International Influences on Democratic Transitions: The Successful Case of Chile

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International Influences on Democratic Transitions: The Successful Case of Chile (Different Fronts for the Same Objective)

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INTRODUCTION

What was the international impact on the Chilean transition to democracy? How much influence was there from international aid both from countries themselves as well as from organizations outside Chile? Where was this aid coming from, how was it manifesting itself, and what was its goal and to whom did it go? How significant was the organizational power of the opposition groups? Did they cooperate? Were they efficient? In the academic literature on the Chilean transition, we find that these questions have not been answered satisfactorily. The bias toward internal phenomena due to the influential lead roles played by local actors has caused interest to wane in regards to the international impact.

The opposition's cooperation during Pinochet's regime was fraught with difficulty, mainly due to the fact that political and civil liberties were drastically restricted. Universities expelled all academics that were against the regime, the police and armed forces repressed all protests by the opposition, and political parties were banned. Likewise, many of the most prominent politicians were expelled from the country while many others were tortured or relegated, some were even executed. The idea of establishing resistance to the regime required the creation of parallel entities that would counterbalance the regime's institutions. As we will see, transition took place under the rules established by the military dictatorship itself.

It is at this point that international aid, both financial as well as technical, comes into play. Faced with the impossibility of securing national funds, these parallel entities arose under the auspices of different international organizations. Institutions from European countries, the United States, and Canada concentrated their efforts in conjoining the opposition to combat a regime that no longer had international legitimacy. Therefore, if we were to venture an explanation on this phenomenon we could see that there was a correlation between the internal and external events that assisted in inducing three elements that today are recognized as having been influential on the Chilean transition: a) the coordination between two sectors, which prior to the coup, were strongly antagonistic (the Socialist Party and Christian Democrats), b) the creation of a strong and functional organization of private research centers, which acted in parallel to the institutions that the regime interfered with (e.g.: universities), and c) the coordination between those who were exiled and those who were in the country, with the aim of preparing the transition to democracy. This point is endorsed by Senator Ricardo Núñez, an important participant in the transition, when he indicates: “The assistance helped in regrouping the previously dispersed intellectual and political strength, to establish a programmatic accumulation that would allow us to better understand what the transition would entail”.

This article is based primarily on interviews with key actors in the Chilean transition and systematic research of the political and historical bibliography on the subject. First we will analyze some external political factors that determined the characteristics of the transition and
the liberalization of the regime. Then we will note how international cooperation assisted in the creation of a strong opposition, united in that framework. Here we will attempt to trace the sources of financing and how these behaved. We will also focus on the influential plebiscite of 1988 and how international observers were an important element in the regime's recognition of defeat. The last section discusses how international aid was forged.

I. THE OUTCOME (Nature and Mode of Transition to Democracy)

On March 11, 1990, Patricio Aylwin Azócar became the first post-authoritarian president of Chile, signaling a successful democratic transition that had started years before. While nobody doubts that currently Chile exhibits a stable democratic regime, there is no consensus as to whether transition to democracy has been fully achieved. On the one hand, for some scholars, transition was completed when the first democratically elected president since 1971 reached office in 1990. On the other hand, for others, transition was reached with the elimination of most of the institutions inherited from the military regime (1973-1990) during the Constitutional Reform of 2005; while, for still others, full transition has not yet been attained given the survival of one of the most infamous examples of military institutional engineering that sought to maintain certain prerogatives and veto power for specific sectors of society, the electoral system.2

Although it is hard to signal a specific date for the fulfillment of the transition, it is even harder to find a date of its inception. For some, the transition started with the social protest and evident popular discontent with the regime during the demonstrations of the early 1980s due the gross economic crisis of 1982. For others, it was the coordination of opposition forces on February 1988, under the umbrella of the Concertación de Partidos por el No—the Coalition of Parties for the “No”—(the “No” referred to the stand taken by these leaders as to how citizens should vote in the plebiscite on Pinochet’s continued rule; planned for October 1988); while for still others it was the approval of the Constitution of 1980 that convened, in temporary articles, the date for the 1988 plebiscite.

As we see, it is hard to point to a single date for the beginning or completion of this rather flexible and fluid concept of “transition to democracy”. Nonetheless, if we define transition as “the interval between one political regime and another” during which “the rules of the political game are not defined”,3 or as a period that “begins with the breakdown of the former authoritarian regime and ends with the establishment of a relatively stable configuration of political institutions within a democratic regime”,4 we could safely talk about a time period that basically extends from the 1988 plebiscite until Aylwin enters Congress to provide his first speech to the nation as the brand new President of the Republic on March 11, 1990.5

Yet, the time framework for this research goes beyond these two years (1988-1990), it covers mainly the eight years between 1982 and 1990, when Chile received most of its international cooperation.6 Edgardo Boeninger, the former Secretary General of the Presidency during the first post-authoritarian government and one of the key actors in the transition, points out:

“...I must place (the transition) in that instant in which the existing regime lost power or even in which the existing regime gave clear signs that it would be soundly defeated and would end in transition. I believe that the Pinochet regime started to lose power, but very quickly, following the social protests in 82' and 83'. Because those protests forced him to liberalize politics enough that, although not admitting to their legality, political parties were allowed to truly function...”7

Nevertheless, the explanations of many of the events that took place during this period would be seriously lacking if we failed to pay attention to those which preceded them. Certainly the milestones that were witnessed in the second half of the regime had their origins much earlier than the analytical boundaries of the transition. The 1980 Constitution, the Chacarillas Plan, the attack on Orlando Letelier, and the economic crisis are all central events that cannot be ignored in the analysis. These will each be addressed below.
II.  LEGITIMACY CRISIS, ECONOMIC CRISIS, AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

Looking back at the events that occurred in Chile during the last 50 years, it is difficult not to agree with the conclusion of Chile scholars Martínez and Díaz that, between 1964 and 1990, Chile experienced a "revolutionary era." During that period, three revolutions were attempted, where just the last one finally emerged as "victorious". This last revolution radically transformed the central features of the (pre-1964) Chilean society and was fully institutionalized in the Constitution of 1980, designed by Pinochet and his collaborators.

However, it is crucial to note that the revolution led by Pinochet had as essential prerequisites those attempted by Frei (1964-1969) and Allende (1970-1973), respectively. In particular, the Frei policies of nationalization and land reform in conjunction with the "Chilenization" of copper, along with the deepening of nationalization and confiscation of factories and latifundios during the Allende administration provided Pinochet with ample room in which to maneuver. For example, the decision of the military regime in maintaining the exploitation of copper in the hands of the State allowed a relatively rapid recovery of the Chilean economy after the crash of 1982. Such was the leading role of Chile at the time that it is highly unlikely that a relatively well-informed person would not know about these three leaders whose fame, for good or naught, indisputably had such worldwide renown.

It is difficult to understand the process of Chilean transition and the international impact which contributed to its demise if we do not first observe the political process of the dictatorial regime. Unlike what happened in the Argentine transition, where the regime collapsed following political, economic, and military (Falkland/Malvinas War) failure, or in Uruguay where the conversion to democracy was the product of a long and arduous negotiation between the military and political parties, in Chile, transition developed within the institutional standards that the regime itself had established—almost unilaterally—in the 1980 Constitution. Specifically, the rules of the transition—consciously or unconsciously—were foreshadowed by the military government itself and its process of institutionalizing power and the rules of succession for the head of the regime.

a.  The Military Regime: Consolidating Power for a “Re-founding” of Chile

Socialist Salvador Allende was elected president by Congress in November 1970, and in fact, it was not the first time a committed socialist became the president of a nation through democratic means. It was, however, one of the most symbolic leftist victories in the Western World of the day. His coalition encompassed a variety of political groups, ranging from Communists to moderate Catholics and his policies constituted a drastic move toward the economic regulation of the country. The whole program of reforms was called "La vía chilena al socialismo" (the Chilean Path to Socialism). The economy was rapidly disjointed due to price controls, increased salaries, nationalization of industries (some of which excel) such as foreign copper firms, and of 60% of the private banks. By mid-1972 massive demonstrations for and against Allende were being staged and signs of political violence began to increase drastically.

The Cold War was at its peak during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. It is not surprising then that events in a relatively far away country like Chile were also impacted by this international atmosphere. While there were signs of an active role of the United States in Chilean affairs, the new, partially declassified documents of the American records show this intriguing and obscure dimension of American foreign policy in its reality. The election of Allende was a particularly hard hit for the American side of the equation, which was openly hostile to the possibility of a second Marxist regime (in the wake of Cuba) in the Western Hemisphere, and efforts to undermine Allende’s government were taken, even before he assumed office.

But as the popular saying goes: “it takes two to tango.” Virtually all relevant political sectors in Chile seem to have received foreign economic collaboration, at least for some years from 1963 to 1973. Thus, the U.S. was not the only relevant international player in Chile at the time. The Soviet Union also had a relevant role in subsidizing communist parties beyond its borders, and the Chilean Communist Party received important resources as well. However, neither the U.S. nor
the U.S.S.R. seem to have been willing to have another Cuba in the region, though for different reasons.

Whereas in other countries in the region the armed forces seized power in stages during the early 1970s, in Chile, the coup on September 11, 1973, took just a few hours and even included a massive rocket attack (from aircraft jets) on the presidential palace in the heart of Santiago, the capital city of the country. Of course, such a violent reaction against the democratic institutions has to be understood in the context of the political and social polarization in which Chile had already been immersed for a while. As soon as the military regime came into power it declared that it embodied the executive, legislative, and constituent powers of the Nation; and that the purpose for talking about a constituent power would soon be understood.

The Chilean military's main ideology was the doctrine of national security. On October 8, 1973, Decree Law 77 announced that the main goals of the new military government were "to extirpate Marxism from Chile, to restore the country morally and materially toward economic development and social justice, and to vitalize new institutional forms that bring about a modern democracy that is free from the vices that favored the actions of its enemies." In short, the military defined its goals in opposition to those that Allende's socialist government had embraced. The national security doctrine dominated the military government's early policy choices; it led to repressive measures and gross human rights violations throughout the regime. At the same time, "the military closed Congress, outlawed political parties, and stripped labor unions of their bargaining rights as well as their organizational base. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly were tightly restricted".

The strengthening of Pinochet's personal power at the expense of the military junta (resulting from the process known as "the coup within the coup") and its consequences expanded the regime's room for maneuver. Pinochet sought to concentrate power not only by removing any officer loyal to Allende from the armed forces (using decrees 33 and 220), but also "to systematically neutralize and retire those officers who had engineered the coup". Despite there being doubts in regards to how concentrated power was during the military regime, it was without a doubt much more concentrated and powerful than its regional counterparts. Indeed, Pinochet's power had no precedent among the region's other authoritarian regimes.

Unlike other military regimes in the region, the Chilean dictatorship attempted a clear re-founding of the country and its institutions. These re-founding attempts had a distinct effect in the transition to civilian rule in 1990, and in order to fully grasp the nature of the transition to democracy in Chile we have first to understand the previous military regime, and its stance toward the democratic regime it overthrew in 1973. Yet, it is hard to create anew the entire institutional framework of a country based solely on a negative doctrine (National Security), something else was needed. A significant ideological substantiation of the regime was provided by the Chicago Boys, and the Gremialistas.


By March 1974 "the UN Commission of Human Rights took the highly unusual step of authorizing its Chairman to address a cable to the Chilean military authorities expressing the members' concern for the protection of the lives of political prisoners and calling for strict observance of the principles of the United Nations Charter and the International Covenants on Human Rights. ECOSOC, by consensus, quickly seconded that demand". The obscene degree of human rights violations circa 1975 prompted the UN Human Rights Commission to send a team of observers to Chile, an initiative promoted by Great Britain, West Germany, France, The Netherlands, and Austria.

In July, the day before the group was to arrive in Chile, Pinochet reneged on his pledge to allow the visit, thus precipitating a deterioration in foreign relations, particularly with the United States. This adverse international situation meant further difficulties in obtaining credits from multilateral organizations, in renegotiating the foreign debt, in accessing foreign
bilateral credits and assistance, and further kindled efforts to organize an economic boycott of Chile.23

Such was the distressing atmosphere that “as the 30th UN General Assembly approached, for the first time, the Junta seriously considered the worst-case scenario that Chile might be expelled from the United Nations” (Barros 2002: 163). In July 1975, Pinochet explicitly requested the U.S. to veto such a vote, should it be necessary. He also requested the American Executive to direct aid to Chile through indirect channels (such as other countries: Brazil, Korea, Taiwan or Spain), acknowledging U.S. Congress opposition to such aid.

In 1975, the UN General Assembly expressed its ‘profound distress’ at the authorities’ practice of institutionalized torture,24 and in 1976 the UN Ad-Hoc Working Group on Chile concluded that cases of torture, as crimes against humanity, committed by the military government should be prosecuted by the international community.25 Also, during 1976 some U.S. Senators called in several members of the Chilean exile, academics, to the congressional hearings related to human rights violations in the Southern Cone. These congressional hearings triggered the U.S. Congress decision (later ratified by President Ford) to cut all military aid to the Southern Cone military regimes due to their systematic violations of human rights. By the late 1970’s, state terrorism shifted from massive to selective tactics.

By 1977, four years after the September 11, 1973 military coup, the regime was gradually becoming less legitimate in the eyes of the international community. The systematic condemnations from the United Nations in regards to the human rights situation in Chile, contributed to the change in tone of the relationship with the U.S. This was in part due to Carter assuming the Presidency, but also due to the murder of Orlando Letelier in Washington mandated by the National Intelligence Directorate, (DINA)”.26

However, by the mid 1970s, American relations with Chile were clearly multidimensional. While the Executive, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency fully engaged in subversive and anti-democratic actions in Chile, as later demonstrated by declassified documents, the American Congress took action to stop Pinochet’s brutality. This situation, different sides of the same country pushing in contradictory directions, became evident after the assassination of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier in September 1976 in Sheridan Circle, Washington DC. Presumably this assassination constituted the most famous act of international terrorism committed in the U.S. prior to [the American] 9/11, and may have been the biggest mistake of the Chilean military regime in terms of international relations.

The accession of Jimmy Carter to the White House in early 1977 and the UN condemnation of Chile due to its systematic human rights violations pushed Pinochet to seek an aura of legitimacy through popular mobilization via a plebiscite. That plebiscite was held on January 1978 as a response to the increasingly frosty international environment facing Pinochet. The text of the 1978 plebiscite was possibly the most loaded text ever used in this type of plebiscite: “In the face of international aggression unleashed against the government of our country, I support President Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile, and I reaffirm the legitimate right of the Republic to conduct the process of institutionalization in a manner befitting its sovereignty”.27 Such a plebiscite was a gross imitation of something related to a vote, given that there were no minimal conditions set for a transparent vote whatsoever. Of course, as was expected, Pinochet “won” with a support of almost 80% of the population (official numbers).

Furthermore, Hunneus affirms that the international isolation perceived by the regime also had repercussions on national security, given Chile’s conflicts with Peru and Argentina.28 For example, the Kennedy amendment, approved by the U.S. Congress in 1974, forbade any security assistance or arms sales to Chile. In 1976 this amendment was expanded. Entitled “International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act,” it prohibited transfers to any country which systematically violated human rights, except in extraordinary circumstances. Senator Ricardo Núñez, leader of the Socialist Party during the transition notes:

“"The "Kennedy" amendment was not an issue that made it impossible for them (for the Armed Forces) to gain access to the arms market, the “Kennedy” amendment turned them
into the parasitic Armed Forces of an atrocious dictatorship that didn’t report to them... they realized that the subject of democracy was not unimportant if they wanted to re-legitimize themselves in the political and social life of the country...”.

Stemming from the political actions taken primarily by the U.S. Congress, Table 1 indicates the abrupt decline in military and economic aid to Chile beginning in 1977.

Table 1: Assistance per capita (military and economic) from the United States to the countries of South America (1973-1988). In 2006 dollars

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<td>0</td>
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Source: USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services

\[c. \text{ The 1980 Plebiscite and the Debt Crisis: The Time Bomb}\]

The "victory" achieved by the 1978 plebiscite—summoned by the dictatorship in response to the UN condemnations of the human rights violations—produced an aura of glory and legitimacy for the regime and General Pinochet (rather artificially) that helped to catalyze the idea of the need to move forward with the institutionalization of the military regime. This plebiscite and the idea to approve a new constitution advancing the institutionalization of the regime—in order to secure a "protected democracy"—captured in the "Chacarillas Plan" disclosed on September 9, 1977, was, in a way, a response to international pressure and the controversy regarding the legitimacy of the regime. Thus, in the midst of an economic boom, on September 11, 1980 a new Chilean constitution was put up for a vote.

As indicated, Pinochet's program was far more sophisticated than a mere survival to international or domestic pressures, and, in a legalistic country such as Chile, this re-founding purpose had to be amalgamated into a new constitution; indeed, the regime had already declared in 1973 that it embodied the executive, legislative, and constituent powers of the Nation. The plebiscite of 1980, again on a September 11, was held without any sort of international monitoring and with no freedom whatsoever. As expected, the regime again “won.” The new Constitution stated, in transitory clause #14, that Pinochet would be president for 8 years and that after those eight years (in 1988) Chileans would have to face another plebiscite (transitory clause #27) to decide whether Pinochet remained (for another 8 years, up to 1994) or a transition was required. The plebiscite of 1988 was thus set in motion.

Chile is the case of an autocratic regime being bound by a constitution of its own making,\(^{30}\) in a way, using the words of Butler and Ranney, the Constitution approved in 1980 was a ticking time bomb,\(^{31}\) that would soon explode. As in 1978, the constitutional plebiscite counted with a high level of participation (6,271,868 citizens) and succeeded in obtaining an overwhelming 67% majority support for the new Constitution.\(^{32}\)

In this setting of economic growth and apparent success of the "neoliberal" model driven by the Chicago Boys, the dictatorial government thought itself capable of managing the process initiated in the 1980 Constitution toward a new regime with a limited plurality and with strong control over
the groups akin to the dictatorship. However, these plans were seriously altered by a second international event, which would mark the future of the dictatorship and its anticipated process of institutionalization.

The debt crisis that affected the Latin American countries was also felt in Chile. Unemployment rose from 11.3% in 1981 to 19.6% in 1982, and the GDP registered a decline of close to 14%. This crisis also entailed serious financial problems for Chilean companies, whose viability was called into question. The radical change in the country’s economic situation, brought to light the weaknesses of the economic model imposed by the dictatorship, and at the same time impelled an important social movement, which broke through the constraints the regime was trying to impose.

Faced with the impossibility of increasing repression and with the lack of effectiveness of intensifying the economic model, the dictatorship opted to distance itself from the liberal orthodoxy of the Chicago Boys and to initiate the process of a budding political liberalization. This process was manifested with the appointment of Sergio Onofre Jarpa as Ministry of the Interior and the establishment of what Huneeus calls the regime's "politics of liberalization." Among the measures which characterize the "politics of liberalization" carried out by Jarpa, the following stand out: a relaxation of the exile (which allowed the return of important political leaders who opposed the regime) and press censorship, and an attempt to engage in dialogue with the opposition. It was thus that, at the insistence of Archbishop Santiago Juan Francisco Fresno, a dialogue was set in motion between Jarpa, social and special interest group leaders, and leaders of the opposition group the Democratic Alliance (a union of right-wing, left-wing, and center politicians who opposed the dictatorship).

In fact, 1983 could be considered the beginning of the transition to democracy, in so far as it is then that the regime starts to decline. Although the political events of the subsequent two years showed that this politics of liberalization was merely a "strategic withdrawal" for Pinochet; the new freedoms that had been granted to social action, to the means of communication, and to political opposition would not disappear. In this way, the second significant international impact on Pinochet's regime—the debt crisis in Latin America—resulted in the creation of a niche for the regime's political opposition, which significantly altered its plans of a 'protected' democracy and in effect initiated the process of transition toward democracy. Although the plans for presidential succession within the regime, as established by the 1980 Constitution, remained intact, the political setting in which they took place were very different from that which was expected by the supporters of the dictatorship. After 1983 the opposition had the means of strengthening itself and gathering politically, so that in 1988—for the ensuing plebiscite—it had become a political force capable of defeating Pinochet at the ballot.

Starting in 1983, the most significant international impacts to the transition arose from the international political, technical, and financial support granted to the democratic opposition. This helped to consolidate the union of two groups which had been radically opposed in 1973 (the Christian Democrat Party and the parties of the Popular Union), which allowed for a strong democratic opposition united in its objective of re-democratization. Likewise, it enabled the democratic forces to show themselves as agents capable of governing and maintaining political and economic stability in a democratic Chile. These processes are analyzed in detail in the following sections.

d. The Plebiscite of 1988: The Beginning of the End

In the context of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes the evidence of a plebiscitary failure is provided only when the government acknowledges its defeat. But if the non-democratic government succeeds in its plebiscitary efforts, we may lack the tools for knowing, and empirically showing, that the plebiscite was held fairly. Yet, there is less than a handful of examples where authoritarian regimes acknowledge their defeat at the ballot box. Indeed, to my knowledge, during the twentieth century there were only two such instances worldwide: Uruguay in 1980 and
Chile in 1988. The simplest and most obvious question is, having roughly all the tools to rig a plebiscite, why do authoritarian regimes accept their loss when they hold one? Was it a political maneuver to pursue other results? Which factors determined the acceptance of the results of those plebiscites? Was it merely the surprise factor, international leverage, or simply a political miscalculation?

With the help of international cooperation, the opposition camp succeeded in building a parallel tallying system for the plebiscite.\textsuperscript{37} Also, an important fact to bear in mind is that by 1988 Chile was one of the last countries in the American continent still under control of a military regime, and thus world attention was focused on it. Unlike the Uruguayan experience of 1980, the 1988 plebiscite in Chile had a significantly long and, most importantly, fair campaign for both camps.\textsuperscript{38} Yet, the day of the plebiscite did not pass free of tensions. Just the day before the election, a blackout in Santiago predisposed the opposition camp to sharpen their senses; extreme caution was required at each of the more than 22,000 polling stations throughout the country.

Notwithstanding the assistance of international cooperation for the 1988 plebiscite, Chileans themselves were also learning from other international experiences, especially those within the region. During a personal interview of former Uruguayan President Sanguinetti, he stated that immediately after the military defeat in the Uruguayan plebiscite of 1980, Genaro Arriagada was sent to Montevideo on behalf of former Chilean president, Eduardo Frei, to learn about the Uruguayan experience and how they defeated the military at the ballot boxes.\textsuperscript{39}

### Plebiscites under the Pinochet Regime (1973-1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Issue</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01-04-1978</td>
<td>91.43</td>
<td>78.69</td>
<td>Support of President Pinochet's policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>09-11-1980</td>
<td>92.96</td>
<td>68.52</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-05-1988</td>
<td>97.53</td>
<td>44.01</td>
<td>General Pinochet for President for 8 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06-30-1989</td>
<td>91.30</td>
<td>91.26</td>
<td>Constitutional reforms</td>
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On the day of the vote, a series of contradictory information was released by both camps. Early in the night, Arriagada (about 21:00) announced that based on the Command for the NO numbers, the "no" is leading with 58.7% and the "yes" is slightly higher than 41%. Police forces repressed budding demonstrations in downtown Santiago while the Command for the NO is forced to evacuate their headquarters. About an hour later, Cardemil provided the nation with a second outcome: 51.3% for the "yes" and 46.5% for the "no" based on 600 polling stations. The Committee for Free Elections later indicated that the "yes" has obtained 44.6% of the vote against the 55.2% "no" vote garnered by the opposition.

A critical juncture was faced by the leaders of the National Renovation party, a right-wing party that was a sympathizer of the coup d'état, which also had a parallel apparatus for tallying the votes and whose information was similar to that of the Command for the NO. The tension was between those who wanted to wait and see and those who wanted to publicly acknowledge that their statistics were not concurrent with those of the government. Allamand communicated to La Moneda that if a new distorted result were publicly announced, he would publicly acknowledge a rigging of the election.\textsuperscript{40} A bit later Cardemil informs Pinochet that it is impossible for the "yes" to win. Arriagada again provides a new report: 40.2% for the "yes" and 57.8% for the "no." Subsequently, on a TV program, Jarpa sat with Aylwin and recognized the "no" victory.

A few minutes after midnight Pinochet called a cabinet meeting and told his ministers "Gentlemen, the plebiscite has been lost. I want your immediate resignation. That is all". Pinochet called all members of the Junta and on his way to La Moneda, the Air Force commander, Fernando Matthei, tells reporters: "It is fairly clear that the 'no' has won, but we are not concerned." This phrase was transmitted on air by Radio Cooperativa. The results were there for anyone to see (reconstructed based on interviews with Arriagada and Godoy).\textsuperscript{41}
The accession of Patricio Aylwin to the Presidency in 1990, signaled an end to one of the most relevant and unifying phases of international cooperation in Chile. Unlike in any other time period, a single common objective succeeded in uniting a variety of public and private organizations that, through their programs of technical, financial, and political assistance, argued for the removal of the ruling military regime and a return to democracy.

Many countries were engaged in this cause. Organizations in Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, and the United States among others worked—even in coordination with each other—to support the groups opposing the regime. An example of this is described by Jeffrey Puryear—who during the period of the military regime led the regional Ford Foundation office for the Andes and Southern Cone—in his book *Thinking Politics*. According to the author, one of the goals of this international cooperation was the creation of a critical mass of think-tanks, so they could act as a significant force in the re-configuration of democracy. Hence, Puryear attempts to demonstrate that the collaboration obtained a great political impact at a critical moment in Chilean history by establishing and maintaining a framework of highly specialized professionals who were able to play an important role in the return of democratic rules. Thus aid came to the opposition from multiple sources with multiple aims; although the greater part of this was related to research centers whose main, or perhaps only, means of funding came from donor institutions in Europe and the United States.

On the other hand, Paul Sigmund who is also concerned with the role of North American funding of the opposition groups, argues that this support allowed a counterbalance to the regime's control of funding resources and means. This is apparent by the U.S. Congress' approval of a budget directly aimed at the promotion of democracy in Chile through the *National Endowment for Democracy*, a fact that indicated the United States' interest in pressuring the regime toward liberalization and respect for human rights.

Nonetheless, the true effect of international cooperation on the Chilean political process is not that evident. For many key figures of the transition, international cooperation—although important—never became its main trigger. Boeninger, in corroborates this view, indicating: "...just as the military coup was not a product of CIA malice, but rather internal confrontation, the return to democracy was not a result of international cooperation...".

Likewise, there are those who point out that the international aid to the Chilean transition, played a subordinate role to domestic political forces. Genaro Arriagada indicates: "...If the dictatorship doesn't have internal opposition, international aid is not triggered. The fundamental actor is internal opposition. International aid is subordinate and of relatively less importance. You can't overthrow a dictatorship from the outside...".

Therefore, what role did international aid have in the success of the transition? How significant, or not, was its impact on the return to democracy? Enrique Ganuza proposes an opposing view to that stated by the two key actors of Chilean transition previously mentioned. "How could it be of little importance? International aid was crucial! Many countries received refugees and cooperated so that internal opposition could articulate itself. Almost all the resources of the opposition were purely from international aid."

Although these statements may be seen as opposing and somewhat split from each other, the correlation between the two postures may be a good mechanism to understand the impact of international influence on the recovery of democracy. Certainly, a cooperation without formal, well-organized negotiators could have become the inefficient product of the groups' inability to absorb those resources and apply them adequately. The opposite is also true, for a permanent internal articulation and even survival of opposition groups could not have happened without the international aid that came from different countries.

Therefore, if we were to venture an explanation of this phenomenon we would see that there was a correlation between the internal and the external events that assisted in inducing three
elements that today are recognized as having been influential to the Chilean transition: a) the coordination between two sectors, which prior to the coup were strongly antagonistic (the Socialist Party and the Christian Democrats), b) the creation of a strong and functional organization of private research centers, which acted in parallel to the institutions that the regime interfered with (e.g.: universities), and c) the coordination between those who were exiled and those who were in the country, with the aim of preparing the transition to democracy.

III.1. Mapping International Aid

One of the most difficult tasks faced during the research was identifying the institutions that were giving as well as those receiving international aid. The lack of documentation and systematization of the international institutes which collaborated in the process of transition has added an extra layer of difficulty. One of the more plausible explanations for this lack of information is that the majority of the aid was directed in an individualized manner to one or more non-governmental organization, without the existence of a central registry to record those deposits. If methodologically speaking it is extremely difficult to isolate the cooperation from a single source when there are multiple objectives; then, trying to measure the impact from a plethora of organizations that were giving and many more that were receiving makes this task a project of titanic proportions that could hardly be carried out by a research project of this magnitude.

For the most part, foreign cooperation took place among think-tanks, civil organizations, and syndicates. Much cooperation was by means of projects whose outcomes had to be reported on, and yet other ways were through unrestricted donations, free to be used as needed. This aid came primarily from Western European countries, Canada, and the United States. There was also cooperation from the USSR toward the Communist Party and other left-wing groups, but the objectives of the Comintern were nowhere close to the idea of a peaceful transition. Ricardo Núñez, points out:

“The Communist Party in the Soviet Union and Cuba helped the Communist Party and the MIR in a different way, and they had a different strategy, the socialist faction of Eastern Europe held a different strategy for our country's release from dictatorship. Chile was merely a platform—indeed insignificant to the Cold War—and the Communist Party had no other alternative, even when many of its leaders admitted in whispers that Chile did not have the conditions to turn into a Vietnam or a Nicaragua.”

Meanwhile, the recipient institutions answered to the non-governmental organizations and the centers created by the Chilean intellectuals. The mechanism for collaboration was primarily through the presentation of research projects and the development of activities. One such example were the famous economic dialogues held by the Center of Study for Development (CED), which was able to bring together for the first time liberal economists, government supporters, and organizations of the opposition to discuss subjects that were controversial for the time; such as the right to private property and the redistribution of wealth. Financed by American sources, the main aim of the institution was to reduce the existing differences between the groups, and hence bring their postures closer together primarily on subjects related to the economy of the country. Boeninger points out:

“At the CED we organized seminars, meetings between liberals and government supporters, DC, PS, Unionists, etc., and those were projects that were enabled by the financial aid of American foundations.”

Table 2, shows the group of foreign institutions that supported the Chilean transition. Each institution had its own method of assisting, although the vast majority of them were intermediaries for funding from their own governments.
Table 2: Type, name, and provenance of the main collaborating institutes during the transition

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<th>United States</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Canada</th>
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<th>The Netherlands</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NED- Centre for International Private Enterprise.</td>
<td>Inter-American Foundation</td>
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American cooperation during the transition took place in many fronts. On the one hand there was direct pressure from the United States government with the aim of forcing the Pinochet regime to liberalize. The need of the authoritarian regime for an infusion of funds surpassing two billion
dollars, with the aim of furthering the biannual development plan\textsuperscript{49} gave the United States Treasury the opportunity to demand this liberalization, setting as a condition to their aid a definitive end of the martial law imposed by the regime. Sigmund points out: "The June 1985 loans from the World Bank provided an opportunity to compel the Chileans to liberalize to some degree, since the lifting of the state of siege was a condition of U.S. support".\textsuperscript{50}

Another source of support was from the organizations who were receiving funds from the NED. One of the most active of these was the \textit{National Democratic Institute} (NDI), which established itself in Chile in May 1985 and sponsored conferences, seminars, and visits by external consultants to promote free elections.\textsuperscript{51} The NDI also had an active role in the 1988 plebiscite, sending to Chile a group of observers, among whom were Kenneth Wollack, Lewis Manilow, Larry Garber, and others. The NED funds also helped finance projects in institutions such as CIEPLAN (which also received funds from the Canadian IDRC), FLACSO and even the CED. Private foundations such as the Ford Foundation also contributed to the transition. CIEPLAN and the Interdisciplinary Program for Research in Education (PIIE) were among its beneficiaries. The Rockefeller Foundation did the same for the Center of Study for Development (CED).

German aid was far superior at all levels, almost five times as much as the support sent by the United States. According to Pinto-Duschiszky,\textsuperscript{52} between 1984 and 1988, German foundations contributed 26.05 million dollars, a figure much higher than the 6.77 million from the United States. The largest contribution was from the Christian Democrat foundation, Konrad Adenauer, with almost 24 million dollars. These funds helped solidify projects from opposition institutions such as the Corporation for University Advancement (CPU), the Chilean Institute for Humanistic Studies (ICHECH), and the Eduardo Frei Foundation. The other German political foundation—related to the social democrats—that made a significant investment in Chile was the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Although the amount of money destined to cooperation in this country was inferior to that doled out by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation; both set the standard for common cooperation with the opposition.

Other substantial aid came from Sweden, Canada, and The Netherlands. The Swedish SIDA and SAREC were prominent in their support of opposition activities both in and out of the country. The most distinctive feature of Sweden’s cooperation is that it also harbored 13,900 Chilean political refugees,\textsuperscript{53} a fact that contributed to the strong ties of solidarity with that country. Likewise the Swedish Labor Unions such as LO and TCO also supported their Chilean counterparts, particularly through cooperation in dialogues and union leadership. The Canadian IDRC was also prominent through its funding of research activities on subjects related to the economy and public policy, particularly those developed by CIEPLAN. Joaquin Vial, a researcher at this institute mentions the international aid provided by the IDRC: "Its contribution (IDRC), moreover, enabled us to track the economic situation, a vital task which allowed a group of researchers to observe events and develop tools for monitoring economic developments in great detail. In addition to forming opinion, it thus facilitated the transfer of power to informed people who were prepared to assume the responsibility of governing the country".\textsuperscript{54}

The Netherlands was also another prominent case in regards to international cooperation, specifically dealing with the protection of human rights. One of the salient features of Dutch cooperation was the exceptional strategy of triangulation for Chile. Indeed, from the start cooperation in the realm of human rights was addressed from one government to the next, a strategy that was not well received considering the repression of the state itself toward opposition groups. In this way they decided to supersede aid—especially for Chile and Uganda—reconveying it through non-governmental channels.\textsuperscript{55} The idea was, precisely, to reach the victims of the human rights violations directly, bypassing the victimizing government. Thus, the gamble was to develop contracts with private Dutch institutions (NOVIB, HIVOS) so that they in turn would support the Chilean ones.

Other governments also contributed, although their support was not quite as significant in monetary terms. For example, Mitterrand’s France supported some activities in the Center for the Studies of Contemporary Reality (CERC) and the Academy for Christian Humanism.\textsuperscript{56} Boeninger
indicates: "Those who least collaborated with opposition institutions were the French and the British."

Nonetheless, the fact that international funds did not proceed from a single country, allowed the groups opposing the government to articulate themselves with a certain level of autonomy. Each organization undertook its own agendas for research and political activism without the aid being subjected to conditions. Thus, international cooperation adapted itself to the plans of the recipients and not the other way around.

III.2. International Cooperation in the Organization and Reconvening of the Opposition

a. The Union of Two Camps

If we could find a defining moment in international aid in Chile it would be the rapprochement of two camps which were highly antagonistic prior to 1973. During Salvador Allende's government, the supporters of the Popular Unity and those of the Christian Democrats opposed each other vehemently, being unable to reach even minimal consensus in order to save the democratic regime. Although this confrontation left many open wounds and resentment, the hard lesson of the military coup made both sides come to the conclusion that the only escape from totalitarianism was to put aside their differences and maximize their similarities.57

This objective was successfully captured by the supporting organizations. Núñez says in regards to the German Social Democrat Foundation, Friedrich Ebert: "The Foundation understood that here was a specific solution, particular and unique, which was that the Socialists in Chile had the possibility of engaging with the Christian Democrats in order to overthrow a dictatorship".58

It is interesting to note that this specific and exceptional solution was quickly grasped by the international community and they quickly began to develop activities toward that aim. For example, the embassies played a significant role in the first years of the dictatorship, when they held the early dialogues between Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Communists in the ambassador’s own homes. Boeninger points out: “I would say that the embassies were, from 75’ onwards, places that facilitated meetings and held meetings between opposition groups which had been distanced from each other prior to September 11, 1973. I remember participating in the first meeting of this type, held in the house of the then ambassador of Norway, attended by Claudio Ortega Senior, Genaro Arriagada and myself for the DC, some Communist whose name I never knew, and also a Socialist.” Other diplomatic delegations imitated the logic of these meetings, such as Spain and Italy. Special notice should be made of the business attaché from Italy—a country which at the time did not have an embassy in Chile—Tommaso de Vergottini, who according to Boeninger was a soldier of the dissident cause.

Thus it was that the international community never stopped thinking about how crucial this unification was to further a return to democracy. Lectures and seminars were organized that aimed to bring the two sides together. Already in 1976, in Venezuela, the Democratic Action and COPEI parties were successful in facilitating a reunion between Socialists, Communists and Mapu, with the Christian Democrats. The Swedish and German foundations were doing the same by organizing or supporting activities both in Chile and abroad.

The Konrad Adenauer Foundation indicates in their institutional presentation: "After the military coup in 1973 and until the return to democracy in 1989, FKA lent its support through multiple activities destined to maintaining and developing the democratic structures. At the same time it dedicated itself to promote a rapprochement between the opposition forces and collaborated in paving the way toward the difficult transition to democracy." This perhaps is one of the clearest objectives of the international cooperation.

Another salient factor of this reunion was the Christian Democrat's following of certain paradigms that had originated abroad, especially in Spain and Italy. Núñez indicates: "The way in which the Christian Democrats behaved is related to the way in which the Christian Democrats behaved in
Italy and in the Spanish transition in particular...Adolfo Suárez arrives in Chile and becomes a determining factor in strengthening the idea of unity among the Christian Democrats and the Socialists.” Indeed, the influence of Adolfo Suárez was paramount to the union of the Chilean opposition, in so far as he had been able to manage a transition in Spain, where he knew how to bring together such dissimilar tendencies as Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and Liberals.

Other means of reunion were through activities in the opposition think-tanks. The multiple activities developed during this time period, contributed significantly to restore mutual trust and understanding. Once again the CED was a pioneer in creating the program of Political Compromise, National Project, and Democracy, which became a meeting place for political leaders (Puryear, 1993).

b. Strong Organizations as Facilitators of International Aid

The dictatorship brought forth one of the most interesting phenomena in regards to organizations. The closure of public places—especially universities—where Chilean intellectuals and academics could develop their work, meant finding new ways of continuing their work. In the beginning, most intellectuals sought refuge in international organizations such as the Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO) or the International Center for Educational Development (CIDE). Later, other organizations arose created by the opposition themselves, such as the Chilean Institute of Humanistic Studies (ICHEH) and the Center for Socio-Economic Research (ISEC). By the end of the seventies, there was an array of highly functional organizations engaged in the academic debate of politics and public policy. The Latin American Corporation for Economic Studies (CIEPLAN), the socialist Center for Social and Economic Studies (VECTOR), the Center for Social and Educational Studies (SUR), the Latin American Center for the Research of Political Economy (CLEPI), the Center of Study for Development (CED), and the Program for Work Economy (PET), all represented places where there was a critical and functional mass that could propose politics alternative to the dictatorship.

The interesting thing is that each of these institutions was composed of people with some sort of political affinity. As noted by Puryear: “Each tended to have a single, relative cohesive political viewpoint, reflecting the traditional tendency of Chilean institutions to organize around political subcultures”. Likewise this organization transcended its walls; direct contact with the different social sectors and, in particular, with the party leaders, established a well prepared and confident organizational power.

It was this organization that allowed for the facilitation of international cooperation. International organizations tended to find their Chilean counterparts through these think-tanks. Thus the NDI established itself with the CED and CIEPLAN (institutions tied to the Christian Democrats), the Konrad Adenauer Foundation with the ICHEH and with the two former ones, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation with VECTOR, etc.

Ganuza notes: “It was paramount to international collaboration that Chile have a strong organization, because the donor institutions could find their counterparts in the country...but Chilean society was also a society where there were strong churches, which were very important for the international movement.”

Indeed, the Catholic Church was very important both internationally and inside the country, by becoming a strong element pressing for change in the regime. Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez was the founder of the Solidarity Vicarage, a Church institution which succeeded in harboring within the country many who were persecuted by the government. Rev. Robert S. Pelton, C.S.C., from the University of Notre Dame was one of those in charge of smuggling documents (inside his cassock) from the Vicarage to the safe haven of the Notre Dame Library.

Likewise, the successor to Silva Henríquez, Francisco Fresno, collaborated for the creation of the National Agreement for the Transition to True Democracy amid the conflicts and protests of 1983. This agreement, composed of the whole political spectrum, received full support from the United States’ Department of State for achieving a basis of agreement and consensus between all those
who were aiming for a peaceful solution to the conflict. Representatives of six of the signing parties met with leaders of the United States for a conference in the Woodrow Wilson Center. The International Relations Committees of both the House and the Senate approved a resolution supporting the National Agreement and a peaceful Chilean transition.62

c. Exile and International Cooperation

One form of international aid was the harboring of Chilean refugees in European and South American countries. Be it through exile or refugee programs, the Chilean diaspora became one of the most numerous in many of the host countries.

The influence of this exile was felt in three ways. The first was the mere presence of Chilean refugees that contributed in a big way to the international community becoming aware of what was happening inside the country. To this end, solidarity committees and organizations that broadcasted the Chilean cause against the regime were created.63 A grave mistake was made by the regime when it expelled noted intellectuals from the country, thus launching some of the key figures of the transition. Regarding this point, Genaro Arriagada says: "The dictatorship made serious mistakes. When it expelled (José) Zalaquett64 it creates the future president of Amnesty International, or when it expels Eugenio Velasco65 and Jaime Castillo (Velasco)66 it creates two human rights leaders in the international community.”

The countries that received the most exiles and refugees were Venezuela, Spain, France, Italy, Sweden, and Canada; and to a lesser degree, Australia, the United States, and countries in the Soviet Block. Some of these countries supported activities in exile. Recalling the 40 years of Chilean activity, the German foundation, Friedrich Ebert, states: “The FES program to support activities of the leaders in exile was based on three precepts. On the one hand, the FES provided grants to the leadership groups of the democratic parties in exile with the aim of allowing them to develop their political work. To avoid a fragmentation of the parties in exile and the structures that still existed in Chile, and also to facilitate understanding between the groups.”

Another key element was the role that Roberts ascribes to the impact of the exile on socialist leaders.68 In particular, he notes that their exposure to debates that were sponsored by Eurocommunists and Social Democrats during the eighties enabled the moderation of the Chilean Socialist Party. Senator Ricardo Núñez also notes:

"...the exile (Chilean) was fortunate in never distancing itself from the dynamics being lived inside the country...it was very political...certain elements that flourish in international politics such as the substantial modifications experienced by the European Left—after Eurocommunism—allowed us all to prepare for the fall of the Berlin Wall and, from the point of view of the Left, enabled us to be prepared for a process of generation of different political forces...it allowed us to understand even better the phenomena that were occurring in the Latin American and, primarily, European Left. I feel that was the great contribution that the Chilean exile made toward transition.”

Thus, one of the cornerstones of the Chilean transition was the moderation of the Socialist Party. The fact that the opposition to the dictatorship could act in a unified manner, is due in part to the impact the Western European Left had on the moderation of Socialist leaders. The agreements reached between Christian Democrats and Socialists, and their capacity to reach strategic consensus against the regime would have been unthinkable without this process of moderation of the Chilean Socialists. Nonetheless, those on the other side of the Iron Curtain felt otherwise. Boeninger points out:

“Those who adhered to Eastern Germany or to the USSR, could not conceive that the military would relinquish power, and hence always supported, not necessarily all forms of the struggle, but did support, at the least, a social revolution that would tumble the regime.”

A last point is the interrelation between the exiles and the internal resistance. The activities that encompassed both groups were primarily supported by international cooperation enabling the
reunion of those inside and outside the country so they could plan the resistance to the regime. “Carlos Altamirano, Ricardo Núñez, and Jorge Arrate would meet with Ricardo Lagos and other people who attended the meetings which we sponsored”. As a matter of fact, many Chilean intellectuals and politicians were outside the country, but the ability to relate with those inside the country contributed to the strengthening of the movement.

III.3. The last step of the transition: The Committee for Free Elections and the Plebiscite.

Having achieved the task of coordinating and unifying the opposition, the main task that remained was to force the regime to relinquish power. To this end, in 1987, three Committees for Free Elections were created, one composed of Christian Democrats, another of Socialists led by Ricardo Lagos, and another called the Committee of Personalities led by Eduardo Frei Montalva’s former Minister, Sergio Molina. The three committees coordinated with each other, and although in their initial declarations they tended to reject the idea of the plebiscite proposed by the regime and called directly for free elections; none of them truly believed that this would happen and they realized that the fight must be held through the instrument provided by Pinochet. However, the Committees for Free Elections (CEL) were able to take advantage of this instance, to mobilize the Chileans, and thus cement one of the greatest challenges faced by the opposition: the defeat of the regime at the ballot box.

In his book *Democracy in Chile* Edgardo Boeninger notes: “For those of us who already suspected that a plebiscite was inevitable, the campaign for free elections was a concrete step in the direction of taking on the electoral challenge, the defeat of the regime at the ballot box as the great objective of the opposition”.

The coordination of the CEL, led by Genaro Arriagada, counted with strong support from the NDI and American cooperation in general. The need to have alternate tallies, to prepare the representatives, and to have foreign observers that would control the election, had an immediate response among international institutions. The *Inter-American Institute for Human Rights* and its Costa Rican affiliate the *Latin American Center for Electoral Assessment and Promotion* (CAPEL) contributed 1.2 million dollars to CIVITAS, a foundation tied to the Church and directed by Mónica Jiménez, in order to develop activities surrounding voter registration and education. As a matter of fact, CIVITAS was extremely important for the CEL during the scrutiny of the electoral results. Likewise, the United States Congress approved the allocation of one million dollars to a national foundation for democracy to “promote democracy in Chile,” which was administered by the NDI. The Europeans made similar donations.

On the day of the plebiscite, the NDI sent a large delegation of observers headed by Adolfo Suárez, Misael Pastrana, Bruce Babbitt and Peter Dailei to monitor the sanctity of the vote, the freedom to vote, and control the process. The fear of fraud was present in the minds of the opposition and the international community. It was thus that a specialist sent by the NDI, Glen Cowan, suggested it would be necessary to protect not the total tally, but rather the individual tables, in order to later force the government to release individual table votes to compare with their own. In this way the opposition placed its representatives at all the tables and created centers for information gathering that was later fed to a central command office.

Although the government delayed in releasing the results, Pinochet finally accepted defeat. As previously told, the “no” option won with a 55.99% of the vote versus the 44.01% obtained by the “yes.” Democracy had been recovered and the groups had to prepare for the presidential and legislative elections that would take place a year later.

IV. DISCUSSION

Although much has been written on the Chilean transition to democracy, not much analysis has been made of the international impact to this process. A discerning view of these factors allows
one to appreciate that the international political impact had great significance and can help us to better understand the Chilean transition.

International demands and pressure to protect human rights led the regime to feel its legitimacy being undermined both internationally and nationally. This probably impelled it to begin a path of institutionalization. This path, born of the logic to establish a regime that restricted pluralism, a "protected democracy," was seriously altered by the impact of a regional economic crisis that forced the regime to allow for platforms of free expression. Hence, within the rules established by the regime itself the Chilean transition begun—with an international trigger such as the debt crisis.

These two international impacts set the stage where the democratic opposition and the supporters of the dictatorship competed to impose their vision of the type of government that should rule Chile. In this competition the international factor is once again transformed in political cooperation and had its role in supporting the democratic opposition. Thus we can extrapolate some conclusions about the characteristics and functioning of the political cooperation on the Chilean transition.

As Whitehead confirms, the characteristics of European cooperation led the political organizations to look to Europe for aid, while the eminently military profile of North American aid prompted the military to look toward Washington. In the case of Chile, this seems to have been the trend. Although the support of the NED was very important, even more important was the loss of said aid from the United States to the government, which had a tremendous impact on the preferences of the regime’s supporters toward democratization.

It is evident that collaboration to the political forces of the opposition came primarily from parties or other organizations that saw themselves as their counterparts abroad. The support of the Socialists to the Chilean Social Democrats and Socialist Party, and of the Christian Democrats to the PDC, and, of course, of the Communists to the Chilean Communist Party is perceived as a natural course of events. In this way, as Whitehead suggests, the similarity of the European party systems to those of Latin America, especially that of Chile, favored cooperation. However, the same is not the case for the American political cooperation with Chile. Aid from NED was only possible through the NDI and its ties to leaders of the Christian Democrats. Although the Democratic Party in the United States is not the counterpart to the PDC in Chile, American aid became effective thanks to the exhaustive contacts between the leaders of both parties.

More importantly, however, the main lesson that we can extract from the Chilean case is that the central attribute which made international cooperation a functional element of the strategy of the democratic opposition was—as Whitehead suggests—that local agents had the liberty to act on behalf of their own interests and objectives. This enabled the aid to strengthen their ability to oppose the regime without losing their legitimacy within Chilean society. In other words, it allowed them to establish themselves as “authentic” organizations rather than puppets of foreign interests. Had there not been strong pre-existing organizations with strategic autonomy from outside influences, international cooperation would not have favorably impacted the Chilean transition.


Arriagada, Genaro. 2008. *Interview with the author, March*.


Boeninger, Edgardo. 2008. *Interview with the author, January*.


Ganuza, Enrique. 2008. *Interview with the author, March*.


Godoy, Oscar. 2008. *Interview with the author, March*.


Luna, Juan Pablo. 2006. "Party-Voter Linkages in Two Institutionalized Party Systems: Chile and Uruguay in Comparative Perspective." Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill.


Sanguinetti, Julio María. 2008. *Interview with the author, February 22*.


Author interview with Ricardo Núñez (March 2008).


(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986:6).

(Gunther, Diamanduros, and Puhle 1995:3).

On definitions of transition see (Munck 1996).

It is worth noting that prior to this temporary interval, there already was much international aid, particularly from German political foundations. Nonetheless, most of the inflow of money was concentrated between 1983 and 1990. See (Hunneus 2000, Puryear, 1994).

Author interview with Boeninger (2008). Key actor of Chilean transition. Former Ministerial Secretary General to the Presidency during the first post-authoritarian regime.

(Martínez Bengoa and Díaz Pérez 1996).

(Luna 2006).

According to the Chilean Constitution of the time, if no presidential candidate obtained a majority of the popular vote, Congress would choose one of the two candidates with the highest number of votes as the winner. Tradition was for Congress to vote for the candidate with the highest popular vote, regardless of margin.

(Skidmore and Smith 2001: 127). See also Vergara (1986: 90).

On October 16, 1970, an official command was issued to the CIA base in Chile, pronouncing: "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end, utilizing every appropriate resource. It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG and American hand be well hidden...". But, U.S. covert operations in Chile did not end there. Allende was subjected to destabilization efforts while in government, the coup was catalyzed by the U.S., and after the military regime overthrew the democratically elected government, U.S. efforts were aimed to bolster the military regime of Augusto Pinochet. On September 16, 1973 Kissinger talking to President Nixon told him: "We didn't do it" [referring to the coup]. I mean we helped them....created the conditions as great as possible." Retrieved from:

See: (Centro de Estudios Públicos (ed) 1998; Ferrandois 1985; Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 1975; Uliánova and Fediakova 1998).

(Vergara 1985: 20).

(Stallings and Brock 1993: 81).

(Vañezuela 1991: 32-33).

(Barros 2002).

(Castiglioni 2001; 2005).

The Chicago Boys were a group of young economists whose programs were the precursors of Chile’s radical market-oriented reforms, and participated in the economic policy-making process from the beginning. In 1956, the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago and its counterpart from the Universidad Católica de Chile established an agreement that allowed promising young economists from Chile to pursue graduate studies in Chicago. Although they gained preeminence during the mid-1970s, they started to work together during the late 1960s from their own research center, the Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos, where they prepared an economic program for the right-wing candidate Jorge Allesandri in the 1970 elections. This experience and subsequent collaborations culminated in the draft of an economic development program that came to be known as “The Brick” (El Ladrillo). On September 12 (only one day after the coup), “The Brick” was distributed among prominent members of the armed forces. Yet,
during the first few years of military rule, “The Brick” was not accepted as the framework for the adoption of economic and social policies. Hence, from September 1973 to April 1975, military officials were appointed to nearly every ministerial position, and the “Chicago Boys” were invited to serve mainly as advisers (Castiglioni 2005: 28-29).

21 The Gremialistas, on the other hand, was a political movement founded in the late 1960’s by Jaime Guzmán within Universidad Católica de Chile, in opposition to the reform of higher education taking place at the time. Although he failed, as a result of these actions the Labor Movement came into being. Guzmán was influenced by different schools of thought, including Osvaldo Lira, from Franco’s Spain, with corporatist ideas.

22 (Franck 1984: 826).

23 (Barros 2002: 163).


26 Upon the occasion of the visit to Chile of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Terence Todman, the regime announced the dissolution of the DINA and the creation of the National Information Center (CNI).

27 “Frente a la agresión internacional desatada en contra de nuestra patria respaldo al presidente Pinochet en su defensa de la dignidad de Chile y reafirmo la legitimidad del gobierno de la República para encabezar soberanamente el proceso de institucionalidad del país”.

28 (2000).

29 http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/us_assistance_per_capita_07.xls

30 (Barros 2002: 1; Heiss and Navia 2007).

31 (Butler and Ranney 1994:7).

32 Data extracted from Huneeus 2000.

33 Source: INE and Banco Central de Chile, Castiglioni 2005.

34 (Huneeus 2000).

35 (Huneeus 2000).


37 Most notable among these were the National Endowment for Democracy and the German stiftungs.

38 On February 2, 1988, thirteen political parties and movements signed an agreement calling for the "No" vote. This coalition was named Concertación de Partidos por el NO, which was the springboard for the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia that has governed Chile since 1990.

39 (Sanguinetti 2008). Genaro Arriagada, however, in another interview done for purposes of this research, gave little importance to that meeting with Sanguinetti in Montevideo. Author interview with Genaro Arriagada (2008). In charge of the international cooperation for the 1988 plebiscite. Former Ministerial Secretary General to the Presidency during the government of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle.

40 (Allamand 1999: 164-165)

41 Interview with Oscar Godoy (2008), Professor of political science, and then Member of the Comité de Personalidades por las Elecciones Libres.

42 (1994).

43 (Puryear 1994:9).

44 (Puryear 1994: 51).


46 Author interview with Enrique Gana (2008). Director of the Latin American and the Caribbean Division for the Swedish International Cooperation Agency during the eighties and current Resident Representative of the UNDP in Chile.

47 (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson 2007).

48 What is surprising is the lack of universities among those receiving international aid for the transition to democracy. The study of the effects of international cooperation acquires yet another layer when we consider that many of the institutions receiving aid, belong to complex organizations that already had an underlying, predetermined vision. The Catholic University is a
clear example of this situation. Although it was the birthplace of the Chicago Boys and of one of
the most Ultramontane Schools of Law that one could imagine (where the Gremialismo arose), it
likewise housed the Political Science Institute, which may be the only institute in the Chilean
university system of the mid-eighties with a notably democratic and liberalizing attitude. It was
under the leadership of Oscar Godoy that, years before the 1988 plebiscite, and under an NED
grant, a conference was held on the subject of transition, blessed with the presence of prestigious
figures such as Robert Dahl. Many of the conference attendees arrived in Chile with their
respective partners. And it is still astonishing, to mention an anecdote, to think of Robert Dahl's
wife organizing a sit-in at Plaza Italia against the Pinochet dictatorship. All of these events were
front-page news in the Mercurio (Chilean newspaper) at that time.

49 (Sigmund, 1993).
50 (Sigmund 1993: 153).
51 (National Democratic Institute 1989).
53 (Roniger and Sznajder 2007).
54 (IDRC 1992:2).
55 (Baehr 1982).
56 (Puryear 1994: 52).
57 (Funk 2006).
58 (in Wille 2007).
59 The exile nourished other Latin American academies that took advantage of the
opportunity to incorporate those affected by the repression. For example, although FLACSO
(Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales—the Latin American School of Social Sciences) in
Argentina was a very important refuge for Chilean and Uruguayan academics from 1973 until the
Argentine military coup in 1976, the countries that “capitalized” the most by attracting colleagues
from the south were Mexico and Brazil in the first instance and later Venezuela and Costa Rica.
For example, the CIDE (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas—Center for Economic
Research and Education) in Mexico was, at a given moment, a kind of refugee center for
outstanding social scientists from South America, especially from the Southern Cone and Chile in
particular. In this respect we might include the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the
University of Notre Dame as one of the most prominent centers for Latin American intellectuals at
the time (Altman 2006b).
60 (1993:48).
61 (Personal Communication).
62 (Sigmund, 1993).
63 (Roniger y Sznajder. 2007).
64 Attorney for the defense of human rights, who was exiled in 1976.
66 Prestigious attorney, who was exiled in 1976.
67 (Wille 2007: 21).
69 (Ganuza, 2008).
70 (Boeninger 1998:335).
71 (NDI, 1989).
72 (1986).