Regeneration or Degeneration? Youth Mobilization and the Future of Uzbek Politics

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Regeneration or Degeneration?

Youth Mobilization and the Future of Uzbek Politics

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SUMMARY

This study analyzes the Uzbek government’s emphasis on youth mobilization as an alternative to now failing policies of post-communist patronage rule.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Patronage politics is an ever less viable strategy of political survival for Uzbek President Islam Karimov. The Andijan uprising of May 2005 is an indicator of the current regime’s inability to ensure regional elite loyalty through traditional patronage networks. Motivated by this policy failure, the Karimov leadership now seeks to mobilize Uzbek youth as an alternative base for political support.

IMPLICATIONS

Although the Karimov leadership faces growing regional unrest, the regime’s attempts to mobilize broad youth support have met with some success:

- New, independent and society-based sources of economic wealth will continue to erode the Uzbek government’s efforts to rule through political patronage
- The future stability of the Karimov regime will be defined by its ability to mobilize youth as a counterbalance to increasingly powerful regionally-based patronage networks.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ESSAY

Three sections follow the introduction:

- Patronage Politics: A Failing Policy of Balance of Power…………………………4
- New Institutions of Youth Politics………………………………………………….5
- Age and Perceptions of Mobilization and the State: Public Opinion Analysis……..10

A conclusion (p. 10) summarizes the central points of the study.
Regeneration or Degeneration?
Youth Mobilization and the Future of Uzbek Politics

Uzbekistan differs from many post-communist transitions in that, along with other Central Asian states, post-Soviet politics in Uzbekistan is characterized not by liberalization, but rather, by sustained if not increasing authoritarianism. Despite fifteen years of independence, Central Asian states continue to rely on the same strategies of rule as did their Soviet predecessors. As the May 2005 unrest in Uzbekistan illustrates, though, the success of these Soviet era strategies is not guaranteed. Instability marks authoritarian change in Central Asia just as it challenges democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, while Kazakhstan’s Nazarbaev regime, for example, has thus far proven adept in maintaining uncontested power through a mixture of state-led economic growth and patronage politics, Uzbekistan’s Karimov regime has become ever more embattled, incapable of maintaining either the loyalty of the political elite or the support of society at large. And just as democratic liberalizers in Ukraine and Georgia called on young activists during periods of struggle, so too has the embattled yet brutally autocratic Karimov government turned to youth mobilization in an attempt to limit growing contestation within Uzbekistan’s divided political and economic elite.

In contrast to Kazakh president Nazarbaev, who has used oil wealth to successfully promote an ideology of state-orchestrated economic growth and to maintain effective control over central and regional political elite, Uzbek president Karimov’s comparative lack of economic resources has eroded both his popularity and his ability to sustain patronage politics. Unable to co-opt elites, the Karimov regime has sought to divide and thereby weaken unruly bureaucrats by pitting regional identity networks and government ministerial groupings against one another. As this study details, however, inter-regional and inter-ministerial competition has had the unintended consequence of solidifying inchoate or only weakly held instrumental identities into coherent networks of political contestation and opposition. Youth politics, the attempt beginning in the late 1990s to mobilize and acculturate new, state-oriented cadres, is the Karimov regime’s response to the paradox of patronage politics, to these increasingly powerful regional and familial networks of political contestation. The ability of youth politics to counter these growing networks of political contestation, this study finds, will shape the tenure and viability of the Karimov regime.

This paper proceeds in three steps. In section one I provide a brief overview of the Karimov government’s attempts to maintain power by balancing the interests of competing regional and familial identity networks. This effectiveness of this policy, I demonstrate, though it has enabled Karimov to maintain a tenuous hold on the presidency for fifteen years, is weakening and regional elites are becoming less responsive to central government dictates. No longer able to guarantee his power through divide and rule, Karimov has turned to Uzbekistan’s younger generations in the hopes of creating a nationally-oriented elite more responsive to central government initiatives than to
regionally-based identity networks. In section two I examine three institutions—the Kamolot youth group, state-controlled political parties and the Tashkent Islamic University—so as to illustrate and explore the Karimov government’s new emphasis on youth politics. These institutions, first established or, in the case of political parties, significantly overhauled in the late ‘90s and early ‘00s, have created a cohort of young, loyal elite. What is not immediately clear, however, is how broad this pro-Karimov cohort is among Uzbekistan’s younger generations. To address this question I turn to public opinion survey data in section three and assess the effect, if any, age has on perceptions of governance. Ultimately, I do find some evidence that Uzbek youth are more admiring of the Karimov regime than are older generations.

I. Patronage Politics: A Failing Policy of Balance of Power

Scholars, both Uzbek and foreign, have devoted considerable attention to the Karimov regime’s balance of power strategy of survival. Some analysts describe this balance as one among clans, among broad networks of familial (or perceived familial) relations with each network headed by a single charismatic leader. Others argue that competing regional identities, rather than ones of blood and kin, are what drive Uzbek politics. Regardless the nature of the affiliation, the central government’s strategy of divide and rule is the same—Karimov steadily rotates elites into positions of power so as to (1) promote loyalty by distributing the riches of state (2) promote inter-regional or inter-clan competition so as to divert animosity away from Karimov’s personalized authoritarianism. Thus, for example, the Samarqand regional elite compete with the Tashkent and Ferghana groupings or devotees of Rustam Inoyatov, head of Uzbekistan’s National Security Service, unite against supporters of Zakir Almatov, Uzbekistan’s former Interior Minister, so as to win the center’s attention and material largesse.

Analysis of Uzbek political elite biographies indeed does reveal that factions, both familial and regional, do compete for key ministries and offices of power. What is less certain, however, is the long-run sustainability of Karimov’s divided and rule strategy of promoting inter-group competition. This strategy for political survival, for example, depends on the state maintaining a near monopoly on economic wealth. As soon as alternative sources of wealth emerge, the effectiveness of centrally-defined patronage networks weakens. Instead, the Karimov regime is left with an ironic paradox: regional and familial identity networks—networks which the central leadership actively cultivated as part of its balancing strategy—rapidly turn against the executive once alternative, local sources of wealth become available. The May 2005 Andijan uprising illustrates this dynamic and provides causal hints into why the Karimov government has initiated a new

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3 See, for example, Pauline Jones-Luong, *Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia* (Cambridge, 2002).

strategy of youth politics so as to break increasingly troublesome regional and familial networks of political contestation.

The Andijan protests, contrary to the Karimov leadership’s claims of religious extremism, were a product of the leadership’s failed attempts to reassert control over regional appointees and a regional population that had become more responsive to local rather than national level sources of wealth. In May 2004 Karimov dismissed Qobijon Obidov, Andijan’s governor, citing the negative effects of regionally-based “personal connections.” Karimov’s charge of corruption was an oblique reference to the growing influence a local cohort of wealthy Muslim businessmen—a group the Uzbek regime labeled Akramiya—held both over Obidov’s administration and among Andijan society more broadly. Karimov, however, was not content with simply sacking Obidov. Concerned that an administrative reshuffle alone was insufficient, Karimov proceeded to jail and eventually convict the wealthy Muslim businessmen for religious extremism—an action which precipitated the May 2005 uprising.

One case of failed patronage politics does not conclusively demonstrate that the Uzbek president faces the wholesale collapse of his divide and rule strategy of political survival. Problematically for political analysis, the Karimov regime is authoritarian and thus reluctant to publicize its weaknesses. As such, it is unclear to what extent there are other potential Andijans in Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, mass protests throughout Uzbekistan, for example in Ferghana, Quqon and Karshi in November 2004, suggest that patronage politics likely is failing and that the center is losing control over the regions. Under such conditions of policy failure, we would expect the Karimov government to pursue new strategies of control. It is in this environment of growing disaffection among the traditional, regional and familial-ordered political elite, I find, that the Karimov government has initiated its new strategy of youth politics.

II. New Institutions of Youth Politics

At the center of the Karimov regime’s new strategy of youth politics are three institutions: the Kamolot youth organization, pro-government political parties and the Tashkent Islamic University. Together, these institutions work to promote a pro-Karimov Uzbek nationalism and to limit the centrifugal pull of regional and familial identities. Importantly though, the effectiveness of these institutions varies. Though Kamolot’s reach, for example, is broad, the extent to which it promotes loyalty to the regime is questionable. The reach of political parties and, even more so, of Tashkent Islamic University, is narrow. Here however, a better defined system of rewards and penalties for each institution’s members does appear more capable of promoting pro-Karimov sentiments. Ultimately, it is the net effect all three institutions have on Uzbek

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youth which will shape the future durability of the Karimov regime—a question I address through survey analysis in section three of the paper.

**Kamolot**

For any student of Soviet politics, Uzbekistan’s Kamolot youth organization is immediately familiar. Modeled after the Soviet Komsomol, Kamolot is both an institution for the Karimov government to exert centralized control as well as a means for assimilating new cadres into the state bureaucracy. Problematically, however, whereas the Komsomol offered what many Soviet youths found to be a coherent and attractive ideology—communism—Kamolot has yet to capture the imagination and loyalty of its members.

This absence of a sustainable mobilization ideology has not deterred Kamolot’s leadership from claiming an ever growing presence among Uzbek younger generations. Kamolot’s target age group is fourteen to thirty.\(^7\) There are approximately nine million Uzbek youth between these ages.\(^8\) Of these nine million, group leader Botir Ubaydullayev estimates, half are active Kamolot members.\(^9\) Despite these vast numbers, though, for many Kamolot remains a fiction, an organization with little substance or meaning.

Kamolot’s most prominent role is that of spectacle. Though registered as a non-governmental organization, it is in actuality one of the most expansive arms of the Uzbek government. The youth group, for example, regularly partners with state ministries to stage concerts and celebrations.\(^10\) Thus, in January 2006, Kamolot and the government’s Forum on Culture and Art televised the celebration, “Voices of the Future,” in which Gulnora Karimova, the president’s daughter, along with leading Uzbek celebrities sang patriotic songs and awarded medals to young leaders in the arts, businesses and sciences.\(^11\) In December 2005 Kamolot organized a “mass marathon” from Termez to Tashkent to commemorate the thirteen year anniversary of the Uzbek constitution.\(^12\) And throughout the summer of 2005 local branches of Kamolot together with regional government administrations held departure galas for new military recruits and their parents.\(^13\) These spectacles, Kamolot’s executive secretary Said-Abdulaziz Yusupov candidly notes, are designed to promote “loyalty to the mother land and protect against

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8 The US Census Bureau estimates there were approximately seven million Uzbek nationals between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine in 2000. The nine million figure I provide is derived from estimates of the number of fourteen and thirty year olds the US Census Bureau includes in its 10-14 and 30-34 population bins. For more on the US Census figures, see [http://www.census.gov](http://www.census.gov).
religious extremism, fundamentalism and separatism.”

Absent a coherent state ideology, however, orchestrated shows of youth mobilization have yet to translate into a true mobilization movement capable of supporting the increasingly imperiled Uzbek president.

Where Kamolot has proven effective is in damage control, in limiting antagonism against the Karimov regime. Immediately following the May 2005 Andijan protests, for example, Kamolot organized mass meetings throughout the country so as to “inform [people] about the truth of what happened.” To further publicize the Karimov government’s interpretation of the Andijan events, Kamolot staged a “Patriot’s Festival” for thousands of students in Tashkent’s central stadium. And in Andijan itself, two months following the town’s mass uprising, Kamolot sought to assuage tensions and instill allegiance to the center by holding a youth celebration under the slogan, “Protect Your Motherland As You Would a Loved One.”

Spectacle alone does not constitute a viable social movement. Nevertheless, although Kamolot lacks the compelling ideology the thus the mobilization capacity of its Soviet predecessor, the Komsomol, the Uzbek youth organization has managed to increase its size by providing some measure of material incentives to its members. Most notably, Kamolot has won young admirers by opening internet cafes and free access points throughout the country. Similarly, though on a narrower scale, Kamolot has helped several hundred students and almost two thousand aspiring entrepreneurs secure loans in order to further their education and small businesses. And perhaps most important for young Uzbeks with limited means, the group provides welcome diversion through its sports clubs and summer camps.

Kamolot is a comparatively new institution. Though the youth group traces its roots to the mid 1990s, the Karimov regime began investing in it as a vehicle for youth mobilization only in 2001. As such, one could argue that it is too early to assess Kamolot’s long term potential. Problematically however, a Karimov regime which is confronting growing challenges today cannot survive by waiting for a groundswell of youth mobilization tomorrow. Instead, the Uzbek president has turned to two other institutions—political parties and Tashkent Islamic University—in the hopes of shaping a new, considerably more narrow cadres of young supporters.

Political Parties

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15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
19 “Uzbek Youth Movement Leader Says Its Ranks Increasing.”
The central challenge confronting the Uzbek government’s expansive Kamolot initiative is that returns on investment are difficult to capture. Though young students and entrepreneurs may welcome government aid, there is little indication that this aid inspires loyalty to the regime. A study conducted by the Tashkent State University of Economics in 2002, for example, lamented that talented young specialists who had received government aid for advanced studies almost always preferred working in the business world rather than sharing their expertise with younger students:

The best graduates, those whom the government has supported through the “Umid” fund and those with a mastery of foreign languages and Information Communication Technology, rarely return to their home institutions so as to help prepare the next generation of [government] cadres.\(^{21}\)

Unlike the Nazarbaev regime in Kazakhstan, which can afford to pay bureaucrats and even academics salaries which rival those in industry, there is little financial incentive in Uzbekistan for capable and honest youth to seek careers in government.\(^{22}\) And although working in industry may serve the broader good of Uzbekistan, it does not serve the immediate cadres needs of the Karimov regime.

Institutions which are capable of providing such immediate returns are Karimov’s state-run political parties. Devoid of any substantive independent meaning, Uzbekistan’s five political parties serve as conduits through which the Karimov regime can identify and promote promising young elites. In contrast to Kamolot, where the organization’s expansion undermines its institutional capacity, membership in political parties is limited and thus easily rewarded and readily policed. And in contrast to government ministry appointments, where actors may exercise real power, political party leaders provide a façade of parliamentary democracy yet hold marginal if any authority. In short, state run parties provide an ideal environment for acculturating and showcasing potential new elites before these elites enter the more contested arena of executive branch politics.

Asliddin Rustamov, leader of the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (NDPU), is emblematic of this new, pro-Karimov elite. Born in 1962, Rustamov is a generation removed from the 67 year old Karimov and the clique of Soviet-era apparatchiks who continue to monopolize power in Tashkent. Rustamov joined NDPU in 1991, joined the Samarkand regional party leadership as first secretary in 1994 and advanced to national first secretary in 2003.\(^{23}\) With degrees in literature and economics from Samarkand and Tashkent State Universities, Rustamov has the unusual ability to parse and resolve the Uzbek president’s seemingly contradictory demands. Thus, responding to the Karimov’s January 2005 call for the “normal practice” of opposition politics, Rustamov declared that he and his NDPU colleagues, though they would not “oppose the further advance of

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\(^{22}\) Kazakh civil service wages were predicted to rise by 32% in 2005 with the target goal of making civil service salaries equal to 75% of the highest salaries of employees working in state owned enterprises. For more information on the Kazakh civil service, see: World Bank, “Kazakhstan: Reforming the Public Sector Wage System,” Policy Paper No. 331707-KZ (April 2005).

market reforms in Uzbekistan…. shall try to see that the laws adopted in parliament do not pass through it smoothly and unanimously.”

Such political agility has not gone unrewarded. From his modest beginnings as a school teacher in Samarqand, Rustamov has risen to chairman of the board for one Uzbekistan’s leading financial institutions, Turan Bank.

Rustamov, though as leader of the NDPU he is perhaps the most prominent of a new generation of political elite, is by no means the only or the youngest Uzbek parliamentary deputy auditioning for higher office. Forty-seven percent of Uzbek legislative deputies are between the ages of thirty and forty-five. And of the lower house’s 120 members of parliament, none are older than the Uzbek president and only one is Karimov’s contemporary. Ostensibly a forum designed to serve the interests of Uzbek society, the parliament is equally an arena where Karimov and his supporters can watch aspiring young cadres compete for the regime’s attention. And unlike the much more dispersed and difficult to monitor Kamolot, it is here within the parliament, that a new pro-Karimov elite would be most likely emerge.

**Tashkent Islamic University**

Loyal bureaucrats, importantly, are not the only new cadres the Karimov regime wishes to cultivate. Equally important are loyal religious elites. President Karimov’s government, devoid of any coherent ideology, is vulnerable to charismatic leaders who offer a world view based on morality rather than favoritism. Uzbekistan’s imams, therefore, are of particular concern to the current government. Even if not oppositionists themselves, independent imams and their mosques can offer safe haven for the disaffected and a language of mobilization for those more inclined to protest.

In an effort to limit these threats, the Karimov regime has maintained and, in some areas, expanded Soviet era methods of religious control. As during the Soviet period, all Uzbek imams are required to pass attestation exams. Ostensibly conducted so as to ensure religious expertise among Muslim leaders, the exams are more often used to weed out free thinking or excessively popular imams. More than simply policing existing imams, however, the Karimov regime has created new institutions designed to ensure the next generation of religious leaders are as devoted to the central government as they are to Islam.

Most prominent among these institutions is the Tashkent Islamic University (TIU). Founded by presidential decree in 1999, the university differs from Uzbekistan’s older—and considerably less well funded—madrasas in that it emphasizes instruction in the sciences and the humanities as much as it does religious studies. The university’s

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26 For a complete listing of deputies elected in December 2004 and January 2005, see *Vestnik Tsentral'noi Izbiratel'noi Komissii Respubliki Uzbekistana*, No. 1-2 (11-12) 2005 (Tashkent), pp. 87-104.
27 For more on the perpetuation of Soviet methods of religious control, see McGlinchey, “Islamic Leaders in Uzbekistan,” *Asia Policy* (Vol.1, No.1, Winter 2006).
28 Author’s interview with Saidakbar Agzamkhodjaev, Dean of the TIU History Department, July 6, 2005.
pedagogy differs from that of the madrassas as well. Whereas madrassas instruct students in Islam, the religion, TIU’s approach is consciously secular; that is, students are taught the history and philosophy of Islam rather than in the inviolable truth of Islam.\textsuperscript{29} Students, in turn, convey this secular, state-defined Islam to broader Uzbek society through weekly television and radio programs. Tashkent Islamic does produce a handful of imams but the religious leaders TIU is most keen to graduate are secularized agitprops who can instruct Uzbek society in a Karimov-friendly and state-centric Islam. Accordingly, among the courses students pursue at TIU are marketing, management and the history of Islamist extremism.\textsuperscript{30}

As is the case with \textit{Kamolot} and political parties, it is difficult to access how successful TIU has been in cultivating a new generation of loyal cadres. Because TIU, similar to Uzbekistan’s political parties, engages a small proportion of Uzbekistan’s younger generations, the Karimov government’s capacity to monitor, punish and reward potential cadres is far greater here than it is with the more expansive \textit{Kamolot} organization. The ability of these cadres to spread their secularized and state-centric approach to Islam to broader Uzbek society, however, is questionable. Though the university has existed for less than seven years, religious Uzbeks already perceive TIU to be an institution for propaganda rather than a school of Islamic learning.\textsuperscript{31} To what extent Uzbek youth more broadly question’s TIU’s purpose, as well as the goals of \textit{Kamolot} and state-controlled political parties is what I address in the following analysis of Uzbek public opinion.

\section{III. Age and Perceptions of Mobilization and the State: Public Opinion Analysis}

Public opinion surveys do suggest that, at least in some areas, youth do perceive the Uzbek government more favorably than do older cohorts. A US Department of State survey commissioned in July 2002, for example, demonstrates that Uzbek youth are more likely to perceive the Karimov government as making positive strides in combating corruption than are older Uzbeks. As Table 1 summarizes, 53.5 percent of Uzbeks between the age of 18 and 24 rate positively government efforts to combat corruption while only 29.2 percent of Uzbeks 64 and older share a similarly positive view.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & 1—Very Poorly & 2—Rather Poorly & 3—Fairly Well & 4—Very Well & Do Not Know & Mean Score\textsuperscript{b} & N\textsuperscript{c} \\
(\%) & (\%) & (\%) & (\%) & (\%) & (\%) & & \\
\hline
18-24 & 16.9 & 12.4 & 33.5 & 20.0 & 16.2 & 2.69 (.09) & 153 \\
25-34 & 14.2 & 17.0 & 35.6 & 13.9 & 18.0 & 2.61 (.06) & 261 \\
35-44 & 14.8 & 19.7 & 32.8 & 13.8 & 17.7 & 2.56 (.06) & 247 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{How are state authorities dealing with the problem of corruption?}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{29} Author’s interviews with students at Tashkent Islamic University, August and November 2004.
\textsuperscript{30} Author’s discussions with Saidakbar Agzamkhodjaev.
\textsuperscript{31} Author’s interviews with the supporters of imprisoned Karshi imam, Rustam Klichev, August and November 2004. Klichev’s supporters noted that the young imam had considered enrolling at TIU but, after making a visit, concluded his religious education would be best furthered by serving as a deputy to an established imam in the regions.
Further study of the 2002 Department of State survey underscores that public opinion analysis in the Uzbek case demands considerable care. The corruption indicator of public perceptions of governance is unusual in that it is one of only a few indicators that exhibit statistically significant variation by age cohort. More frequent—and Table 2 provides an example of this—is converging perceptions of governance among age cohorts. Thus, while older Uzbeks willingly express disapproval of government attempts to combat corruption, they express markedly similar—and positive—evaluations of President Islam Karimov as do younger Uzbeks.

Table 2: Do you have confidence in President Islam Karimov?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>1—No Confidence (%)</th>
<th>2—Not Very Much Confidence (%)</th>
<th>3—Fair Amount of Confidence (%)</th>
<th>4—Great Deal of Confidence (%)</th>
<th>Do Not Know (%)</th>
<th>Mean Score b</th>
<th>N c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.81 (.04)</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.82 (.03)</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.79 (.03)</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.78 (.04)</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.63 (.07)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 &amp; Older</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.76 (.06)</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b Do not know and no answer responses not used in calculating mean scores. Standard errors are in parentheses.

c Sample size used for calculating mean scores.

It is worth noting, however, that in authoritarian settings the negative consequences for criticizing a practice are considerably less than they are for criticizing political elites. As such, we would expect that Uzbeks of all ages would be more willing to openly answer questions of corruption than they would be questions of personalized autocratic rule. In short, although respondents’ evaluations of Islam Karimov are likely distorted by preference falsification, reported perceptions of corruption may indeed be an adequate tool for evaluating varying degrees of satisfaction in governance. Viewed in this light, the corruption indicator is considerably more compelling and suggestive of the possibility that Karimov’s attempts at youth mobilization may be neither misguided nor unrealistic.

Conclusion

Uzbekistan, as do all Central Asian states, offers sobering conclusions for the study of post-communist transitions. Although Uzbekistan and its similarly autocratic neighbors need not mark “the end of the transition paradigm,” these non-democracies do suggest we
reconsider causalities of political change.\textsuperscript{32} Liberalizing transitions did not occur in Central Asia and as such, it is understandable that democratization proponents and practitioners are frustrated with what many undoubtedly perceive as the transition paradigm’s inability to deliver. Alternative approaches, however, namely those that emphasize institutional continuity, have fared little better. Indeed, much as was the case during the ascendance of another T-paradigm, totalitarianism, emphasizing seemingly unshakable “dominant-power systems” risk overlooking real political change in their explanations of autocratic continuity.\textsuperscript{33}

The strength of the transitions literature lies in its ability to identify potential causalities of political change. Where transitions studies can improve, however, is in addressing the multi-directionality of liberal and illiberal political change and, more specifically, in formulating hypotheses for why similar variables in seemingly similar cases can lead to such markedly different outcomes. The varying dynamics of youth mobilization—and social mobilization more broadly—are illustrative of this need. Thus, though the transitions literature provides compelling explanations for liberalizing social movements, scholars have devoted comparatively little attention—with the one possible exception of Islamist movements—to the question of illiberal mobilization.\textsuperscript{34}

This comparative inattention is particularly striking given that in many post-communist states political change, albeit autocratic and possibly destabilizing change, is shaped by the ability of opposing domestic elites to rally populations around competing visions and institutions of identity and patronage. The continuing struggle between the Karimov leadership’s attempts to mobilize youth broadly and Uzbek regional elites’ demonstrated ability to mobilize populations locally is only one example of this dynamic.

At the center of these competing attempts at social mobilization is what, in the introduction of this study, I identified as the inherent paradox of patronage politics—autocratic leaderships’ unintended fostering of increasingly powerful regional and familial networks of political contestation. Placating would be competitors by distributing state perquisites along regional lines strengthens regional identities and, over time, furthers the capacity of local elites to mobilize populations against the incumbent regime. The outcome in the Uzbek case has been ever more frequent political convulsions matched by equally frequent attempts by the Karimov leadership to mobilize youth as a bulwark against regional patronage networks. From a transitions and human rights perspective, one might welcome an outcome where regional elites, however steeped in patronage politics, depose the autocratic Karimov regime. Importantly though, as the failed revolution in Kyrgyzstan suggests, social mobilization, even ostensibly democratic social mobilization, need not produce democratic change. Waves of patronage politics, though destructive of old regimes, remain effective tools for new autocrats to mobilize political support.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{34} The newer literature on transnational activism is particularly helpful in identifying conditions which produce effective liberal social movements. See, for example, Sidney Tarrow’s \textit{The New Transnational Activism} (Cambridge, 2005) and Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s \textit{Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics} (Cornell, 1998) underscore causalities of liberalizing mobilization. These studies do not, however, address the question of illiberal activism.