?

**DISCUSSANT**  
**David Holloway:**

There was indeed something distinctive in post-communist transitions since state socialism is distinctive. Therefore, it is appropriate to treat them separately, but it does not preclude a comparison with Third Wave transitions. It is not zero sum meaning various comparisons are appropriate.

Appel refers to post-communist and post-colonial state development. As 22 of the 28 post-communist states are new states, this requires an investigation of state formation too. How does it compare to Africa and Asia? Are there similarities to waves of new states in the 1960s? New post-colonial states had a choice of capitalism versus communism while post-communist states did not have a choice. Comparison in terms of revolution has pros and cons as all comparisons do. There is a general uneasiness with the term ‘transition.’ What is transitions literature seeking to answer?
The international context of what is happening is underdeveloped in all the papers and in the discussion. This context could serve to link or not link transitions as a result of a single set of causes, or serve as a contagion effect linking all. In terms of the human rights process, the Carter Administration plus the Helsinki process, even if only rhetorically, emphasizes the importance of human rights and democracy. If the collapse of communism is the result of an internal conflict of state socialism, it also had an important international component. Inter-systemic competition with the West had impact. Each side had the same goal – to be the best. The shared international criteria were strategic competition and the competition of ideas.

Another element of transition is the change of state in relation to the international context. When states broke free from Moscow, they found themselves in an institutionally and culturally rich environment, especially those in Eastern Europe. It would be beneficial to consider the impact of different neighborhoods through a more systematic investigation of the international component.

**OPEN DISCUSSION:**

In the discussion, there was agreement over the distinctive nature of transitions from communist rule and the limitations of the transitions model. Neither the need for comparison nor the best method for comparison was specifically examined; rather, discussion focused on the necessity of addressing the international context of transitions, the role of external factors and of contagions, and the difficulty of measuring impact.

It is artificial to compare transition in Latin America with the former Soviet Union. In southern Europe and Latin America, a market economy existed and was fairly free. This was not the case in the Soviet Union with state socialism. Satellites of the Soviet bloc had some variants of a market economy, but there was nothing in the S.U. where the economy was ‘militarized.’
The linkage between outcome variation and the level of elite penetration from Moscow into the social structure merits further exploration. Those who were dependent on Moscow were more shaped by the outcome of other contests.

The term uncertainty continued to raise doubts. Politics is by definition uncertain, but how much uncertainty qualifies as a transition. Predictability has proven ineffective. On Larry Diamond’s chart “ambiguous regimes” are equivalent to uncertainty, such as Georgia post-Shevardnadze. It could be agreed that all regimes in the modern world other than those in either extreme are unpredictable or to a degree, uncertain.

Additionally, there is a need to narrow the definition of transition, especially in relation to the international effect. The literature has not dealt with the international effect sufficiently. It is necessary to examine under what conditions external influences are even effective. There is a permissive diffusion of norms and ideas. Is it possible for external forces, such as US assistance, to have impact if political will to reform is not present in the region?

Concerning the contagion effect, the notion of “return to Europe” already was strong in the 1980s since the West had won. Those countries desiring immediate trade relations with the EU were subject to political constraints and requirements for reform. There were contagions within the system from common sources such as Helsinki and the EU, and not so much from U.S. foreign policy. The challenge is disentangling which drove democratization in Eastern Europe. The normative effect of democracy and human rights (Helsinki, USAID policies) and the economic effect may have had impact on Eastern Europe, but not so much in Central Asia.

Are there alternative models worth considering? In Central Asia, the models of the Middle East, sultanism, and of China, gradual economic reform and minimal political reform, are considered. The importance of other models is an interesting question as particular models may
have greater validity in one region versus another. It should not be assumed that western integration means a clear path to democracy. For example, African states have juridical, but not substantive, democracy.
In order to have a successful transition to democracy there are certain preconditions such as a viable economy and civil society. Modernization theory correlates these preconditions or values with democratization. On the other hand, it is possible these values were actually effects rather than causes of democracy. In modernization literature, the focus is on structure and a fixed idea of culture as a bound and uncontested theory. Everything in a culture is the same, but different than things outside of it – highly homogenous within, but conflict on the edges. This largely abandons the fact that culture is mobile with fluid identities making it difficult to include culture as an independent variable and to make any general predictions based on culture.

Transitology considers the mode of transition and an agent-centered approach as the key factors which likely result in democracy. Rational actors, agreements, elites, and pacts smooth the transition: anyone can make it as a democracy if the transition is right. However, the nature of the authoritarian past cannot be discounted. It plays a critical role in the form of state structure, the institutions, politics, economics, and the international situation.

In the South Caucasus, there are commonalities among the three states. They are weak states with fragile, embryonic institutions, and disputed authority over their populations. There is no widely accepted rationale for the rulers who are in power to be in power; and therefore, societal factors are of greater significance. Regional elites, clans, mafias, and cronies are more influential than they would be otherwise. Another common issue is that of national identity, which is highest in Armenia and weakest in Azerbaijan. Armenia has a higher degree of ethnic
heterogeneity, and winning in Karabakh in 1994 strengthened the almost racial national identity. By contrast, Georgia’s losses in ethnic conflicts have resulted in continued societal fragmentation. All three countries share a commitment to a democratic and capitalist government at least in rhetoric, but all three have also had coups. There is a general trend away from free elections and toward more manipulation, but there is also a trend away from chaos and disintegration, and toward relatively greater solidarity and stability. Much state property remains in the hands of managers: politics gives economic clout, which in turn gives power. The result is that ordinary people are depoliticized and disenfranchised.

Armenia was initially very successfully democratized with a degree of unity or consensus achieved by the nationalist movement until the mid-90s. Cooperation in Armenia where there was a condominium with a smooth transition in 1989, contrasts with the inflexibility of the communists or ruling elite in Azerbaijan. The nature of competing discourses in terms of inclusiveness or exclusiveness is also telling of differences. In Georgia discourse is predominantly intolerant while in Armenia it is becoming increasingly intolerant. In terms of pacts, perhaps the lack of a pact in Georgia led to instability. Azerbaijan had no pact and the National Front eventually emerged. Meanwhile, Armenia did have a pact, or more of an agreement, resulting in a condominium between the communist party and the nationalist party.

The similarities and the variance reflect that the truth must lie somewhere in the radical middle: agents and elites are both important. Pacts do make transition easier, but must be understood within the context in which the elites operate. It is necessary to consider structure, history, and culture.
Coding is important in determining why the revolution metaphor gets you further than the transition metaphor. If the transitions model is applied along with its assumptions, it does not hold up because a pact is just one path. A pacted transition is supposed to lead to democracy, yet post-communist transitions demonstrate that sometimes it does, and often it does not. According to transitions literature, imposition from above, is least likely to result in democracy, and more likely to lead to dictatorship. Imposition from below (revolution) was supposed to be the worst way, however, it resulted in democracy more often and faster in the post-communist transitions. A new understanding regarding violence and revolution is needed. There is much violence in stable democracies, yet this gets you the furthest down the road the fastest.

Terry Karl suggests the transitions literature is being misread; however, if the theory that all pacts lead to democracy is not true, it is not a good explanatory variable demonstrating the need for new theories. Poland and Hungary are the grand exceptions with pacted, post-communist transitions. The causal importance of the roundtable or pact was not long lasting or far-reaching since other states did not have pacted transitions imposed from above.

As illustrated in the following chart, there are clearly three different outcomes dependent on the following factors at the time of transition: (1) the balance of power in favor of democrats with democrats writing democratic rules; (2) the balance of power in favor of those in power; or (3) the balance of power through a pacted transition. A conflation of stability and quality of democracy is evident with the most unstable and less certain consolidations ending up in the middle square.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Balance of Power for challengers</th>
<th>Dictatorships</th>
<th>Partial democracies</th>
<th>Democracies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia</td>
<td>Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia</td>
<td>Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia</td>
<td>Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia</td>
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<th>Balance of Power uncertain</th>
<th>Dictatorships</th>
<th>Partial democracies</th>
<th>Democracies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Albania, Azerbaijan, Macedonia</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Mongolia</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Mongolia</td>
</tr>
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<th>Balance of Power for regime</th>
<th>Dictatorships</th>
<th>Partial democracies</th>
<th>Democracies</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Yugoslavia/Serbia</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Yugoslavia/Serbia, Romania</td>
</tr>
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The cause of these transitions demonstrates the possibility of a different dynamic. The speed of change and contagion worked antithetically to pacted transitions. The bigness of the negotiating agenda was not so easily divisible and resulted in conflict rather than cooperation. The transitional moment was not dictated by those it affected, but rather dictated externally. In Moscow there were votes even before there were rules in the Spring 1990 elections.

Data on the distribution of power before the rules of the game were established exists, and there is literature addressing this dichotomy (rational choice or breakage by Val Bunce.) There are also a number of problems that arise such as the challenge of measuring who is a democrat or why some stalemate transitions lead to conflict while others lead to negotiation. Additionally, there are exceptions based on borders (Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia); violence (Tajikistan – also borders); and the pull of the West or the impact of the neighborhood.
Evidently, neighborhoods do matter a great deal, and the pull of the West matters more or less based on the neighborhoods.

DISCUSSANTS
Terry Karl:

In the United States, the consumption of the original transition from authoritarian theory has been misread. Pacts emerged as the dominant model although they were never the dominant part of the original transition work. There were no books on getting to democracy, only on how they last or fail. Franco took forever to die and gave the Spanish the opportunity to think for a long time about what they wanted to have. Felipe Gonzalez and other underground thinkers were in Venezuela, the true developer of pacts. The Spanish model was proposed as the ideal model of transition although it really was not the predominant model in our studies.

On the agency side what matters is the source of ideas. The world historic timeframe matters a whole lot as it impacts influences, knowledge, and the moment of entering transition. Contagion also matters a lot, but it is hard to measure or catch. There is more to contagion and diffusion than has been captured.

Regarding structure, in 1950, Taiwan and El Salvador were equal in economic terms. Variations in the region happened very quickly, yet Venezuela today looks like Venezuela in 1960. There are different patterns in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. The mode of transition may not explain this as well as other factors. For example, the war factor is significant in a lot of these problematic countries and should be explored more.

Pacts are really about a pact to make pacts – to roundtable, to negotiate, to make agreements. It is not the content of the pact, but the signal to negotiate and to keep dealing that
is significant. In terms of sequencing, the pact should come first and should be about the rules of the game. If elections come before the pact, there is trouble.

*Charles King:*

The current outcomes are not counter-intuitive from a broad perspective like Islam or poverty. There are two possible strategies for further analysis: (1) look for exceptions to the intuitive pattern or (2) embrace one or more causal connections, and then specify causal mechanisms or proxy variables. Perhaps Islam could be a proxy for clan, or poverty could be a proxy for extractive industry.

Intuition changes over time as do intuitive outcomes. This affects how the problem is set up. Coding countries is dependent on when the question is asked. It is tough to see the current position of countries as an ‘outcome’ and therefore, this variable is tough to pinpoint. By not delimiting a period, it is just politics in general. Focusing on the immediate transition period allows for a more detailed analysis while broadening out can be problematic. Using the language of transition beyond the transition itself, marginalizes both politics and the elite. The stakes in politics are low, the scope is narrow; and therefore, it is contentious. There is much off the table that is internationally negotiated. This might be a product of globalization, but also political actors themselves have an interest in making politics marginal.

*Ghia Nodia:*

What is the bottom line of the debate? Is it whether or not a specific model of transition for a specific area and time (Latin American transitions) is applicable to post-communist transitions? There is a qualitative difference in post-communism and it matters in transitions.
The starting point is very different. It is a definition game. McFaul argues better that post-communist transitions are more like revolutions.

The discussion is too focused on whether or not to apply the model, which is not necessarily useful to gaining a deeper understanding. McFaul’s paper was meant to define variables and outcomes, but focuses on disproving the transition theory and leaves out important variables. Just the fact that Poland was more democratic 10 years ago than another country does not explain why it is more democratic than that country now. We need to explain why Poland and Kyrgyzstan are different and identify variables. In terms of a general theory of transition, the Schmitter-O’Donnel model cannot be a general model. It is built on a narrow and small sample and cannot serve as a strict and empirical model that could predict transition outcome. A general theory may not even be possible.

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi:

In a lot of cases we do not yet have the facts, especially to assert the existence of pacts. The most relevant archives are not yet open to determine, for instance, what role the KGB played in revolutions in Eastern Europe. In general, we have underestimated the importance of the international community and its presence. The commitment of Europe and of the EU commissioner matters. The Slovak elections proved that conditionality enforced by the international community works, but does not necessarily represent the democratic process. It also matters if the international community is not there.

Agency also matters. A theory of political change should look more like a complex causal path model; a number of things should be looked at. The quality of elites is important. Why was there no one in Belarus, Romania, or Bulgaria to take control? Political repression was much higher. Why did the level of repression vary? The different level of interest of the West is
a key factor. Structural factors help explain consolidation. Connecting all this into one path model makes sense. There is much room for further research to try to establish differentiation.

**OPEN DISCUSSION:**

It was difficult to determine the relative weight of structure versus agency as an explanation for transition trajectory. It was even argued that there is no reason to have a structure-agency debate because both clearly play a role. Overall, more participants did lean towards the greater impact of structure in the post-communist transitions. At the same time, the complexities of effectively disentangling and measuring impact were emphasized by inquiring how to disentangle the role, the level, and the intensity of engagement of the West with the importance of culture, history, and the weight of experience. Frequently, these factors point in the same direction.

In transitology, soft-liners are the pivot, the agent; they cut the deals or impose them. Everything that leads to democracy is all about negotiation meaning soft-liners need to be involved. In post-communism, they are not involved; they do not drive the deals. There are many paths to authoritarianism. This is not a pact to make pacts where there is not much negotiating. There are non-cooperative transitions with forced agreements.

It is necessary to debate agency first by pushing the causal arrow back to determine the balance of power and how the actors got to the table. There is some agency involved; people were doing things. In the long run, structure trumps and structural arguments always can be invoked. But in the short run, in political science versus history, agency is worth writing about. Does it have causal force in the long run? Maybe not in the long run, but there is a need to be sensitive to how you got there as it does have some influence.
A series of cause effect pairs with a temporal aspect does not let us stress the true cause-effect relationship. It is important to analyze specifics such as the pact (implicit, explicit, formal, or informal) and then to be precise with a more detailed explanation based on culture, ideology, etc. The most important features of culture are institutional traditions and mass politics. The measure of ‘balance of power’ in McFaul’s analysis is the first election. In terms of critical elections in Latin transitions, the first elections had no real meaning and were not real indicators. It is necessary to identify the critical elections. When imposition from below results in democracy, then the notion of democracy is largely accepted.

What is the power of the international community to play a role of agency? It does have the power to tie hands. The role of EU integration, defense population, and minority policy are ways the international community ties the hands of new countries. It is important to note that just because the international community is involved, it is not necessarily helping. Agency is not limited only by structure, but also by the decisions made by actors.

What have been the factors in the last 10-15 years that led to changes in outcome? Is there a move toward a consensus that structure matters more than agency and that the quality of leadership and institutions matters less while the international situation and location matter more? Eight years ago there would have been more believers in agency, but structure seems to have won out. What was structure doing 8 years ago, 20 years ago? Why wasn’t a concentration of resources then undermining democracy? Even when it does not intervene with outcome, it should be considered. Maybe what seems to be a structural outcome is actually not. We should not write off a country just because structure broke.

In terms of the international variable, the international system, it is critical to get it right. We cannot just say it matters, but need to specify why it matters, when, under what conditions,
and what historical context. Peasants and oil have been around for years, but why do they have different influences? It cannot be just structural. Neighborhoods also matter. Would there be a difference if the Baltic states were in the east and not the west of the Soviet Empire? Non-negotiation is not a democratic norm. The international influence helped soften anti-democratic transitions, namely in the Balkans. Non-negotiated transitions would have led to violence, bloody revolution, civil war, autocracies, etc.

The communist legacy seems to matter much less than expected ten years ago. The modes of transition affect outcome less, but they can be very important in many other respects. The French Revolution continued to influence hundreds of years later, though not directly in its outcome. The mode of transition will be a model for future transitions. Both the neighborhood and the pre-communist legacy matter a lot more than was expected.

It is particularly relevant that the Soviet Empire was a land empire, and not a sea empire. It was still attached after the break up. The role of Russia itself continues to shape the region, and not just because of location and neighborhood. The military security role is important; its military is involved in many of the ethnic conflicts. Russia is a major supplier of subsidized energy, serves as a transport route for energy supplies to these nations, and can impact economic viability. Russia’s influence is a combination of geography and agency that influences the contrasting trajectories of Armenia versus Azerbaijan and Georgia.

There does seem to be a level of applicability of the transitology theory, but the project needs specification, deliberation, and an explanation of variation within the regions of the Former Soviet Union. We have many cases if we do not just use the large republics. Uncertainty is necessary for change and for democracy, but it needs to be contained. Specificity requires reasonable comparisons. There is no alternative to comparison; what is up for discussion is what
would be a reasonable comparison. Just saying Eastern Europe is unique is a comparison. We need to look at variation and controlling for that variation. In terms of the international situation, it is important to bring in the temporal aspect of a very specific capitalist mode at that moment (Hoover/Chicago model.)

Regarding a future project, Valerie Bunce offered some insights as to what would be in a large project about post-communism. A lot can be done to complicate the simple model. There are two sets of opposition characters: nationalists versus anti-nationalists, liberals versus anti-liberals. The communists are hard-liners, reformers, or opportunists greatly impacted by communist party cohesion or fracture, by the decision to join or fight the opposition/nationalists, and by winning or losing elections. It would be beneficial to reexamine social structure and politics. Nationalism and democratization still remain relevant factors added to the notion of state building: weak states, borders, contestation, and new states. New names could be determined by looking at the exceptions or defining a causal story. The ethno-federations on Mike McFaul’s chart indicate violence when the challenger is in power versus peace when the communists stay around.
Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Eastern Germany: these are all known as success stories and rated as ‘free’ by Freedom House. There has been communist party reform in general. The opposition won initially; then the communists came back, but then lost again. It is this decreasing volatility that serves as an indicator of consolidation. Moreover, the homogeneity of these countries eased the transition process considering Slovakia is the only one divided ethnically. This supports Rostow’s theory emphasizing the significance of a nation-state and a definition of political community as prerequisites for democracy. Economically, these are still poor democracies (poorer than Portugal or Greece) but they continue to develop. This is not a problem of transition, but rather of poor capitalism and poor market economics.

The most striking feature of Central European transitions from communist rule was the self-limiting behavior of the participants. Poland and Hungary fit the pact-making model and this is crucial to their uniqueness in the history of regime change. Czechoslovakia and the GDR fit the imposition from below model. There were negotiations, but the terms were different. The round table was not about regime change; it was about power sharing and practical matters. After ten years, it appears the mode of transition does not possibly matter that much. At the time, however, it did serve as a peaceful, solution-seeking, negotiated transition especially when contrasted with the French Revolution. It served as a model for South Africa and could maybe affect Cuba or Vietnam. It is a model for future transitions, and therefore, has lasting effect.
Poland was unique due to its particular sequencing. Evidently early negotiations in Poland had significant symbolic value. In August of 1980, negotiations in the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk were the first example of communist authorities negotiating with dissidents, activists of the newly formed Solidarity Party. Then, Marshal Law interrupted this new approach causing a ten-year delay in the transition process. Prior to Solidarity, East Central Europe had experienced two major attempts to change communist rule. The Hungarian Revolution in 1956 failed due to an external invasion by the Red Army. This demonstrated that a clash from below was not a viable way out. In Czechoslovakia in 1968, reform-minded political change was also stopped by the Red Army. This eliminated reform from above as a possible option for change.

In the 1970s, a new strategy developed with new ideological innovations; do not deal with the state, just walk away and build independent circles of freedom in society. The focus shifted to rebuilding and revitalizing civil society and human rights. Additionally, a counter-elite of intellectuals emerged that never gave up thinking about alternative futures for society.

Examining the transition paths in Central Europe reveals similarities and differences in the region. Except for Hungary, the opposition was unified under umbrella organizations across the region. In Hungary, the opposition was divided and pluralism was already evident. Overall, privatization was largely controlled by the state except in Poland and Hungary where it was spontaneous. There was a tacit agreement that the former communists could be the first to privatize by converting political capital into economic capital. This signaled that everybody could win including the outgoing elite. Only Slovenia had a war of secession, but this had minimal impact due to its short duration. It did reinforce national identity, and was not an
obstacle in this case. Slovakia, which had only existed as a puppet of Hitler, experienced a
tougher and more difficult transition.

Reviewing the multiple tasks and problems associated with these transitions in Central
Europe reveals the complexities involved. Both political and economic change was achieved
very quickly illustrating simultaneity is possible and may even be easier. Extrication from the
old regime was not sufficient since revolution remains unfinished without new institutions in
place. There was a basket of influential ideas on human rights, civil society, and self-limitation
that came from the widely read Schmitter green book, from Carter’s influence, and from
Helsinki. Deregulation became very popular due to the desire to reform the economy as quickly
as possible. Everyone wanted better living standards and agreed that capitalism and a market
economy was the best route. Therefore, the best transition was fast, even if it was painful. This
fit the concepts of neo-liberalism with many politically on the left, but economically on the right.
There was a counter-elite preparing for change and Gorbachev opened the window of
opportunity for this counter-elite to act.

Elite change is considered fundamental to social transformation. When society does not
seem to agree, the result is a very slow transition process. Symbolic legitimacy in terms of
transitional justice can be an issue, but does not prevent transition. Democracy is supposed to be
just, but justice does not appear to be as crucial as it was considered at the outset. These
transitions were truly peaceful with no political killings as experienced in Spain, for example, at
the hands of the Basque separatists.

In judging the importance of the pre-communist legacy to the level of success of post-
communist transition, it is useful to note there were rudimentary democratic traditions. At a
minimum, there were constitutional traditions, multi-party traditions and a level of civil rights.
This is not true for the Soviet Republics. Furthermore, the time period of communism in this region lasted for 40 years, and not 70. Lastly, a tradition of liberal nationalism should not always be viewed in a negative light especially as a nation-state is a precursor to democracy.

ALINA MUNGIU-PIPPIDI
University of Bucharest and Romanian Academic Society
The Balkans
“Democratization without Decommunization: The Post-communist Experience in Comparative Perspective”

It is critical to ensure politics lie within the boundaries of the states. There are reasons why politics are within their own boundaries, and this is key in understanding the Balkans. For Serbia, which maintains an unclear constitutional status, it is critical that the borders become clarified especially regarding Montenegro and Kosovo. Despite the fact that eighty years have passed, the situation is comparable to 1918 in terms of minorities. They want better quality of governance and a better way of life.

There are differences in the nature of the communist regimes of Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia. Romania and Bulgaria had tougher variants with a totalitarian regime in Romania and an orthodox repressive regime in Bulgaria. Serbia had liberal communism comparable to that in Central Europe. There are commonalities with Cuba and China in terms of nationalist communism. The domestic elites of national communist governments feel they are stakeholders. This also impacts the degree of penetration of society since society is more permissive with national communism.

At the initiation of transition, there were key differences within the region. Serbia represented a unique mode of transition. Romania witnessed a two-part transition beginning with a generally popular uprising that was suppressed and left two hundred dead. A diversion
was then staged with various units of the army shooting at each other resulting in over one-thousand dead. It remains difficult to ascertain the truth of this period as the archives remain closed. Up until 1997, few generals were even prosecuted. In the next phase of transition, the Communist Party did not participate in the first elections. There was spontaneous formation of many organizations. The nomenklatura was reorganized with the backing of the military through the creation of freely elected committees to replace communists. Effectively, ‘bad’ communists were replaced by ‘good’ communists and a new party was created that represented the largest party with a membership of four million, 27% of the population.

The transition in each country of the region also had much in common such as strong post-communist parties. In Romania and Serbia these parties used nationalism to keep their power and consolidate it. The democratic opposition movement was divided, weak, and fragmented as a result of the communist legacy. There was no counter-elite, just isolated dissidents that could not get together due to repression. Everything started from scratch in 1990 which witnessed the first civic movements, let alone the first parties. Bulgaria developed better in terms of the creation of parties.

Constituencies in the region are populist and dislike politicians and politics. Voters believe in technocrats, but do not vote that way. When analyzing why people vote the way they do, it is useful to consider the striking similarities in public opinion and attitudes. In surveys, two-thirds claim to be doing worse now than under communism, and objectively they are doing worse. However, they also believe that there is hope for a better future indicative of the role of both EU and NATO enlargement. The common goal and interest is European integration. There is a trend that reflects a decrease in the sentiment that communist times were better. This trend
combined with an emerging generation provides hope. The politicians must provide something to the constituency because confidence in the political system has been lost.

Another commonality is the Balkan legacy in and of itself. This includes the demographics of a largely peasant society and the Byzantine political tradition. Due to the weak opposition during communism, there are weak alternate elites. Society has been crippled by the large number from academia that had to fill government positions. Basically, democratization without decommunization has been a slow and painful process.

LUCAN WAY, Temple University
The Slavic Region
“Authoritarian State Building and Transitions in Western Eurasia”

By focusing on democracy, discussions of transition have treated authoritarianism as a residual variable, as something that happens when democracy fails. This one-sided view has inhibited our understanding of why competitive politics emerged where democracy had structural obstructions such as concentration of resources and weak civil society.

Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine are better understood as failed authoritarian regimes rather than as struggling democracies. The relative pluralism in these countries is a result of pluralism by default due to failed authoritarianism and incumbent incapacity rather than civil society, democratic institutions or democratic leadership. The elites were initially poorly adapted to utilize the existing structure, but have learned to utilize and monopolize their positions as states have become stronger. This explains the tendency toward authoritarian rule in the Slavic region. The mode of transition mattered, but not in the sense of the transitions literature. The simultaneous collapse of regime and state led to incumbent incapacity.
The resulting cleavage within the elite led to conflict, fragmentation and polarization while promoting pluralism. It was fraught with risk due to prevailing contradictory processes that undermined long term democratic consolidation. The existing structural obstacles to democracy include a high concentration of resources in state hands; no tradition of democracy; weak rule of law (allowing leaders to use the government to harass opposition); weak civil society; and weak engagement with the West. In Moldova for example, the use of the tax administration to harass opponents demonstrates the prevailing weak rule of law. There were still competitive elections, but it takes more than that for democracy.

Weak incumbent capacity allows these structural obstacles, but minimizes the capacity to reduce elections to a mere façade. This requires know how as in how to undermine the opposition without attracting international pressure. There was no experience on how to manipulate elections especially since even nominal opposition was new to the elite. State strength stems from the ability of leaders to control subordinates and rely on them, in particular military and regional leaders. Elite cohesion is key to maintaining authoritarian rule and at crisis moments, this is essential. In the absence of such capacity, the result is pluralism.

The lack of a strong ruling party resulted from a lack of elite support or support for elites. Belarus has lots of resources, but cannot capitalize on them due to complete disorientation. The 1994 elections demonstrate the initial minimal experience in manipulating elections. Yeltsin’s difficulty in 1993 led him to more compromise in the future. Yeltsin moved toward democratic means when authoritarian figures failed to secure what he needed. In Ukraine, it was state weakness that enabled competition. Kravchuk had a weak grip over appointees who were actively campaigning for Kuchma. His loss of the election was not a function of society, but
rather a function of weak authoritarianism. Kuchma’s capacity to consolidate state power in the 1999 elections reflects his ability to control the elites.

Pluralism survived longer in some places depending on the degree of conflict and polarization among the elite. Ukraine and Moldova were polarized over national identity. In Ukraine it was just the East versus the West, whereas in Moldova fragmentation was worse: Romania, Russia, or independent. Polarization in Russia was over communism or not communism forcing the destruction of many communist institutions.

There are pitfalls and costs associated with pluralism by default. Division leads to conflict, undermines the state, and can result in civil war. Conflicts over national borders are bad for democratic consolidation. Rather than look for the absence of fragmentation as the transitions literature does, it is more important to examine the sources of fragmentation such as conflicts over national identity. A focus on incumbent incapacity helps understand pluralism and the obstacles to democratic consolidation. The same factors that motivate pluralism may also undermine long term democratic consolidation.

DISCUSSANTS

Valerie Bunce:

For the future there needs to be more development of both the administrative and legal culture. What was the bribe line before state socialism fell? It was never used in Hungary, but in Bulgaria, Romania, and other points south bribery was institutionalized. Is it the Ottoman line? Another key issue to address is why did the losers lose? Was it the absolute incompetence of the opposition? Why was the opposition so weak in Croatia and Serbia? Is it that the winners are clever? It is probably more fruitful to look at the losers.
The Balkan experience provides an interesting set of comparisons with the north, which also should be developed further. All tried to use the international system to carve out their own place while the north had more bargaining power due to its importance to Soviet security. That is where the dividing line mattered more. Also, the Balkans have a smaller definition of community that differs from the north.

In terms of the project, this could provide an opportunity to classify communist regimes, and then link them to transition dynamics. The key issue is whether there was protest of any sizable amount during communism and the relation to the Warsaw Treaty Organization. There was a strong tradition in the south of much higher party membership. The origins of communism and the degree of penetration or indigenous support wash out. We need to deal more with the opposition and its strengths and weaknesses. Two models for treating outcomes surfaced yesterday which correlate the development of the opposition and the end of the communist party hegemony: (1) the development of opposition prior to the end of communist party hegemony and (2) the end of communist party hegemony and then the development of opposition. This results in different transition dynamics: slower pacting in the south versus ready to go in the north.

Charles King:

Lucan Way’s paper presents two projects: (1) a macro-theory of political change and (2) where to look for theories. It shifts the spotlight to a new place, opening new venues. It underscores the quiet teleology of the transitions literature: not all transitions lead to democracy. We set up the problem and ask the question as if there is a tacitly ideal model for explaining variation in outcomes that do not result in democracy. Rather than trying to explain variations in
successful democratization, we should look at it in terms of the degree of success of achieving authoritarianism. State capacity is crucial, but not for the reason we might think. We may think about it in terms of governance and democratic quality, but as Way points out, state weakness is a back door if not to democracy, then to pluralism. This also undermines authoritarianism.

Allied fragmentation and polarization as an explanation is not necessarily good: it’s hard to argue Moldova is more pluralistic than Ukraine by linkage although the elections were less manipulated. There is a need to be careful of taking the idea of trajectory too seriously. The current understanding of the undemocratic realities in some countries is not really due to an actual decline in democracy, but to a clearer picture today. A relook at the indicators of the 1990s may reveal that what looks like a decline of democracy might be an increase in the organization of the opposition, just not on democratic lines. Rise in state capacity seems to be negatively correlated with democracy. It may not be necessary to return to structure as an explanation in the end by falling back on polarization and fragmentation. It could be revealing to stay on the path of the elites and the details of how the elites win – state capture, bargaining with security forces, or controlling parliament by packing/winning.

David Holloway:

The influence of external factors is striking, namely in the Balkans, the small states. A great deal depends on the great powers - how Germany and Russia develop. The EU and NATO are looked to for a stable framework/environment for political and economic development. The treatment of history in the Balkans and Central Europe clearly reflects there are real differences in the kinds of communist rule that existed. An alternative elite existed in Central Europe, whereas to the south it was not possible. More broadly, in the Balkans, history and its legacy
serves as a constraint by limiting capacity. In the paper on Central Europe, history is a resource where you look back to for help and legitimacy and the integration of today into that history. What can we pick and choose to tell our story? What is history - a determinant? Does the kind of history you write depend on the present or can you not understand the present without understanding history? What is the importance of history as a surrogate/proxy of culture when applied differently?

OPEN DISCUSSION:

The question of which history matters the most repeatedly surfaced. It was suggested that the history of communism matters the most for democratization, and the rest matters for development. History is a very dangerous subject because there are too many variables, all of the past. The role of political science is to make something of the chaos. The combination of legacy, the influence of state socialism, the role of the international community and other structures, and the role of the military in these East European transitions are what differentiate them from Latin America.

The military role varies throughout the region depending on whether a state was independent or part of the bloc. If a state was a member of the Warsaw Pact Organization, there was no control over the military. If independent of the WPO, then the military could act. Within the Soviet Union, there generally were not military takeovers. In Armenia, the military lost power and the opposition/civil society took over. A new military emerged out of Karabakh, and although there is not a military regime, the military is a source of power for the Kocharian regime. The military has a role in power and provides the current popular support, while in Azerbaijan it is the opposite.
There was considerable debate over the concept of state strength and state capacity. Regarding national political dynamics, it is worth examining a number of areas: the informal relation between business and political allies; how state capacity is affected by corruption; what are the business relations within the state; and how could government capacity be strengthened through international institutions or structures such as the International Criminal Court.

Lucan Way defined state capacity as strong rule of law and emphasized strength in terms of control. Terry Karl pointed out that defining strength as the ability of leaders to get what they want or to control the country could result in state strength without state capacity (Indonesia). She recommended looking at state capacity differently to be less tautological. Gail Lapidus remarked that in terms of state capacity, there was too much focus on the political factor. The political economy is essential as it created resources and impacted elites. Different patterns of privatization also affected the difference in capacity of elites. For example, Kuchma had ties to largely industrial Eastern Ukraine and Kravchuk had links with largely agrarian Western Ukraine. These ties between elites and business may affect outcomes to an extent. Security services, in addition to the role of the military, are usually very powerful and the most influential across the board. Therefore, the relation of these services with elites and power is significant. External factors such as the EU and the European Community do affect the balance of elites, but Russia also has influence. The linkages that exist between domestic and external elites and the impact of bargaining power should be considered. For example, in Belarus is Lukashenko’s bargaining power connected to his role in promoting a Belarus and Russian Union?
Larry Diamond expressed the need to think more precisely and systematically about the dependent variables. First of all, there is a need for a framework to classify regimes to avoid the implicit teleology of looking at the degree of democracy as Way, Bozoki and the Freedom House scale do. Secondly, in terms of the degree of consolidation of democracy and of institutionalization, there is now much richer literature for democratic consolidation than authoritarian consolidation. Survey data and public opinion data does exist for most Central and East European countries and could be utilized systematically in all of the papers. It is not possible to understand a country or a group of countries in isolation. There needs to be a standardized method for comparison beyond simply examining the nature of the regimes analyzed. The quality of governance can be measured by three factors: the level of corruption, the degree there is a commitment to the rule of law, and the commitment to the public. This is not the same thing as an electoral democracy. Each paper should analyze this social, political and economic framework. If there are standardized categories for assessing the regimes, the project will be more fruitful.

Terry Karl pointed out there is significant literature on democratization versus re-democratization. The role of memory is very important; the same figures keep popping up with new labels, new purposes, and new parties. These features keep resurfacing in Latin America. Even a brief democratic experience that fails can be a key force creating self-limiting behavior years down the road. Additionally, Karl recommended framing more discussion of authoritarian rule within some of the classic literature on authoritarianism. There is literature on the Soviet Union and the pre-existing regime about authoritarian stability.
Central Asian clan-based autocracies are uniformly the worst in all indicators and on all Freedom House charts. What makes them so bad? There are interesting variations in the region throughout the 90s and now. What triggers Central Asian transitions?

The role of the Central Asian states within the Soviet Union made their transition more similar to decolonization. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union served as the exogenous factor pushing Central Asia into transition. There had not existed any internal push before hand. The collapse de facto pushed Central Asia into a transition from communism, but to what remained a question. The agenda was broad and included state building, new independence, identity formation, decolonization, border clarifications, political changes and economic changes.

Although the late 80s witnessed a series of pacts across Central Asia, pacts were not the mode of transition to democracy. Tajikistan is the only place where pacts did not occur. Pacts were made in reaction to Gorbachev’s reforms and the purges of the Central Asian elite. These were pacts among clans, among the elite, and against Moscow. They were pacts for stability rather than democracy, and as a result, the region bears many parallels with Africa.

Across the region, the mode of transition was elite imposition. The window of opportunity for elites was pretty narrow because the elites who were imposing these new institutions were very constrained by the clan-based structures in which they were embedded. The elites were not autonomous, and hence, the window of opportunity for democratization was
quickly closed and constrained. This was especially true for Akaev in Kyrgyzstan as his reforms directly impacted clan-based benefits.

It is necessary to push the causal order back and examine both pre-Soviet and Soviet history in order to establish rationale for the existing balance of power structure. The Central Asian states have maintained a distinctive set of identities that are kin-based and clan-based. These identities survived the Soviet period; and therefore, it is not just the Soviet legacy, but also interaction with the previous legacy that matters. Soviet nationalities policy, the modernization of the economy in the form of the *kolhoz* system, Brezhnev’s stability of cadre policy, and the decentralization of power under Brezhnev and Gorbachev all led to clan-based groups manipulating the Soviet system.

Prior to 1991, Central Asia was already moving toward informal clan-based politics and rule. Given the legacy, it is not surprising that this deeply entrenched clan tradition resurfaced in the early 90s. Consolidation in these states stemmed from the convergence of formal authoritarian structures with informal clan-based structures that controlled economic resources. Informal identity networks increasingly played a significant role. In Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev and family control the oil, while in Uzbekistan Karimov and family control the oil and gas. These regimes more closely resemble those of Africa.

The fact that Central Asia is clearly within the Russian orbit cannot be ignored. This has had positive impact because Russian interest in its diaspora forces these governments to moderate ethno-national tendencies and harsher ethnic policies on the treatment of minorities. The Russia effect has also had negative impact stemming from Russia’s geopolitical attempts to maintain a hegemonic presence. Continued Russian military presence in Tajikistan has played both a stabilizing and destabilizing role as President Rakhmanov remains largely dependent on
Russia. International investment in the region has had more of a destabilizing effect especially as foreign direct investment remains low and has been primarily directed at resources such as oil in Kazakhstan. Global norms of human rights and democracy stemming from Helsinki or linked to aid from USAID appear to impact less in this region although the message is the same. There is much less interaction with the West which reduces the impact of global norms.

While Eastern Europe had Western Europe to look to for alternative models, there have been other models influential in Central Asia. The Central Asian regimes are not interested in Islamic-based regimes such as Iran, but talk more about Saudi Arabia, China, Singapore, and Pinochet. As for the neighborhood, Central Asia would have had a better chance without the impact of Afghanistan and the Taliban.

GHIA NODIA
The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development
The Caucasus

The Caucasus region is an anomaly with several distinctive features. First of all, ethno-national mobilization plays a special role in political processes. This was comparable to the Balkans and the Baltic states in that ethno-nationalism served as the basis for anti-communism. However, it is necessary to analyze just how democratic the communist opposition was within the Caucasus. The level of ethno-national mobilization varied with the strongest cohesion and highest level of consensus in Armenia, followed by a fairly strong level in Georgia, and a weak level in Azerbaijan. Secondly, the Caucasus experienced an adversarial mode of transition following the moderate and radical paradigms. In Georgia and Azerbaijan, radicals played a greater role while in Armenia there was great consensus between the new and old elites resulting in a more moderate mode. Thirdly, the Caucuses are especially weak states. Georgia is the
leader as the weakest state, followed by Azerbaijan, and then Armenia where state capacity is also relatively low. Lastly, the Caucasus region is the most contested geopolitically in the larger arena between Russia and the United States. Geopolitics has caused great volatility regionally and internally by reinforcing the adversarial nature of these regimes. This has led to a division of the Caucasus into the Russian clients of Armenia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia and the U.S. clients of Georgia and in general Azerbaijan.

Transition in this region was contested in general. Each state should be considered within the framework of transition toward democracy. There was significant political change. Change was undertaken within the normative framework with democracy as a reference point. As a major outcome, some democratic institutions have somehow developed and moved these countries to the left of Larry Diamond’s table. If uncertainty is key, broadly speaking, this region is still in transition as the outcome remains uncertain. There are no clearly consolidated regimes with clear rules and expectations. Georgia is the most uncertain since it is unknown when Sheverdnadze will exit, how he will exit, and what regime will follow. Azerbaijan is a more conservative authoritarian regime. Aliev’s exit is unknown although it clearly will be his death, yet it remains uncertain what will follow. Armenia is stable in that they can choose the leader and then set up the elections.

Façade democracy is a problem, not in the sense that it is false, rather because there are strong grounds to argue that the actors want to look democratic, but do not really care for real democracy. It does not have good explanatory power because it has become part of the norm in globalized democracy; everyone is expected to be a democracy. In an age of emphasis on the need to look democratic, all non-consolidated democracies are façades. The tendency to judge the sincerity of leaders results in an overemphasis of the role of the former communist influence.
It would be better to look at how local political actors take advantage of the situation and of democratic institutions and to examine the differences between these countries. For instance, there are some in which democratic institutions such as free media work, while other democratic institutions do not work.

_DISCUSSANTS_

_Ned Walker:

There is a need for a more elaborate and nuanced typology of non-democratic or authoritarian systems. Encoding on Larry Diamond’s chart does not reveal what is different about the politics of these countries. There has to be some differentiation of the regime and state variables. Just because there is an authoritarian convergence, they are not necessarily in sync, nor are they converging the same way. For example, Georgia and Tajikistan have militarized societies with state monopolies while Armenia and Turkmenistan have total state control. The democratization dimension needs expansion. For example, in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan there is authoritarian convergence, but it is not to the same degree in each. Moreover, the various interpretations of each regime’s legitimization formula merit further exploration.

Why have efforts to embrace democracy failed? Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Armenia all made concerted efforts. This backsliding to authoritarianism should also be examined. The range of dependent variables is huge including seventy years of Soviet rule, no memory of democracy, sub-national loyalties, a political economy hardly conducive to democracy with no resources other than oil, primarily agrarian economies, widespread poverty, distance from Europe, and a generally nasty neighborhood. The Russia factor should be reevaluated. The two most repressive places, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, are where Russia matters the least. Uzbekistan matters as it considers itself a dominant regional player. There are a number of
structural variables that have been over-determined. As Martha Brill Olcott points out in her book on Kazakhstan, the convergence toward authoritarianism was not necessarily inevitable. Clearly, agency plays a huge role.

*Eric McGlinchey:*

The question of agency in the Central Asian cases is worth examining. The effect of the agency given an actor impacts the pre-selection of the causal aspects and independent variables used in the debate. The Lucan Way solution employs a hybrid approach, which is a good option, but still leaves challenges. In the Kyrgyz example, there is an assumption that Kyrgyzstan started its transition to democracy via elite imposition. Akaev was influential, but did not act alone. Structures such as clans existed and emerged in the later 90s when they started to extract resources from the state and to force elites to work with them. It is interesting to consider that maybe Akaev was never democratic and really was authoritarian. He may have relied on the northern clan purely out of the necessity to balance the southern. If Akaev is given a different agency, structure ends up trumping agency in the causal explanation.

The causality of foreign aid argument in Kyrgyzstan stems from a series of events as it is hard to determine direct linkage from authoritarian governments. In his rise to power, Akaev was elected by the parliament by just three votes in the second round of the second election. In 1990 Akaev had minimal influence, but in 1994 he bought out parliament after receiving a 40% increase of the state budget due to a substantial increase in the foreign aid component. In 1994, aid from the World Bank came in without conditions. At the time, half of parliament was non-cooperative by boycotting. The money came in, people in the state administration were paid and parliament stopped objecting to the president. His behavior does not rely on him being a
democrat since there is a structural explanation for democracy in Kyrgyzstan. If the issue of agency is pushed, it influences the resulting explanation. The agency imparted affects the selection of independent variables and the determination of causes. The role of international aid is significant and should not be discounted.

**OPEN DISCUSSION:**

This metaphor and this language of pacts are widely used, but need to be refined because pacts do not necessarily lead to democracy. The power, capacity, and strength of the political elite actors serve as reinforcement that there are multiple paths. The concept of pacts requires greater specificity. A pact could be a win-win contract where two actors agree to be better off. It could be more of an agreement where the terms are more coercive. It does not appear there was much negotiation. Another possibility is a short term agreement for short term ends that locks institutions into place. Are agreements between clans ever made into institutions?

It is necessary to look at the range between negotiation and coercion. Pacts are larger, over-arching agreements that determine things. They are not ‘pactitos.” They set critical parameters and are substantive in terms of economics, politics, and education. They are longer lasting and establish a habit of consultation with an opposing side, a pact to make pacts and to negotiate or agree. There could be pacts in the form of new transitions from authoritarian to authoritarian rule resulting in intra-regime change and a new type of authoritarian regime. What matters is the actual content of these pacts and not just the negotiating style. There are many pacts in authoritarian regimes, but how do you find out the content? It would be useful to pinpoint what really mattered, what might be long lasting, and whether pacts were more about a style of ruling.
Pacts in Central Asia were informally negotiated backroom type deals that were not coercive. In Kyrgyzstan, Akaev was not a player in the deals that ultimately brought him to power. The clans negotiated to get him in as a way to get out of Moscow’s grip. The same thing happened in Uzbekistan. Karimov did not engage in formal consolidated agreements, but initiated a lasting pact to continue pacting, especially over the distribution of resources. As resource flow slowed, some clans were pushed out and this led to more instability. This froze into place an informal style for establishing political power, negotiating, and distributing resources. The lasting effect of pacts in Central Asia was the de-institutionalizing of the state.

In the Caucasus, pacts were short-term agreements under pressure. When there is change in power, the pacts are null and void. Deals are characterized by wheeling and dealing among patronages in defining and splitting zones of influence. The issue is not whether they work for or against democracy, but whether they work at all.

The importance of history is illustrated by how Soviet practices reshaped old traditions in Central Asia. Collectivization was centered on old structures and the old leaders ran the collectives. This served to ‘re-traditionalize,’ and ‘re-institutionalize’ old structures. It makes sense that they mobilized at the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time, it is necessary to clarify the meaning, the organization and the implications of clans. A clan can be established based on a district or along family lines with strong beliefs in blood ties. Differences in blood ties versus territorial associations can impact the quality or level of cohesion. According to Nodia, in the Caucasus, clans are not traditional. It is more of a patronage network set up around certain stronger leaders. In Azerbaijan, there is stronger regional identity associated with clans. Collins defines a clan as a set of kinship ties or informal institutions and ties, which are in part regional. Collectivization in a way provided institutions. In reproducing clans, blood ties were
very important in the Soviet era as evidenced by inter-clan marriages; however, this may be breaking down as a result of the move toward market economies. The distribution of resources in the government is based on kinship ties. The relationship between Nazarbaev and Akaev (who has a Kazakh father) is also clan-based as evidenced by the marriage of their children.

Nations and national identity are products of the Soviet Union. National level clan identities proved to be more salient than Islam or Turk identities. This may be a useful approach for examining the Caucasus. The analysis of Central Asia by Collins may help in understanding Caucasian politics. *Identity construction* stems from identity orientation. Georgia is oriented on the West, Azerbaijan – on Turkey, and Armenia – maybe on Israel and the Jews as fellow genocide victims. In Armenia, the diaspora has significantly influenced the building up of the army; in Georgia, the Moscow elite has played a notable role. In the Caucasus, violence is central to politics in the region. These conflicts do not all have an ethnic basis, but do serve as a corrosive influence on the prospect of democracy. The relative level of public support for resolving these issues is also an interesting basis for comparison. It is the top priority in polls in Azerbaijan, while it does not even make the list in Georgia. The impact of *conflicts* is that the dynamics of democracy or authoritarianism mobilize around a national cause.

A critical point to resolve is whether there is actually variation in outcomes or whether there is just better information now that improves our ability to understand. For example, whether or not Akaev was a democrat cannot be determined, and regardless, an analysis cannot be built based on intentions. Most leaders in the 90s would claim to be democratic. Forcing people to adopt certain procedures forces certain behaviors. Forcing elections on authoritarianism does not result in elections, but rather *electoralism*. Elections do not matter on the road to democracy, but they do matter a lot in internal political dynamics. They change
behaviors of incumbents and opposition, impose restraints, impose requirements, and impose
certain timing. Elections matter a lot even in an authoritarian regime. It does not matter whether
or not Akaev’s ideology was democratic. The fact he cannot get reelected on a democratic
platform does matter.
CONCLUSION
Concluding Roundtable Discussion on Future Work
Chairs: Gail Lapidus and Michael McFaul

Michael McFaul:

If there were a book to come out of this project, we need to set the bar high especially as there are opportunity costs associated with edited volumes. There are three main issues to consider. First, we need to explicitly define the dependent variable. Is the focus on regime type? Considering the existing tension between transitions from communist rule 10 years later, is there utility to do this 10 years out? Do we take regime type where it is and make today’s regime type the dependent variable? The factors and conditions that create transitions are not coterminous with the consolidation factors. Do you keep the transitions language? If we throw it out, with what do we fill the vacuum? What is the new theory for a coherent project?

The second issue centers on the most useful structure and organization of a book. The workshop was organized on the basis of geography, but we do not want a book based on case studies region by region, country by country, which would be unmanageable. We could expand to a large enough size for linear regression or go back to the panel-imposed regions. If our structure is based on geography, do we organize by region, by state, or by regions within states? If we adopt a thematic structure, around what do we organize? The relation between mode of transition and outcome, the international system, resources and oil, ethno-territorial constraints, the distance to Berlin, the leadership, the military, state capacity, or the relation between economic and political reform? Finally, what is the scope of the final product? This can range from just a workshop report to an edited volume or book, or even to ‘Phase II’ involving something even larger with more structure.
OPEN DISCUSSION:

The concluding discussion centered on regime trajectories organized thematically as the primary focus for future work. Many appeared to support a break from the transitions model. Most agreed that the final product would result in a book, while a few envisioned a larger scale project.

Valerie Bunce suggested the dependent variable should be regime trajectories: sustainable democracies (the Baltics, the winners in Central Europe); sustainable autocracies; break downs in democracy; and break downs in autocracy. Organization could be built around two clusters: regime trajectories and interethnic cooperation and conflict. Larry Diamond concurred that the logic of the project drives toward regime trajectories, or regime change in the classic sense. This would involve examining the historical implications of each country and looking at transition, persistence, breakdown, oscillation and variation. It would still be possible to cluster and group. The degree of consolidation is part of trajectory. One task of the project would be to develop a framework for a common analysis and for how to look at consolidation. The literature on authoritarian regimes also needs to be drawn into the overall project.

A thematic approach may enable just post-communist states to be sufficient for the scope of the project. There are practical limitations in that the papers are already organized geographically, and not thematically. It is possible co-authors from different regions could deal with this issue by looking for similarities thematically. But, the international question is a little different when addressed thematically. The productivity of a cross-regional approach was supported, but the need to co-author was questioned.
There was agreement that a book could flow directly from the chapters presented at the workshop. Larry Diamond emphasized the need for a shift toward analyzing regime change and suggested a potential project title – “Transitions from communist rule.” The limitation of the transitions model is not teleology resulting from a lack of careful reading, but rather dichotomization which allows only two outcomes. There is either a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy or there is not. Post-communist transitions involve transition from authoritarian rule to authoritarian rule. The terms competitive authoritarian regimes and electoral democracies have added precision to the terminology by accounting for variation. Different forms of authoritarian rule transition to authoritarianism in different ways. The potential title implies there is a transition away from communist rule toward something else, but does not presume the type of regime it is. Subtitles could refer to variation, simultaneity, consolidation, deconsolidation, and regime change.

On the other hand, others advocated an even stronger break from the transitions terminology. Hesitation was expressed over the title due to the baggage associated with the term ‘transition’. “Transitions from communism” would place the project in the development field, but does not get away from emphasizing the ‘from’ aspect. It is hard to get away from the ‘transitions’ baggage because of the problem of dichotomization. At the same time, this stresses the importance of getting away from it.

There were other ideas expressed in support of a larger scale project. Ned Walker recommended the editors determine the important explanatory hypotheses to be investigated and the most important causal variable to explain outcome. It could come from the previous literature, but not necessarily. The important thing is to establish a framework. Regime transition is a typology because transition from authoritarianism implies ‘to democracy’. A
typology of regime types for organizing the discussion could be ‘from authoritarianism to sultanism’ or to something else. It is necessary to determine a set of hypotheses and come up with a reasonable regime typology in order to proceed with the project.

Valerie Bunce considered replicating the Schmitter project by having people examine China, Cuba, and North Korea to look at the internal regime variations within weak states. Others concurred with this angle in expanding the project, while some also reemphasized the similarities with African transitions that had been raised throughout the workshop discussions and presentations.

The notion was raised that a global approach incorporating international conditions was of greater value than a focus on common historical conditions. This argument was countered due to the complexities of demonstrating causation on an international variable. For example, when analyzing U.S. policy in the Russian transition, it is extremely difficult to establish causation. A workaround was suggested in that it may not be necessary to show precise lines of causation. The international dimension could be captured in the form of a chapter reflecting the international situation and the international forces operating at the time of post-communist transitions.

Terry Karl offered insights for the possibility of a larger scale project cautioning that an edited volume on just the post-communist experience would only be read by those interested in the region. In order to speak to a larger audience, the end product needs to be cross-regional. The first study was inter-regional and the cases were selected ad hoc. There was a selection bias, but who was going to become a democracy was not known. Now there is the advantage of hindsight, but that also has the disadvantage of thinking backwards.
In order to contribute to theory building, it is necessary to fit into the transitions language. It is important to be precise about what the hypotheses are and whose they are. The modes of transition do matter in getting to democracy. They influence the choice of institutions and influence the quality of democracy (although it is difficult to prove). With a different set of questions, it does not matter. In the U.S. there are founding documents, the Federalist Papers, which are still read and have had a lasting effect.

Theory development illuminates the region, but also transforms and improves the theory. Therefore, the hypotheses must be clear. It will be more important to have more cross-regional expertise and more cross-regional comparison outside of post-communism to truly test the theory. More regions to test against other regions are needed in order to do theory building and to test other theories. If the theory works in one sub-region, but not another, it needs to be explained. These are important issues that underscore the need for cross-regional work.

The workshop concluded with a reminder of the moral obligation to not just address the spectral factors and how they have constrained the transitions. Beyond theory building, any future project on post-communist regime transitions should focus on the practical matter of addressing what the international community can do to facilitate transitions to democracy. At present, transitions are particularly important for Afghanistan and Iraq. This project represents an opportunity to explain post-communist transitions, but more significantly, to influence successful outcomes of future transitions.