Evaluating External Influence on Democratic Development: Transition

Amichai Magen
Stanford University

Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Paper prepared for CDDRL’s Authors Workshop “Evaluating International Influences on Democratic Development” on March 5-6, 2009.

Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
Encina Hall
Stanford, CA 94305
Phone: 650-724-7197
Fax: 650-724-2996
http://cddrl.stanford.edu/

About the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)

CDDRL was founded by a generous grant from the Bill and Flora Hewlett Foundation in October in 2002 as part of the Stanford Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. The Center supports analytic studies, policy relevant research, training and outreach activities to assist developing countries in the design and implementation of policies to foster growth, democracy, and the rule of law.
EVALUATING EXTERNAL INFLUENCE ON DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT: TRANSITION

Amichai Magen

CONCEPTUALIZING DEMOCRACY

While political theorists have classified different forms of government and debated the nature of democracy since the days of Herodotus, contemporary conceptions diverge along two main, and related axes:

The first, as Diamond observed, is on “the range and extent of political properties encompassed by democracy” (Diamond 1999: 8). Rejecting classical definitions based on the source of political authority or the purpose served by government, Joseph Schumpeter’s influential 1942 definition advanced a procedural conceptualization whereby democracy: “is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1947: 269).

Schumpeterian, “procedural” (a la Huntington), minimalist, or electoral conceptualizations of democracy emphasize popular sovereignty, with competitive elections for effective power viewed as the essence of democracy. The relative simplicity of regime classification and data collection afforded by minimalist conceptions helps explain their continuing appeal and influence, particularly on quantitative, cross-national indices and other analyses of democracy and democratic change. As Munck and Verkuilen’s evaluation of alternative leading indices of democracy conclude: “Most constructors of indices subscribe to a procedural definition of democracy and thus avoid

the problem of maximalist definitions”, yet this “minimalism has its own problems” (Munck and Verkuilen 2002).²

Critics of the Schumpeterian school bemoan not only the problems of measurement resulting from the sparsity of democratic content in the procedural conception, but also what they see as “the fallacy of electoralism” (Karl 1986: 34) embedded in minimalist definitions. Building on Robert Dahl’s 1971 conception of democracy as Polyarchy, scholars such as Schmitter, Karl, Diamond and O’Donnell assert that in addition to the bare elements of competitive and representative politics, democracy must encompass critical, substantive, non-electoral dimensions, notably civil liberty and the rule of law.³ In reality, as Mandelbaum recently put it: “What the world of the twenty-first century calls democracy is in fact a fusion of two distinct political traditions. One is liberty – that is, individual freedom. The other is popular sovereignty: rule by the people.” (Mandelbaum 2007: 121) To this duo we might add a third essential element, namely the rule of law (or, more accurately, a constitutional order) which ensures a degree of political equality, prevents the arbitrary use of might, safeguards stability by providing rules for the peaceful transfer of power, and generates ongoing civic involvement beyond periodic elections.

The second main axis along which conceptions of democracy diverge today concerns the question of whether to treat democracy and nondemocracy as a dichotomous or continuous variable. Favoring a dichotomous approach, Sartori has argued that treating the distinction between democracy and nondemocracy in terms of gradations represents an analytically “stultifying” exercise in “degreeism” (Sartori 1987: 184). Similarly, in a series of studies, Alvarez, Przeworski, Cheibub and Limongi – following the example of other prominent scholars, including Linz and Huntington – insist on a dichotomous conceptualization, and castigate as “ludicrous” the notion of conceiving gradations in democracy for the purpose of conceptualization and measurement.⁴ As Elkin (2000) observes, Alvarez, Przeworski and collaborators advance two separate arguments in defense of the dichotomous view. Their “validity claim” is that democracy is first a question of kind before it is one of degree, and that, accordingly, it makes little sense to think of or evaluate the degree of democracy across different kinds of regimes. [“The analogy with the proverbial pregnancy is thus that while democracy can be more or less

---
advanced, one cannot be half-democratic: there is a natural zero point.” And second, their “reliability claim” is that dichotomous measures are preferable since they contain fewer measurement errors compared with graded measures. “In sum, they argue that efforts to look for traces of democracy in “nondemocracies” are both invalid and excessively error-prone.” (Elkin 2000: 294)

Scholars such as Dahl (1971), Bollen (1980; 1993), Bollen and Jackman (1989), Bollen and Paxton (2000) and Coppedage and Reinicke (1990), on the other hand, incorporate a gradational, continuous definition of democracy (Collier and Adcock 1999). At its most forceful, the gradational conceptualization contends, as Bollen and Jackman do, that “democracy is always a matter of degree” and that dichotomous distinctions between democratic and nondemocratic regimes are difficult to justify, since the resulting measures fail to capture “the inherently continuous nature of the concept of political democracy” (Bollen and Jackman 1989: 612 and 617). As such, Bollen asserts, we “unnecessarily compromise the concept by considering it as a dichotomous phenomenon” (Bollen 1990:19). The choice of a dichotomous conceptualization, they assert, in other words, lumps together regimes characterized by very different degrees of democratic development, blurs interesting distinctions between borderline cases, and ignores finer-grained information that would otherwise be available to analyze regime types. So, although alternative dichotomous and graded measures of democracy are strongly correlated with one another (Alvarez et al. 1996: 21), Elkins (1999) demonstrates that in examining the impact of regime type on the initiation of war or political stability, graded measures reveal important incremental effects that would go undetected with a dichotomous measure (Collier and Adcock 1999: 538).

THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY: TRIUMPH AND TREPIDATION

The relevance of the two axes of debate concerning the conceptualization of democracy – procedural versus substantive and dichotomous versus gradational – has increased over the last two decades, as the phenomenon of democracy itself has become more differentiated with the growing number of democratizations around the globe. At the onset of the “third wave” of democratization in 1974 – marked by the Portuguese Revolução dos Cravos which overthrew the longest standing dictatorship in Southern Europe – the number of electoral democracies in the world stood at a mere 39. As the third wave of global democratization gathered pace – spreading to the remainder of Southern Europe (Spain and Greece), then to Latin America, to a number of countries in Asia, Africa and, with the collapse of Soviet Communism beginning in 1989, to Central and Eastern Europe – the number of democracies in the world tripled, reaching 122 at the end of 2005 (Freedom House 2006). By the mid 1990s, over five dozen democracies were created or restored, and the percentage of democratic states in the world had increased from 27% in 1974 to over 60% - making democracy the dominant form of government (Diamond 2005). At the end of 2006, out of 193 independent countries surveyed by Freedom House, 123 ranked as electoral democracies (Freedom House 2006). For the first time in human history, democracy had become not only a universal

---

5 Mike Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limogni, and Adam Przeworski, *Classifying Political Regimes*, at 21.
aspiration, but the predominant form of government in the world (Gershman 2005; McFaul 2004).

Yet this sanguine picture has been seriously marred by another, potent trend in global regime development. Since the beginning of the third wave, but particularly in its later period in the 1990s, we have been witnessing the proliferation of so called “hybrid regimes” – i.e. states that fulfill the minimal conditions of electoral democracy (namely that all its principal positions of political power are decided by regular, meaningful, free and fair elections) but lack, or are seriously deficient in, essential attributes of substantive, liberal democracy, which encompasses “not only democratic elections but solid protection of civil liberties under a strong rule-of-law” (Diamond 2002: 25). Whereas in 1974 there were only 39 democracies in the world, all 39 of them ranked as “free” states by the Freedom House Index, by 2003 out of 117 electoral democracies in the world, only 88 qualified as “free” – approximately two thirds.6

The sharp rise in the number of electoral democracies, coupled with the unprecedented growth in the number of states which are neither fully democratic nor conventionally authoritarian, has precipitated important developments in the study of democracy and democratization. Summarizing a vast body of literature, Croissant and Merkel (2004: 1) observe that:

“While the ‘transitologists’ of the 1970s and 1980s investigated the conditions and modes of transition from dictatorship to democracy, the ‘consolidologists’ of the 1990s concentrated on inquiring into causes, conditions and models of the consolidation of young democracies. Most recently, the questions of whether democracy is working, how ‘good’ or ‘bad’ a democracy is, and of the conceptual issue of diminished sub-types of democracy (illiberal democracies, defective democracies and so on) have begun to become the new predominant trend in democracy theory and democratization studies.”

Owing to the changing empirical reality we can, in fact, identify three main sets of recent intellectual developments.

First, the opening of a broad (and possibly growing) spectrum of regime types between consolidated, high-quality liberal democracy and closed authoritarian regimes, has made a dichotomous view of democracy less analytically compelling, and has heightened the appeal of viewing democracy as a spectrum, with a range of variation in degree and form (Diamond 1996: 53).

The second development has been the definition of sub-categories of regimes along the democratic-nondemocratic continuum, and the emergence of a vociferous struggle to classify regimes situated at the middle of the continuum. Diamond (2002), for example, identifies six “regime types” categories: (1) Liberal Democracy; (2) Electoral Democracy; (3) Ambiguous Regimes; (4) Competitive Authoritarian; (5) Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarian; and (6) Politically Closed Authoritarian.

In terms of classifying mid-spectrum regimes, as Schedler (2006) observes, scholars have thus far adopted three alternative approaches, categorizing them as either defective democracies (described variably as “illiberal”, “delegative”, “clientelist” or

---

6 “Free” states are ones that score 2.5 or better on the Freedom House scale.
simply as “democracies with adjectives”); hybrid regimes (or “pseudo-democracy”, “semi-democracy”, “semi-authoritarian or “the gray zone” entities); or, more strictly and pessimistically, as new species of non-democratic governance (“disguised dictatorship”, “electoral authoritarianism”, or “competitive authoritarianism” or “democracy as deception”).

And thirdly, the fact that an unprecedented number of countries in the world possess the form of electoral democracy but lack, or are seriously deficient, in democratic substance, is drawing attention as never before to questions about the quality of democracy (Altman and Perez-Linan 2002; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Morlino 2004; O’Donnell et al. 2005), notably its non-electoral dimensions (Diamond and Morlino 2005; O’Donnell 1999).

Against the background of these empirical and intellectual developments, conceptualizing democracy as a dichotomous phenomenon and democratization as a short interlude between two types of stable regimes is now clearly unsatisfactory. Rather, processes of democratization are best conceptualized in terms of four main categories of democratic development, of which only transition can be said to be a dichotomous phenomenon in the sense that it entails the interval between one political regime and another (Schneider and Schmitter 2004). The remainder three categories: democratic state-building, liberalization of autocracy, and consolidation of liberal democracy, all involve multi-dimensional, open-ended, continuous processes best conceptualized as a matter of degree.

DEMOCRATIZATION: EXPLAINING TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC RULE

The explosion in the number of democratic transitions in the last three decades has been greeted by social scientists, as Geddes put it: “with delight, intense attention, and theoretical puzzlement” (Geddes 1999: 117). Indeed, despite a number of “wavelets” of almost simultaneous regime change in different regions of the world resulting in both

democracy and new forms of authoritarianism (first in Southern Europe, then Latin America, parts of Asia and Africa, and the post-Communist world) – circumstances which provide an almost laboratory like set of conditions for theory development and empirical testing of causal patterns of transition to democracy – democratization theory remains woefully fragmented and underdeveloped (McFaul 2002).

Without denying important internal variations and distinctions, two broad approaches have framed analyses of transitions to democracy:

The socio-economic requisites, or “structuralist” approach, which dominated theorizing about regime outcomes in the 1960s, has remained influential throughout the past four decades, and is recently enjoying a degree of resurgence, essentially views democratization as most likely to take place where certain socio-economic – Capitalism (Schumpeter 1957), economic and social modernization (Huntington 1968; Lipset 1959; O’Donnell 1979; Przeworski and Limongi 1997), bourgeois society (Moore 1966), the working class and relative class power (Therborn 1977; 1979; Rueschemeyer, Stevens and Stevens 1992) – or cultural and religious factors (Huntington 1991; Inglehart 1988; Kalyvas 2000; Lipset 1994; Muller and Seligson 1994; Putnam 1993) are met.

Strongly influenced by modernization theory (Lerner 1958; Rustow 1960; Apter 1965) the notion that there exists a positive relationship between a society’s level of economic development and its likelihood to be a democracy was intuited for millennia (Rowen 1995: 52) but first explicitly articulated by Lipset in 1959, and is now one of the few general and uncontroversial facts to have emerged from the study of transition to democracy. Socio-economic development (as measured by per capita income levels or the UN’s Human Development Index) makes transition to democracy more likely (Boix and Stokes 2003; Geddes 1999; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Rowen 1995). At the high end of the economic development scale the relationship is axiomatic and although the correlation between dictatorship and low levels of development has weakened in the last decade (i.e. we observe a growing number of poor countries that are democracies) more development strongly increases the probability of a transition to democracy (Boix and Stokes 2003: 531). The same association holds for the relationship between economic development and levels of freedom as measured by Freedom House (Rowen 1995).

Moreover, economic development is powerfully beneficial to the survival of democracy once initial transition has taken place. The poorer the country, the greater likelihood of reversion to authoritarianism in any given year, yet once a certain level of development is reached ($9300 per capita income in 2004 purchasing power parity U.S. dollars) the probability of authoritarian intervention drops dramatically and the survivability of democracy appears virtually assured (Przeworski et al. 2000).  

---

8 Using a data set covering the period 1850 to 1990, Boix and Stokes demonstrate that although more development always increases the probability that a transition to democracy will occur, the rate at which development increases the probability of transition diminishes with income growth. Thus, in low (below $3000) and medium (between $3000 and $6000) income countries the probability of a transition to democracy grows by approximately 2% for each $1,000 increase in per capita income, while for high ($6000) levels of development the probability of transition still increases, but only by 0.5% for each additional $1,000.

9 Larry Diamond points out that as well as there being no cases of democratic breakdown for states above this level of per capita income during the four-decade period of study of the Przeworski et al. study (1950-1990), no one ever has in the subsequent period. The two wealthiest cases of democratic breakdown were Russia in 2000 ($8,600) and Thailand in 2005, where it was approximately the same (Larry Diamond,
The Causal explanations for the relationship between development and transition are more contested. One group of transitions – including Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Spain, and Taiwan – appear to have been powerfully aided by the success of the authoritarian regime in producing economic growth. In particular, economic development accompanied by greater equality in distribution of wealth seems to increase both the likelihood of transition to democracy and subsequently its survival (Boix 2002). According to Diamond, economic development drives, or at least greatly facilitates democratization, in two main ways: first, by transforming the social and economic structure of the country, it shifts power from the state to society, dispersing power to a much wider set of societal actors, making it difficult for one man, one junta, one party or any other small elite to sustain monopolistic power. And second, by generating urbanization, better education, more and freer information, economic development “profoundly shifts attitudes and values in a democratic direction” towards greater tolerance of differences, trust, belief in one’s ability to shape political reality, and the value placed on freedom (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

On the other hand, poor economic performance increases the likelihood of breakdown of authoritarian regimes (Bermeo 1990; Diamond and Linz 1989; Przeworski and Limongi 1997), with sudden economic crisis particularly deleterious to authoritarian regime stability and survival (Haggard and Kaufmann 1995: 45-74). A similar structural-crisis thesis is made by Way (2006) who contends that state weakness promotes authoritarian failure by strengthening electoral competition.

The second major approach to the study of transitions to democracy – emerging in the late 1970s and 80s from a different analytic tradition and partially in opposition to structuralist perspectives – is an agency-based, actor-focused approach. Unlike structuralist studies, agency-based explanations have tended to concern themselves more specifically with the precipitants and causes of transition to political democracy, rather than with longer-term societal change. Accordingly, perhaps, some of the more controversial propositions and outright debate regarding the causes of democratization have unfolded over the last two decades within this tradition itself. Indeed, under the broad umbrella of the agency-based approach we can identify two main distinct generations of theoretical development, corresponding roughly to the “third” and “fourth” waves of democratizations (McFaul 2002); with the latter defined at least partially as a rebellion against the former (Berins Collier 1999: 4-14; Carothers 2002; Bunce 2003).

In their underlying concerns and assumptions, conceptual choices and analytic methods, two seminal exposés – Linz and Stepan’s 1978 collection The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, and O’Donnell and Schmitter’s 1986 Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies – have laid the foundations for the enormous, first generation, “transitology literature” of the 1980s and

“Chapter 4: Domestic Drivers” in Larry Diamond, forthcoming, note 30). An important précising of Przeworski et al.’s thesis is Boix and Stokes finding that whereas the probability of democratic breakdowns declines rapidly as income goes up at the low (below $3000) and medium ($3000-$6000) levels of development, the marginal impact of additional wealth at high levels of development (above $6000) is light (Boix and Stokes 2003: 533).

10 Larry Diamond, “Chapter 4: Domestic Drivers” in Larry Diamond, forthcoming, at 18.
much of the 1990s. Aggregating the essential set of claims advanced by this literature yields a number of claims on the causes of transition to democracy:

One of the most widely accepted insights of the transitology literature has been the notion that the first phase towards democratic transition occurs with a split within the authoritarian regime. Basing their analysis on a number of Southern European and Latin American cases, O'Donnell and Schmitter asserted emphatically that: “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself” typically “between hard-liners and soft liners.” (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 19). According to this hypothesis – backed by evidence from the transitions in Latin America, Greece, Spain, but also several Asian and African countries (Diamond 2007: 6) – the first step in what eventually becomes transition to democracy is the division of the authoritarian elite into factions over internal or popular protest and the question of how to achieve the legitimation of the authoritarian regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 19-20).

Departing from what they saw as the overly deterministic, pessimistic bent of structural explanations, secondly, transitologists emphasized the key role of free choice, decision-making, strategic calculation and signaling on the part of both incumbent and opposition elites (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Linz 1990; Higley and Burton 1989; 2006; Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992). Although neither Linz and Stepan nor, subsequently, O'Donnell and Schmitter rejected structural variables entirely, they did perceive these to have been accorded too much explanatory weight in earlier theorists. O'Donnell and Schmitter made this explicit, emphasizing “the structural indeterminacy” (1986; 19) of transitions to democracy and arguing emphatically that “elite dispositions, calculations and pacts...largely determine whether or not an opening will occur at all” (1986; 48). In a similar spirit, Di Palma (1990) asserted that “democratization is ultimately a matter of political crafting” (1990: 8), whereas Burton, Gunther and Higley found that in the final analysis “a central conclusion of these studies [Southern Europe and Latin America] is the great responsibility of national elites for achieving, or failing to achieve, the degree of consensus and unity necessary for the establishment and consolidation of democracy.” (1992: 342)

A third feature of the transitology literature has been the notion of a top-down sequence of democratization, driven by elite choices. Following the initial internal rift in the authoritarian regime, transitologists asserted, a liberalization process was typically initiated by the ruling elite itself in an attempt to stave off loss of power – easing repression in order to strengthen legitimation. Such liberalization, transitologists contended, opened up new political space for organized elite opposition groups, and produces a slippery slope dynamic which eventually carries political reforms further than incumbents had originally intended. In this theoretical orientation, little or no role is accorded to societal involvement, norms, ideology or beliefs (Berins Collier 1999; McFaul 2002. “Democracy without democrats” is achieved as the outcome of a cooperative settlement between elite constituencies.

In the sequential, strategic “transition game” posited by transitologists, uncertainly about political outcomes plays an important role in influencing the mode of regime change. Since incumbents and oppositionists are presumed to possess roughly equal power, and neither incumbent nor opposition elites are certain they could impose their respective first choice preferences – retention of monopolistic power or outright
overthrow of the existing order – on the other side, incumbents and oppositionists opt to negotiate power-sharing arrangements as the second-best political outcome. This “pacted” nature of transition has been carefully documented feature of Southern European and Latin American transitions (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Karl 1990; Di Palma 1990; Linz 1990; Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992) as well as in the case of South Africa in 1994.

In sum, the transitologist’s attention to agency, strategic action and rational-choice calculations, small group alliances and rivalries, elite signaling and judgments – both wise and blundering – opened up a series of questions essential to the study of the finer-grained, more immediate precipitants of causes and modes of democratization, notably: Under what conditions will authoritarian leadership fracture and factions within it move in a consciously, or unconsciously, democratic direction? How do opposition leaders identify and exploit weaknesses within the ancien regime? And how do incumbents and opposition forces bargain for new rules of the game?

Two additional points are noteworthy here. The first is the fact that the two traditions have not remained entirely separated in the academic literature. Several recent studies have drawn upon both structuralist, relative-class-power factors (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992), and actor-centric bargaining explanations, in an attempt to account for transitions. Revisiting late 19th and early 20th century democratizations in Europe, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000; 2005) view transition to democracy through extension of the franchise to the working class as an act signaling elite commitment to future distribution; an elite decision motivated by the threat of revolution. Without democratization, Acemoglu and Robinson argue, the promise of elites to redistribute resources in the future, while retaining political power, would not have been credible. Transition, according to this theory, is an outcome of strategic elite concessions underlined by a shifting balance of power between dominant and subordinate groups in society.

And second, the transitology literature of the 1980s has had an enormously influential role in shaping not only theory, but policy. Confronting the early and mid stages of the “third wave” of democratization, the nascent democracy-promotion community in the United States and, to a lesser but still significant degree Europe: “rapidly embraced an analytic model of democratic transition...derived principally from their own interpretation of the patterns of democratic change taking place, but also to a lesser extent from the early works of the emergent academic field of “transitology”...” (Carothers 2002: 6). The fact that the democracy-promotion community’s formative years took place in temporal parallel to the heyday of transitologist explanations, in other words, has served to both mould policy in critical respects and at the same time bolster the perceived theoretical validity, including the assumed generalizability, of the transitology framework.

While acquiring a dominant – perhaps even hegemonic – status in theoretical and policy accounts in the late 1980s and 1990s, the transitologists’ state-centric, elite-driven, strategic bargaining explanations have, over the last several years in particular, faced growing empirical and theoretical challenge. This has come largely from within the agency-based approach, and in response to scholar’s observation of a substantial number

---

11 On the origins and evolution of these communities see in particular: Smith (1994); Carothers (1999; 2004; 2006); Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi (2000); Youngs (2001; 2004).
of democratizations around the globe which appeared to be unfolding in a manner inconsistent with earlier explanatory models (Carothers 2002; McFaul 2002; Bunce 2003).

Regarding the conventional axioms of an initial internal rift within the authoritarian regime, and the emergence of incumbent-opposition pacts, Bratton and van de Walle’s forty-two country study found little evidence of this dynamic in Africa. Instead, they argue “transitions in Africa seem to be occurring more commonly from below...rulers are driven by calculations of personal political survival: They resist political openings for as long as possible.” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 83). The democratizations which emerged from the collapse of the Soviet bloc, similarly, could not generally be traced to a rift within the ancien regime, nor were these transitions generally “pacted” (Geddes 1999; Carothers 2002; McFaul 2002; Bunce 2003). Opposition leaders in Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and the like rejected Spanish and Latin style compromises, preferring: “an immediate and sharp break with the authoritarian past.” (Bunce 2003: 174). Moreover, as McFaul (2002) argues, the transitologists’ assumption of a rough equality of power distribution between incumbent and opposition elites, proved to be wrong, at least in the case of postcommunist transitions. Where the ideological balance of power was strongly in favor of democrats, democracy emerged, regardless of the wishes of the old guard. Where autocrats remained ideologically powerful, transition failed, whereas mixed cases, where power was roughly balanced, did not produce “pacted” transitions but rather “protracted confrontation” resulting in lingering, gray-zone regimes of “unconsolidated, unstable partial democracies and autocracies.” (McFaul 2002: 214)

More fundamentally still, the transitologists’ elite-driven explanations have come under attack for unduly emphasizing certain kinds of actors to the exclusion of others, particularly to assigning too little a role to popular mobilization as a cause of democratization. Berins Collier puts this critique nicely in asserting that the O’Donnell and Schmitter led “dominant framework” of theoretical and comparative accounts in the 1980s and much of the 90s: “has tended to privilege certain kinds of actors: individual elites rather than collective actors, strategically defined actors rather than class-defined actors, and state actors more than societal actors.” (Berins Collier 1999: 8 emphasis in the original).

Indeed, for Berins Collier, the preeminence of the transitologists’ framework has had a pernicious impact on our underlying assumptions and questions regarding processes of democratization: “When this framework became genemonic, it became not just a framework for posing a particular question, but implicitly, at least, a kind of substantive assertion that sees democratization in terms of the dominant role of elite strategic action.” (1999: 8). In a challenge to this core assumption, Bratton and van de Walle contend that popular protest was pivotal in persuading elites to initiate a transition to democracy in several African cases (Bratton and van de Walle 1997), whereas Bermeo (1997) and Berins Collier and Mahoney (1997) posit that popular mobilization accelerated the slippery slope of transition by pushing ruling elites to liberalize faster and farther than they initially intended. Going further in attributing a causal role to mass protests, Bunce argues that in virtually all the post-communist transitions in Central and
Eastern Europe: “The transition to democracy ...began with mass protests.” (2003: 172).12

Apart from their tendency to screen out international dimensions of democratization (on which more shortly) existing structuralist and agency-based theories of transition have been afflicted, to varying degrees, by three main sets of weaknesses:

First, all were prompted by, and have been rooted in, the empirical experiences of a relatively small, often geographically clustered set of cases. Modernization and historical-sociological explanations have typically examined, and based their explanatory models upon, the experience of Western Europe and its colonies (Moore 1966; Therborn 1977; 1979; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992; Berman 2001; Greif 2006), while the “third wave” transitologist literature has been heavily influenced by the dynamics of transition in Southern Europe and Latin America, and the “fourth wave” literature – critical of the transitologists’ parochialism – has been predominantly motivated and informed by transitions in the postcommunist world; most recently Serbia (2000) and the “colored revolutions” (successful or failed) in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005). Yet even if we put aside the first (1828-1926) and second (1943-62) waves of democratization (Huntington 1991: 16), limiting our analysis to the narrow slice of history marked by the launch of the third wave in 1974 onwards, we can identify at least seven trends in seven different regions of the world where “wavelets” of transitions have either taken place or shown real potential for doing so (Carothers 2002: 5).13 Variations in the patterns, sequences, pace (and perhaps causes) of these trends clearly provide rich opportunities for comparative analysis. Still, the staggering broadening of the geographical experience of democratization has hardly been matched by a concurrent broadening of comparative study. Global indices on the presence or absence of democracy have certainly proliferated (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Ardnt and Oman 2006), but the “geography of the conversation” on the causes of transition, to borrow Bunce’s phrase (2003: 169), has remained bounded. With it, the parochialism of democratization theory continues to hamper social science’s quest for more generalizable insights.

The intellectual development of consecutive theories of transition, moreover, has so far largely unfolded around a specific set of assumptions and questions posed by members of small research communities at different times, and in deliberate response to earlier explanations. In articulating their actor-centric, rational-choice arguments about

---

12 According to Bunce political protests performed a number of important functions in this context: “They signaled the breakdown of the authoritarian order; created a widespread sense that there were alternatives to that order; pushed authoritarian leaders (and sometimes even leaders of the opposition, as with Walensa in Poland) to the bargaining table; created (and sometimes restored) a large opposition united by its rejection of the incumbent regime; and gave opposition leaders a resource advantage when bargaining with authoritarian elites. Finally, mass mobilization created a mandate for radical change that subsequently translated into a large victory for the democratic forces in the first competitive elections and, following that, led to the introduction of far-reaching economic and political reforms.” (Bunce 2003: 172).

13 Thomas Carothers classifies these as: “1) the fall of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s; 2) the replacement of military dictatorships by elected civilian governments across Latin America from the late 1970s through the late 1980s; 3) the decline of authoritarian rule in parts of East and South Asia starting in the mid-1980s; 4) the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s; 5) the breakup of the Soviet Union and the establishment of 15 post-Soviet republics in 1991; 6) the decline of one-party regimes in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa in the first half of the 1990s; and 7) a weak but recognizable trend in some Middle Eastern countries in the 1990s.” (Carothers 2002: 5)
bargained, pacted democratizations, for instance, the transitologists of the late 1970s and 80s eagerly adopted “a normative imperative of possibilism” (Berins Collier 1999: 6) which was motivated not only by the exhilaration of what they were observing in Southern Europe and Latin America – regions of the world to which many of the leading transitologists were passionately attached as citizens or longstanding regional experts – but also in an active effort to escape what they perceived to be the overdetermined pessimism of the dominant structuralist explanations of the 1960s. Similarly, from the late 1990s onwards, “fourth wave” scholars have tended to formulate their research concerns, questions and explanatory arguments about the causes of democratization in terms of an explicit and direct challenge to earlier agency-based explanations. What is missing from the field, therefore, is an integrated, testable theoretical framework which takes into account the range of theoretical insights from the spectrum of structuralist and agency-based perspectives, in a non temporal non region-specific context.

A second problem afflicting existing explanations stems from the fact that contrasting accounts of democratization have not been careful to distinguish between different antecedent regimes. As Geddes observes, one of the main reasons for the theoretical intractability of regime transition explanations has been that while: “different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy” few scholars have been systematic in considering “how characteristics of dictatorships affect transition.” (Geddes 1999: 121). Hence, the presence or absence of particular elite groups or dynamic in the antecedent government, state, or political culture more broadly, may contribute to illuminating differences in intercountry or interregional patterns of democratization. Whereas in Southern Europe, Turkey and Latin America the military has had a long history of intervention, for example, in much of the postcommunist world there exists a long tradition of civilian control of the military (Bunce 2003: 175).

Geddes distinguishes between personalist, military, single party, and amalgams of these “pure types” pre-transition regimes (1999: 121). Yet, as Berins Collier asserts, the nature of nondemocracy preceding transition in different regions of the world, and at different historical epochs, runs deeper than the form of government preceding regime change. Late 19th and early 20th century transitions to democracy typically involved “the politics of incremental inclusion” (Berins Collier 1999: 13) – where the final extension of mass suffrage to the working class has been preceded by an incremental (sometimes centuries long) process of development of the remainder components of a democratic regime. In contrast, transition to democracy in Southern Europe and Latin America in the latter half of the 20th century involved substantially different changes. There, the principle of universal suffrage as a sine qua non of democracy has long been established, yet “the antecedent regimes were not restricted democracies but outright authoritarian regimes or autocracies. With virtually all the components of a democratic regime lacking, democratization and the recovery of political rights affected virtually all groups in civil society…” (Berins Collier 1999: 13).

A related problem imbued in existing explanations is their implicit assumption of a reasonably functioning state. It is perhaps because modern political theory takes the sovereign state for granted as its foundational idea and starting point that modern studies in democracy often skim over the empirical contingency and normative necessity of democracy’s connection with the state (Linz and Stepan 1996: 16-37; Goodhart 2007: 572-5). The existence of stateness is implicitly and unquestionably assumed in the vast
majority of the democracy literature, whereas in reality, as Carothers points out, both scholars and democracy aid practitioners have seriously underestimated the challenge of the nonfunctional state for processes of democratization (Carothers 2002: 9).

Finally here, a third weakness to have inhibited the development of democratization theory over the past two decades in particular has been one of intellectual, or disciplinary scope. Whereas structuralist inquiries in the 1960s and their progeny did draw upon a range of disciplines – dependency theory, sociological and historical institutionalism, cultural, ethnicity and religious studies among others – the extraordinary proliferation of minimally democratic countries during the period of the third wave helped bury “old, deterministic, and often culturally noxious assumptions about democracy” (Carothers 2002: 8). Instead, the dominant agency-based perspectives of the last two decades have been heavily driven by political comparativists and regional experts, first in Southern Europe and Latin America, and later in the postcommunist world and, to a lesser extent parts of Africa and East Asia. Often unfamiliar or uncomfortable with a range of theoretical and methodological insights beyond their field, comparativists have tended to screen out the inquiries and tools of peer disciplines. Thus, for instance, until very recently development studies and democratic development studies have largely been pursued by parallel academic and policy communities, with little interdisciplinary communication; an artificial separation imposed partly by the main multilateral development institution’s formal mandate which prohibited their involvement in domestic politics. Similarly, as Dimitrova observes, even in the case of postcommunist democratizations in Central and Eastern Europe, democratization theory and regional integration studies have for much of the past two decades tended to: “not only pass each other as ships in the night, but... rarely even sail in the same sea” (Dimitrova 2002: 174).

**EXTERNAL INFLUENCE ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS**

Although contemporary scholarship is now well beyond the point where the external dimensions of democratization (international, supranational and transnational) can be accurately described as the “forgotten dimension” (Pridham 1991: 18; Burnell and Calvert 2005), it is nonetheless important to recall why they have been neglected for so long, and to acknowledge just how underdeveloped and fragmented our existing understanding of the role of external factors, and in particular the causal relationships of external-internal interactions, actually is.

That external variables have been edited out of explanatory models of transition throughout much of the past three decades can be attributed partially to the empirical reality and partially to the intellectual environment within which democracy scholars were operating during the third wave. Empirically, as Whitehead aptly observes:

“Twenty years ago democratic transitions were infrequent and their outcomes were uncertain. In a bi-polar world the two dominant blocs generally promoted loyal protégés, and discouraged the security risks associated with democratic experimentation. Political democratization also raised anxieties about the stability of economic arrangements...So democratization was plausibly viewed as an uncertain undertaking, one that would have to be internally driven, one that was potentially
counterhegemonic and therefore most likely to succeed when domestic strategic interactions favoured agreement, and when external destabilizing pressures could be minimized. The relevant unit of analysis was thus the individual state (or national political regime), and attention was focused on those states that possessed sufficient internal autonomy to screen out international intrusions.” (Whitehead 2004: 135)

This empirical reality has clearly been radically transformed in the past two decades. The end of bipolarity was not only followed by a meteoric increase in the number and geographic distribution of democracies around the globe – making democracy the norm rather than the exception – it also eliminated a chief ideological rationale for tolerating authoritarian regimes, and made democracy the sole internationally legitimate form of government (McFaul 2004; Gershman 2005; Magen and McFaul 2007). At the same time, the rise of democracy and the aftermaths of the Cold War and the September 11th attacks on the United States have helped produce “an explosion of international political and economic incentives for states to qualify as democracies” (Whitehead 2004: 136); incentives increasingly institutionalized in the practices of international organizations (Magen 2006; 2007) and codified in international law (Franck 1992; Fox and Roth 2000). Norms of non-intervention in internal affairs have greatly eroded (McFaul 2004; Magen and McFaul 2007), international elections monitoring has become ubiquitous (Santa-Cruz 2005), and more international actors – states, regional and global organizations, NGO’s and activist networks – now wield more resources for democracy promotion and deploy more intrusive instruments of socialization and conditionality than ever before. If background conditions have changed so fundamentally compared with the 1980s, then “it is hardly surprising if analytical models developed for an earlier era require far reaching rapid development” (Whitehead 2004: 136).

The explanatory models which dominated the 1980s and much of the 90s were not only based on an international empirical reality that has been radically altered, but on the transitologists’ particular set of intellectual preoccupations which involved, inter alia, the repudiation of certain international factors.14 Rebelling against dependency theory – which saw the political economy of the international system as largely retarding, rather than enabling domestic development – O’Donnell and Schmitter made an express point of underplaying international factors, asserting that it is “fruitless to search for some international factor or context which can reliably compel authoritarian rulers to experiment with liberalization, much less which can predictably cause their regimes to collapse” (1986: 18) and concluding emphatically that: “domestic factors play a predominant role in the transition” (1986: 19). For the transitologists, emphasizing domestic elite decision-making and strategic choice, in other words, meant deemphasizing international political economy conditions; conditions which they largely

14 It is noteworthy that O’Donnell and Schmitter did not all forms of external intervention as being relevant to democratic transition. Indeed the authors concluded that “the most frequent context within which a transition from authoritarian rule has begun in recent decades has been military defeat in an international conflict. Moreover, the factor which most probabilistically assured a democratic outcome to the transition was occupation by a foreign power which was itself a political democracy.” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 17-18).
saw as constraining democratization in developing countries, and therefore contrary to
the blossoming of democracy unfolding around them in the 1970s and 80s (Bermeo 1990:
361; Whitehead 2004: 139).

While some political comparativists continue to examine processes of political,
institutional and legal reform at the national and sub-national levels isolation from the
broader international environment (Elster et al. 1998; Geddes 1999), since the early to
mid 1990s growing attention has been placed on the tasks of identifying, conceptualizing
and, most recently, evaluating the role of external factors in domestic democratic
development.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, given the role of regional institutions in post-
communist Europe, the most advanced theorizing and assessments of external-internal
dynamics has been undertaken in the context of the Central and Eastern European
countries process of EU (and to a lesser degree NATO) accession (Linden 2002;
Pridham, Herring and Sanford 1994; Pridham 2005; Sadurski, Czarnota and Krygier
2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Whitehead 2001; Zielonka 2001). Yet even
here, the literature on the international dimensions of democratization in post-communist
Europe remains largely confined to accession states, is concerned with consolidation
rather than transition, often neglects broader external incentives, constraints, examples
and transmission mechanisms, and offers no integrated theory on the international aspects
of democratization (Magen and Morlino 2008). Pridham (1994: 3-31) proposes a three-
prong breakdown of international factors: background “situational variables”, external
actors, and different forms of external influence. The most generalizable efforts to
conceptualize external influence on domestic change undertaken in the European context
are found in Whiteheads’ three international dimensions of democratization (contagion,
consent and intervention) which make up his notion of “democratization through
convergence” with a pre-existing liberal, democratic community (Whitehead 2001: 3-25),
and Kubicek who identifies four possible modes of external influence: control, contagion,
convergence and conditionality (Kubicek 2003: 4-8). Other studies into “democratization
through Europeanization” remain specifically focused on understanding the domestic and
external conditions that best facilitate the transfer of rules, institutions and norms from
the EU to national systems (Magen 2007; Pridham 2005; Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2005; Grabbe 2006).

More broadly, democracy scholars have began to posit that membership in
international organizations (Pevehouse 2005), geographic proximity to leading
democracies (Kopstein and Reilly 2000) or other forms of political, economic,
technological and cultural “linkage and leverage” to the West (Levitsky and Way 2005)
helps encourage the development of democracy, though contagion or diffusion (Starr
1991; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Lankina and Getachew 2006). As Levitsky and Way
assert, there exist at least five dimensions of such linkages: (1) economic ties, which
includes trade, credit, investment and assistance; (2) geopolitical ties, which include
membership in or other forms of association with regional or global governance
institutions and alliances; (3) social linkage, including migration, diaspora communities,
technical and professional epistemic communities and elite education; (4) communication
linkage, including cross-border telecommunications and media; and (5) transnational civil
society ties, including involvement with international NGO’s, multilateral corporations,
social entrepreneurship organizations, party foundations, bar associations, and churches.
In addition, the liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist shift in international relations theory, as well as the growing preoccupation of international lawyers with domestic governance structures, have drawn increasing attention to the potential role of international and transnational factors such as vertical and horizontal governmental, informational and activist networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Slaughter 2004; Thomas 2001), international norm diffusion (Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink 1999), world scripts, emulation (Meyer 1997) and international democratic socialization (Checkel 2005).

However, beyond flagging the role of international variables in promoting or inhibiting democratic change, and positing broad and often unspecified methods of potential external influence (coercion, conditionality, convergence, diffusion) democratization studies still lack core theories and, a fortiori, empirical evidence on the precise mechanisms and pathways of influence linking external factors with domestic causes, whether structural or actor based. There is a growing recognition of the need, in other words, for the literature to move beyond generalizations about the international context of democratization, and towards tracing particular sources of external influence, and testing their influences, interactions and consequences for domestic processes leading to transition. In particular, causal links and patterns of interaction between external factors and domestic processes need to be more systematically and precisely traced, and theorized.

Several main gaps in knowledge stand out. First, isolating the effects of external factors requires an a priori assessment of domestic factors in the process of democratic change. The study of international democracy promotion necessitates piercing the domestic-international membrane, opening up the “black box” of the state and developing both theoretical and empirical knowledge on external-internal linkages of democratization. This is an inherently interdisciplinary endeavor, requiring theoretical insights and methodologies drawing on several fields of social science. In practice however, for a variety of historical, intellectual, methodological and institutional reasons, theories of comparative politics, international relations, institutionalism and international law have constructed largely separate, independent and self-contained spheres of inquiry, with distinct actors and research questions.

Just as political comparativists have tended to screen out international factors, international relations theorists and international lawyers concentrate on international outcomes and have been under-prepared to research causal linkages between international agents and domestic actors. Researching external dimensions of democratization, moreover, must involve the insights of both academics and practitioners. Yet the separation between the two worlds remains profound. In attempting to explain exogenous influences on domestic political developments, academics have tended to gravitate towards history (often going back several centuries) (Moore 166; Tilly 1975, 1990; Greif 2005; 2006) rather than grapple with the messy history of the present. For their part, practitioners borrow few insights from academics, and the two groups are generally “engaged in dissimilar enterprises” (Carothers 1999: 94).

Second, existing literature on the role of international factors has tended to be descriptive (only sometimes critically so) and to focus on the motivations, strategies and instruments – the “supply side” – of individual national policies, notably those of the United States (Allison and Beschel 1992; Brinkley 1997; Carothers 1999; 2004; 2006;

Accordingly, there is now a voluminous literature on the democracy promotion policies of particular states (typically the U.S. and Western European governments, rather than Australia, Canada or Japan) and international organizations (largely the EU, Council of Europe, OSCE, OAS and UN) but even American and European insights are rarely integrated, and few studies are prepared to look at a range of international actors and processes. Consequently there has been little systematic thinking about the spectrum of forces shaping the international democratic or anti-democratic environment.

Third, as in the case of comparative scholarship on democracy more broadly, studies into the international dimensions of democratization have been afflicted by geographical and temporal fragmentation; circumstances that frustrate the production of generalizable knowledge. While early studies have caught the latter fringes of the third wave of democratizations in Southern Europe and Latin America (Pridham 1991; Pridham, Herring and Sanford 1994; Whitehead 1996), the increasingly evident role of international institutions in the economic and political transformations of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s has meant that the bulk of existing inquiries into the role of international actors has relied on the experiences of the postcommunist world. Most recently attention has shifted to the Middle East. This geographical and temporal fragmentation has left a “patchy” and disconnected set of findings that seriously hinders our ability to draw any sound conclusions about external influences on domestic change across time and place.

A fourth hindrance stems from the fact that, to date, inquiries into the role of international factors have tended to follow cases of successful democratizations, resulting in a degree of selection bias. This is partly a reflection of the political economy of the democracy promotion “industry” (where democracy promotion follows instances of initial domestically generated democratic breakthroughs). Yet a serious analysis of the external influences on internal change cannot focus only on cases of successful democratic breakthroughs, but must heed equal attention to cases where either significant external efforts to encourage transition to democracy produced little effects, or where successful transition to democracy has apparently taken place with virtually no external role. Cases of “failure” in particular, must be included into the analysis to avoid selection bias and to isolate the causal mechanisms that were ultimately necessary for democratic transition as opposed to a crisis in the authoritarian regime or liberalization.

Fifth, just as democracy promoters have tended to adopt a “one size fits all” template to their work (Carothers 1999) evaluators of domestic democratic change tend to implicitly homogenize external influence on domestic reform processes. In reality, however, the same set of independent variables (whether internal or external) may have very different impacts on democratization outcomes, depending on the kind of outcome being analyzed. The composition and relative importance of the independent variables that generate political liberalization in an autocratic regime, for instance, may not be
same as those that trigger a successful transition. Likewise, the factors that cause an electoral breakthrough may be of little relevance to the long-term pouring of democratic content into a nascent democracy, post-transition – the protection of political and civic rights, accountability, responsiveness and effective rule-of-law – necessary for high quality, liberal democracy. Societies seeking to build democratic state institutions in the aftermath of state collapse face a different set of challenges that democratizing regimes with effective states. Since to date there has been little contiguity between scholars of democratic transitions, consolidation and post-conflict state-building, it is less surprising perhaps that we have not yet differentiated between what are in reality radically different contexts and processes of change, and the varying roles of external actors in each category of democratic outcome.

Finally, the strong incentive for multilateral development banks, state aid agencies and other donor organizations, is to document success stories, where the wisdom of investment in aid for democracy can be showcased before budget allocating legislatures and taxpayers reassured that democracy promotion “works”. This is partly a reflection of the political economy of the growing post Cold War, post-9/11 democracy promotion “industry”. Thus, for example, a large cross-national quantitative report on the effects of U.S. foreign assistance on democracy promotion – compiled with the participation of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and published in 2006 – contends that a $10 million (U.S.) invested in USAID democracy assistance between 1990 and 2003 produced, on average, a 0.25 point improvement in the Freedom House score of the recipient state (Finkel et al. 2006). Are these felicitous findings matched by the experience of transitional countries struggling to improve the quality of accountability, clean government, and protection of civil and political rights? Does this aggregate level, quantitative report and others like it – which, by their own account, speak very little about causality or the pathways of connections between external influence and domestic change processes – reflect the reality of post Cold War international actor influence on democratic development? Or does the picture that emerges from a close qualitative examination of external influence on domestic change reveal different insights?
Bibliography


Berman, Sheri, “Modernization in Historical Perspective: The Case of Imperial Germany”, 53/3 *World Politics* (2001): 431-462


Bermeo, Nancy, “Rethinking Regime Change”, 22/3 *Comparative Politics* (1990): 359-77


Bratton, Michael and Nicholas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transition in Comparative Perspective (1997)


Burnell, Peter, “Political Strategies of External Support for Democratization”, 1 Foreign Policy Analysis (2005): 361-384

Burnell, Peter, and Peter Calvert, “Promoting Democracy Abroad”, 12/4 Democratization (2005): 443-438


Carothers, Thomas, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad (2006)


Carothers, Thomas, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (1999)


Dahl, Robert, Polyarchy: Participation and Representation (1971)


Diamond, Larry and Juan Linz, “Introduction: politics, society, and democracy in Latin America”, in ?” in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Martin Lipset eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (1989):


Fox, Gregory and Brad Roth eds., Democratic Governance and International Law (2000)


Geddes, Barbara, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?”, 2 Annual Review of Political Science (1999) 115-44


Goodhart, Michael, “Europe’s Democratic Deficits through the Looking Glass: The European Union as a Challenge for Democracy”, 5/3 Perspectives on Politics (September 2007): 567-584


Greif, Avner, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (2006)


Higley, John and Michael Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracies (2006)


Huntington, Samuel, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (1991)

Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies (1968)

Inglehart, Ronald, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies (1990)


Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (2005)


Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (1998)


Latham, Michael E. Modernization as ideology: American social science and "nation building" in the Kennedy era (2000)

Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditional Society (1958)


Linz, Juan, “Transitions to Democracy” 13/3 The Washington Quarterly (1990): 143-164

Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (1978)


O’Donnell, Guillermo, “Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America”, in Juan Mendez et al. eds. The Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America (1999): 303-338


Pevehouse, Jon, Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization (2005)


Pridham, Geoffrey, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe (2005)


Putnam, Robert, Making democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993)

Quigley, Kevin, For Democracy’s Sake: Foundations and Democracy Assistance in Central Europe (1997)


Rueschermeyer, Dietrich, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (1992)


Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier eds., *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (2005)


Schumpeter, Joseph, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1947) (2nd ed.)

Scott, James, “Transnationalizing Democracy Promotion: The Role of Western Political Foundations and Think-tanks,” 6/3 *Democratization* (1999): 146-70


Smith, Peter, *Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective* (2005)


